Attachment
Report Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation5
Washington,
November
1978
[Omitted here are the title page and table of contents.]
[Page 465]
I. Preface
In response to the NSC Directive of
August 24, 1977, subject: “Follow-On Studies for PD/NSC–18,” the Secretary of Defense initiated a DoD study to
address the following related issues:
- —
- modernization of the ICBM force,
- —
- the future of the Triad concept, and
- —
- U.S. requirements for hard-target kill capability.
This two-volume study attempts to illuminate these and related issues
of policy by focusing on broad cost-effectiveness considerations and
the factual basis underlying arguments about military requirements.
With only a few exceptions, the study does not examine alternative
designs for specific systems; nor does it explore the full range of
conceivable strategic systems. Instead, we have focused primarily on
the relative merits of illustrative forces with various deployments
of MAP-based MX, Trident II, and
Cruise Missile Carriers.
Volume II has been printed as a separate document; it contains: (1)
the full text of the study’s technical papers, (2) discussion of the
analytical methodology used in the cost-effectiveness analysis, and
(3) detailed information and results from that analysis, including
background material on costs and special nuclear materials.6
This study was conducted by the Strategic Forces and Arms Limitation
Division in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Program Analysis and Evaluation). Although the study team was
assisted by a working group comprised of representatives from the
Services, OJCS, DIA, and a number
of OSD offices, this report is a
PA&E product and has not
been coordinated within DoD.
II. General
Observations
This section describes a number of observations drawn from the study,
but avoids conclusions on matters of policy. Section II.A summarizes
observations of a general nature traceable to the technical papers
contained in Volume II. Section II.B describes the observations from
the study’s cost-effectiveness analysis.
A. From the Technical
Papers:
- 1.
- The ICBM force has played a
dominant role in the targeting of our strategic forces against
the Soviet Union, [1 line not
declassified] our forces will still be well-hedged in
their ability to destroy economic targets; however, we face a
significant decrease in our counterforce capability until ALCMs are deployed in the
mid-1980s. At that time,
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the issues will be: timeliness of response, ALCM penetration capability, and
flexibility, e.g., in other than a spasm-type war.
- 2.
- Modernizing the ICBM force
through MAP basing has some
strong rationale: to enhance crisis stability and restore the
more stable pre-MIRV situation
in which an attacker could not expect to destroy as many
missiles as he expended; to preserve the Triad concept of
well-hedged forces against non-silo targets and the unique
contributions of the ICBM
force; and, to discourage the Soviets from seeking strategic
superiority. There are also a number of concerns with the MAP concept. Among the most severe
are MAP verification (not
addressed in this study) and the sensitivity of the system and
its cost to a responsive threat. A SALT agreement limiting Soviet MIRVed ICBM throw weight and RV fractionation could go a long way toward
ensuring that a MAP system
would be affordable. Without a fractionation limit, 10-year
system costs could rise above $40B. Without a SALT agreement, there would be no
way to confidently bound the problem, i.e., the Soviets could
continuously expand the threat and we would be forced to expand
the MAP system for a given
level of survivability.
- 3.
- [1 paragraph (12 lines) not
declassified]
- 4.
- Deploying MX in existing Minuteman silos would be by far the
least expensive way to modernize our ICBM force. Among the potential advantages of this
option are: (1) it would be a clear response in kind to Soviet
acts, and might encourage them to accept more arms control and
[14 lines not declassified]
- 5.
- [1 paragraph (13 lines) not
declassified]
- 6.
- Survivability “requirements” for a MAP system should not be based on throw weight or
EMT, especially when
comparing the adequacy of different concepts such as MX in
MAP vs. Minuteman in MAP vs. the common missile in
MAP. Retaliatory
effectiveness against the current [2 lines not
declassified]
B. From the
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis:
- 1.
- A minimum modernization force (i.e., a force with Trident
SSBNs, the Trident I
missile, and ALCMs on 169
B–52Gs, but without MX, Trident II or CMCs) would cost roughly $100B in constant 1979
dollars ($45B when discounted at 10%) through the year 2000. The
cost of greater modernization would depend primarily on: (1)
decisions regarding what constitutes essential equivalence, (2)
our requirements for hard-target capability, (3) the risks we
were willing to accept regarding breakthroughs in ASW, air defense and pre-launch
destruction of bombers, and (4) the strategy we chose for
influencing the Soviets on arms control.
- 2.
- All forces considered in this analysis, including the minimum
modernization force, would provide more non-silo retaliatory
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capability against the
current National Target Base than today’s forces. The minimum
modernization force would also be as well-hedged against
force-wide degradations and against catastrophic failure of any
one component as today’s forces. This greater non-silo
retaliatory capability will be the result of planned
improvements in the SLBM and
bomber forces, including increased day-to-day alert
rates.
- 3.
- The incremental cost for “fully” modernized forces that
present a relatively strong essential equivalence picture,
provide an extensive hard-target capability, and hedge against
catastrophic failure in any force element would be $30–45B
(constant 1979 dollars); +$15–22B in discounted (10%) dollars.
Foregoing the extensive hard-target
capability could save $6–10B (constant 1979 dollars); +$2–5B in
discounted (10%) dollars.
- 4.
- There are no significant differences between Triads providing
quick-response vice
non-quick-response hard-target capability in terms of
cost, essential equivalence measures, total hard-target
capability, non-silo retaliatory effectiveness or hedging. This
issue will have to be decided on the other important factors,
primarily timeliness of response and whether or not we want to
“threaten” the Soviet ICBM
force or attempt to drive them to a mobile ICBM or more SLBMs.
- 5.
- Under the assumption (not assessed in this study) that [less than 1 line not declassified] Dyads
of Trident II and bombers (plus silo-based MM III for use in limited
exchanges) could be given much the same capabilities as
comparably priced Triads. In particular, balanced Dyads could
hedge as well as Triads against force-wide degradations of
effectiveness, and even against catastrophic failure of one leg.
Therefore, conclusions about the relative advantages of Triads
vs. Dyads depend on judgments about [2 lines
not declassified]
- 6.
- [1 paragraph (7 lines) not
declassified]
- 7.
- Given a decision to deploy an extensive QRHTC, a force emphasizing the
baseline MX in MAP basing would
be significantly more cost effective than a force with both MX
and Trident II, whether or not MX and Trident II were developed
jointly in a common missile program. However, a Triad without
Trident II would provide no hedging of the QRHTC.
[Omitted here is the remainder of the report.]
