251. Editorial Note

On September 5, 1978, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12078, formally establishing the Presidential Commission on [Page 822] World Hunger (PCWH). The Executive Order permitted Presidential appointment of 20 Americans from “public and private life” to the Commission and allowed the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives to appoint 2 members from each house. It also outlined the Commission’s charge: “The Commission shall develop factual data as to the causes of world hunger and malnutrition. It shall review existing authorities and programs, public and private, national and international, which seek to address the problems of hunger and malnutrition; and, shall assess to the extent to which those programs are meeting their objectives, and why.”

It continued: “The Commission shall develop recommendations designed to significantly reduce world hunger and malnutrition; and, shall develop various options for harnessing available resources to carry out those recommendations, including policy options for improving the capacity of the United States to reduce the problems of world hunger and malnutrition.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, pages 1498–1499)

The White House announced the appointment of 14 members to the Commission on September 12. The public members of the Commission included John Denver, Harry Chapin, Sol Linowitz, Dr. Norman Borlaug, D.W. Brooks, Dr. Walter Falcon, Dr. Jean Mayer, Dr. Steven Muller, Bess Myerson, Dr. Howard Schneider, Dr. Adele Smith Simmons, Raymond Singletary, Dr. Eugene Stockwell, and Dr. Clifton Wharton. Linowitz was designated Chairman, and Mayer and Muller Vice Chairmen. (Ibid., page 1511) The President subsequently appointed Thomas Wyman and former Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman to the Commission on November 22, 1978, and February 1, 1979, respectively. (Ibid., page 2069 and ibid., 1979, Book I, page 213) Senators Robert Dole (Republican–Kansas) and Patrick Leahy (Democrat–Vermont), and Representatives Benjamin Gilman (Republican–New York) and Richard Nolan (Democratic-Farmer-Labor–Minnesota) served as the congressional members of the Commission.

In a September 12 letter to Linowitz, Commission members Denver, Chapin, Leahy, Gilman, and Nolan described what they believed should be the Commission’s guiding principles:

“The first principle is morality. It is the most fundamental right of every man, woman and child, to live free from hunger and the fear of hunger. This most basic right must be guaranteed if other human rights are to have any meaning. The Congressional Right to Food Resolution reinforces this concept. Thus all hunger, regardless of cause, must be considered immoral. There is a practical application to this principle: the old adage, that when one is in doubt, one should always do the moral thing, is the appropriate way to resolve the potential uncertainties in our deliberations.

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“The second principle is the inherent value of the truth. Accurate knowledge is the first step towards the solution of any problem. Without the willingness to face the full dimensions of world hunger, the Commission will be unable to carry out its mandate. Truth has an unusually long life expectancy. Just as plants and water can crack or wear down the hardest stone, so the principle of truth can help us overcome the problem of world hunger. We should not let short-run expediencies distort our vision of what actually is, and what needs to be done.

“The third principle for the Commission is effectiveness. Our goal is to end world hunger, not to create more programs. We must establish criteria to evaluate past and present programs, and those that are ineffective should be discarded. Currently successful ones should be constantly re-evaluated; new programs should be tested against such effectiveness criteria.

“The fourth principle is direct, personal contact with the problem. The Commission should not be an ivory tower body, deliberating in Washington, D.C. and talking in purely technical terms about abject human misery. All the Commission members together should have first-hand experience of the realities of world hunger. Therefore, we recommend that there be in-the-field hearings both domestically and internationally.” (Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Linowitz’s Subject Files, Box 41, Meetings)

Carter agreed to attend the initial meeting of the PCWH scheduled for October 5, 1978. National Security Council Staff member Henry Owen, the White House point of contact for the Commission following President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues Peter Bourne’s resignation in July, provided Carter with talking points, the draft version of a formal press statement, and a list of Commission members. Owen highlighted the need for Carter’s attendance at the meeting, noting, “Media coverage has been minimal to date. Your participation in this opening session should draw greater attention to the Commission (which Sol very much wants) and underscore your personal interest in its activities.” (Memorandum from Owen to Carter, October 2; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 93, Food: 1978)

Following his meeting with the Commission, Carter issued a general statement on October 5, asserting that the United States bore responsibility for solving the hunger problems “not only because of our humanitarian concerns but for other reasons as well. We cannot have a peaceful and prosperous world if a large part of the world’s people are at or near the edge of hunger. So long as food shortages exist in developing countries, the possibility remains of another world food crisis like that of 1973–74. Such a crisis could trigger another ruinous cycle in [Page 824] food prices and thus contribute powerfully to inflation.” The President also outlined the Commission’s charge, noting that he remained “confident that this new venture, which will entail close cooperation between the private sector and U.S. legislative and executive branches of Government, will produce a notable advance in the war on hunger.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, page 1712)

Commissioners met formally in Washington on November 6. According to a draft decision paper prepared in advance of the meeting, the Commissioners first had to answer the question as to why the United States had “failed so far to turn the tide against increasing hunger in this country and throughout the world.” The decision paper then laid out the challenges facing the Commission:

“There are no limitations on the range of recommendations for action that can be made by the Commission, and we would not want to prejudge the end-product of our labors before we have begun to work.

“But the problem will be to identify a relatively few points of major focus—both to orient the work of the Commission to the highest action priorities and to avoid the familiar sin of producing a long laundry list of undifferentiated things to do. And for this purpose guidance can also be found in statements by the President and in the legislative history of this enterprise.

“For one thing, it is clear that the Commission is expected to make recommendations on how to go about putting our own house in order here in the United States. Whether it would be productive for the Commission to make detailed recommendations for structural changes in governmental organization is a matter for very careful consideration as the work proceeds. But the Commission is mandated explicitly to cope with the interrelationships and interactions of domestic purposes, policies and programs with global goals, obligations, and opportunities. To perceive the domestic and international aspects of food and hunger policy as inherently antagonistic would betray the charge placed upon the Commission—which is to formulate an approach to hunger and malnutrition which simultaneously supports domestic objectives, moral concerns, and the considerable task of helping other countries meet their food and nutrition needs with their own resources and expertise. This is extremely difficult—conceptually and in terms of both policy and operations. But it is the heart of the Commission’s task.

“Further, a major item that the President and Congress want the Commission to undertake is to find ways to engage more deeply and systematically the great resources of the American private sector to help turn the tide against hunger—from the business world through scientific and professional societies to church-related and other organizations inspired by humanistic concerns.

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“The legislative record is replete with references to extremely broad public support for a war on hunger. It also includes tributes to the roles of many non-governmental organizations in waging the struggle here and abroad. Indeed, the committee hearings on the Resolution calling for the establishment of a national commission heard testimony from a number of Congressmen giving credit to outside organizations for generating Congressional action in the first place.

“This part of the Commission’s assignment is a crisp call for social innovation and creative institution-building in working out a more explicit division of labor between the public and private sectors according to their respective responsibilities and capabilities.

“If the Commission can reach conclusions on how to unite our policy objectives, integrate our operating programs and mobilize our own public and private resources, it will be responding positively to the most pressing needs of the Administration and Congress under the question of what the U.S. can do to help turn back the rising tide of world hunger. For if we are seen to be putting our own house in order, we are in an incomparably better position to ask other governments to take steps which may be painful to them. In the final analysis, it is the range of actions that are taken on an international scale that will mount the major assault on hunger.” (Carter Library, RG 220, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Linowitz’s Subject Files, Box 41, Meetings)