88. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President
Carter1
Washington,
September 18,
1978
SUBJECT
Since late last year the Defense Science Board has been studying the
ICBM vulnerability problem. The
Chairman, Dr. Eugene Fubini, has just submitted the Board’s report. It
is well done and highly relevant to some key decisions we must soon
make.
Enclosed (Tab A) for your information is an executive summary of that
report. If, after reading this, you want additional background, I can
send you a more detailed (18-page) summary. I should note that the
group’s conclusions on NCA
survivability are, in my view, flawed by their lack of knowledge of our
plans relative to that issue.
While the Defense Science Board was conducting this study, similar and
related issues were being examined by three other panels: An OSTP panel formed by Frank Press; a panel of the Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board; and a university-oriented panel of the
Department of Defense knows as JASON.2
Bill Perry, Under Secretary for
Research and Engineering, met with representatives from these four
panels ten days
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ago to
determine whether the scientific community that had studied this problem
was converging on a common opinion.
There was, I believe, strong agreement on the nature of the threat, our
need to respond vigorously, and the desirability of starting a new
missile program in the near future. Participants also agreed on most of
the technical issues regarding how to rebase ICBMs for survivability, but disagreed on the best basing
mode—partly because there is incomplete information on some of the
proposals, and partly because of differing subjective judgments. A
summary of the results of that meeting is enclosed at Tab B. You might
also wish to discuss this with Frank
Press, who has been following all of these studies and,
of course, sponsored one of them.
This material is useful background for the Mid-Term Review of the Defense
Program, planned for Wednesday, September 20.
Tab A
Executive Summary of a Report Prepared by the Defense Science
Board3
Washington,
August 11,
1978
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper summarizes the major findings and recommendations of the
DSB Strategic Nuclear Balance
panel.
Current Policy and Planning
A review of official U.S. policy and guidance documents indicates
that current definitions of strategic policy objectives are
inconsistent, vague and incomplete.
Technical-Operational
[3 paragraphs (20 lines) not declassified]
- •
- ICBM survival will be
increasingly doubtful starting in the early to mid-1980’s
because of the major increase in RVs as the Soviets MIRV their ICBM
force and because of the increased accuracy being introduced in
the SS–18 and SS–19.
- •
- In view of the Soviet SLBM
threat, bomber base escape is questionable, especially from
coastal bases. Considerable improvement in
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survivability would be gained as a
result of being able to move the bombers rapidly to the [less than 1 line not declassified]
defined in the strategic bomber study.
- •
- [1 paragraph (6 lines) not
declassified]
In sum, the essential and immediate need to support a broader
“deterrence” requires increased attention to the war-fighting
capability of both our strategic forces and the C3I
systems which support them. The DSB
recommends that first priority must be given to fixing and improving
existing systems; in particular, improving the survivability of our
C3I
systems, and correcting without further delay the increasing
vulnerability of the major elements of our strategic forces.
Acquisition Policy
Establish priorities in the areas of acquisition that emphasize
improvement in survivability and endurance of existing weapons or
devices, even if this requires postponement of new starts of major
national importance. In particular:
C3I: Fix the C3I system so that it works
in peacetime and under attack.
ICBM: Rebase
ICBMs in a survivable
configuration such as a Multiple Aim Point System.
Bombers: Improve the survivability of the
bomber force by providing interior dispersal bases for redeployment
of alert B–52s (and any future strategic aircraft).
SSBNs:
Maintain the capability of SLBMs
at sea by extending the life of POSEIDON SSBNs to approximately 30 years, and back-fitting C4
missiles on most of them.
Resource Implications:
- •
- We are now at a historic turning point.
- •
- On the one side, we are committed to improving general
purpose forces at 3 percent per year.
- •
- On the other side, we must fix the deficiencies in U.S.
strategic forces or be prepared to give strategic
superiority to the Soviet Union.
- •
- The presently projected Defense budget is probably not
large enough to do both.
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Tab B
Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense4
Seminar on ICBM Vulnerability & Responses
1. Purpose
(S) [2 lines not
declassified] The impact of this threat and potential
US responses have been studied
this year under the sponsorship of a number of organizations: Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB), Defense Science Board (DSB), JASON and OSTP.
This seminar provided a forum for interchange and discussion among
representatives of these groups in an attempt to: 1) examine the
convergence of the technical community on the basic facts and
issues, 2) better focus and understand the issues, and 3) separate
the issues from the underlying technical facts. The discussion was
organized in four topic areas: 1) the threat, 2) the importance of a
US response to the threat, 3)
the most effective basing approach in response, and 4) the most
effective missile for that basing. There was also a discussion
recognizing the growing importance of Command, Control and
Communications to the SLBM and
airbreathing legs of the TRIAD in the face of the threat to the
ICBM.
2. The Threat
(S) [9 lines not
declassified] Two groups (JASON and DSB) did not examine the threat as a
part of their review, but took it as a given. The remaining groups
(AFSAB, OSTP) had reviewed the threat
analysis. Representatives from the various groups had examined the
threat in greater depth within the past two years, and found no
basis for disagreement. A more confident assessment of Soviet
accuracy (by the Soviets as well as the US), as demonstrated in
ongoing development tests, will probably require about six more
months of testing. All groups felt it would be useful to conduct an
independent threat assessment at that time, but that there was no
need to defer programmatic decisions pending results of more
detailed assessment.
3. Response to the
Threat
(C) All four panels felt it was important to respond decisively and
vigorously to the threat. Some felt the need to respond by 1983 in
reaction to domestic perceptions if not military need. Others felt
that a gap in an operationally deployed response could be tolerated
from
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1983–1986 so long as
there was evidence of a vigorous program which would be effective in
the long term. The gap from 83–86 might be tolerated by beefing up
our other TRIAD legs temporarily during this period (e.g., increased
bomber alert), recognizing that we could rely on the effectiveness
of these TRIAD legs until 1986, but that our confidence beyond then
might begin to degrade.
4. Basing Approach
(S) If a Multiple Aimpoint (MAP) approach is selected, all panels
agree that vertical shelters are the best technical implementation.
All panels agree on the following desirable features of MAP: 1) it provides a technically
sound approach to survivability; 2) it offers endurance; 3) it is
straight forward to construct; and 4) we can confidently predict its
nuclear hardness. All groups recognize the breakout problem
associated with a Soviet MAP
deployment, but there is disagreement on the degree to which a
Soviet MAP deployment exacerbates
the present breakout problem. All panels feel that mutual
verification of MAP systems will be
a difficult problem, but recognize that it can be resolved with hard
work. With respect to MAP, there is
disagreement on the expected difficulty in negotiations, the time
when negotiations would be completed, and the impact on delaying
SALT II.
(S) There is disagreement on the
relative effectiveness of alternative approaches to MAP. The OSTP panel feels that a strip alert airmobile system
with dispersed inland basing (e.g., wide bodied jet, initially with
MINUTEMAN III missiles) is the most attractive alternative, and it
would be reasonable to begin deployment of such a system by 1983. A
more effective air-mobile system (e.g., hardened aircraft with a new
missile) would be competitive with a long term MAP deployment in 1986, in the opinion
of the OSTP panel. This approach
would avoid the potential environmental and SALT problems which this panel
associates with MAP. Other panels
objected to the strip alert air-mobile approach because of its
dependence upon tactical warning, sharing many of the survivability
problems of the present air-breathing force. They also felt that a
1983 Initial Operating Capability (IOC) was unrealistic and noted that, with a 1977 start,
we were projecting a 1982 IOC for
ALCM, with B–52 modifications
as the pacing item. There was also disagreement on beginning with an
unhardened aircraft as opposed to developing a system with long term
effectiveness from the start.
(S) All panels agreed on the merits of
two potentially far term (beyond 1990) solutions. One potential
solution is a Ballistic Missile Defense system to provide
preferential defense for those MAP
shelters containing a missile. Such a system would be low altitude
and probably non-nuclear. A limited point defense system could be
consistent with the ABM treaty or,
some felt, an expanded system (1000 interceptors) could probably be
negotiated in SALT III (if
non-nuclear). The second
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potential approach is a shallow water (Great Lakes, continental
shelf) submersible system deployed in large numbers. These systems
would be small, with very small crews, and would create ASW problems drastically different
than those associated with the TRIDENT in deep waters. All groups
recommended accelerated R&D for
both concepts.
5. Missile
(C) All groups agreed on the need and importance of developing and
deploying a new missile, survivably based. However, there was
disagreement on the relative priority of initiating a new missile
development as opposed to proceeding first with a survivable basing
approach. Some panels believed that the TRIDENT II SLBM (D–5) was needed for TRIDENT and
therefore recommended starting now with the development of a common
missile. Others felt that a D–5 was not needed in the medium term,
and recommended proceeding now to obtain the flexibility offered by
a large MX.
