Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

64. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)¹

Washington, June 30, 1977

SUBJECT

• PRM 28 on Human Rights

I understand that Steve Oxman now has the dubious privilege of producing a coherent draft PRM on human rights. My staff tells me that

he and Matt Nimetz have already done an impressive job in assembling disparate materials from throughout the Executive Branch.²

Even though I know that another draft is now in preparation, I do want to share some of my concerns about work done so far. (I should note also that we did not get a chance to see the first draft that was sent for interagency comment, which was also not cleared elsewhere in the Department.³ Whether or not S/P plays the role it is supposed to on PRM’s, it will be very important that the Assistant Secretaries affected be involved.)

The latest draft, we believe:

—Does not provide a clear consensus on what we mean by human rights or a clear sense of where differences exist. There is, in fact, a division between those who favor the broad approach outlined in the Secretary’s April 30 speech and those who opt for stress on crimes against the security of the person. That philosophical and practical divergence—from which operational decisions obviously flow—is not identified for the President.

—Still does not relate our human rights policy to our overall foreign policy objectives. The result is a discussion which skirts the key issue of costs and benefits for the Carter Administration. What will pressing for promotion of human rights mean in the short- and long-term for certain bilateral relations, security interests, dealings with the Congress, etc.? Conversely, how might a well-managed human rights program in fact reinforce goals in the North-South Dialogue?

—For those areas where there are serious splits of opinion, such as the use of security assistance or of the international financial institutions, what are the choices? The discussion of these contains a short list of belatedly inserted options. There is, however, no evaluation of those options pro and con or indication of which Department supports what and why.

—In yet other areas, such as those treating public diplomacy and bilateral economic assistance, there are allusions to ambitious programs to promote human rights. In neither case, however, is there a suggestion about a price tag. Do AID, USIA, CU, and PA plan to reallocate from among present and projected resources to emphasize human rights or to request substantial budget increases?

—More money suggests the need for Congressional concurrence. There is no flag raised for the President on the need to launch considerable campaigns on the Hill—both to achieve the kind of appropriations potentially implicit in an expanded basic human needs component to US policy on human rights or for such stalled objectives as Senate ratification of the UN human-rights-related Covenants and Conventions.

—Finally, there is no indication of follow-up. Although parts of the PRM allude to agendas for action, there is no discussion of what need there may be for “new initiatives” and specific action by various agencies of the Government.

Before the final text is sent to the White House, you may want to raise this subject at an 8:30 staff meeting and request all concerned Assistant Secretaries of State to give this document their personal attention. Further, it may be necessary and worthwhile to defer dispatch until all relevant bureaus and offices register their views more clearly. I feel strongly that PRM 28 must address the kinds of issues I have noted if we are to have a final product which both reflects broader policy concerns and provides a concise basis for Presidential decision.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy and Planning Staff—Office of the Director, Records of Anthony Lake, 1977–1981, Lot 82D298, Box 2, TL 6/16–30/77. Confidential. Lake did not initial the memorandum. A notation on the first page of the memorandum reads: “cy also given PHK [Paul Kreisberg]. PG [Peter Grose].” In a handwritten note to Lake, July 1, Oxman commented that he had found Lake’s memorandum helpful. He added: “Please note that the draft you were commenting on was a D/HA product neither Matt [Nimetz] nor Chris [Warren Christopher] nor I had passed upon in any way. That draft about to be completed answers many of your substantive concerns—I think.” (Ibid.)
2. In the NSC Global Issues Cluster’s June 17 evening report, Tuchman indicated that she had met with Oxman that day to review the first draft of the PRM. She added: “Oxman is very bright and a good writer, but the PRM skims over all the tough questions, and concludes that the way State is doing things now is the right way. In many areas, particularly the IFIs, I couldn’t agree less. Other issues may raise some real problems months or years from now that might be avoidable. Fundamental assumptions that should be analyzed are not, etc.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 36, Evening Reports: 5–7/77)
3. See footnote 2, Document 63.