Attached is a summary of the report prepared by the World Hunger Working
Group involving 26 agencies which you asked me to chair.
The report analyses the major causes of hunger and malnutrition and
identifies the key elements necessary to alleviate the problem. Present
United States programs are reviewed and their shortcomings identified.
—A clear concise statement of our overall policy, rather than the inferred
policy from our present fragmented programs.2
—Presidential commitment that is unequivocal, and which is communicated
clearly to the leaders of food deficient countries so they in turn will give
it a similar priority.3
—Increasing production through the development of national food and nutrition
plans, enhanced technical assistance, a general focus on the interrelated
problem of abject poverty, and reduced consumption through stabilization of
population growth.4
—Improved research, generally as recommended in the study by the National
Academy of Sciences, with a shift in emphasis towards the problems of the
developing world.5
—Commitment to a system of international food reserves to alleviate
starvation during cyclical famines, and to stablize prices during times of
shortage.6
—Expanded private sector involvement. Ambassador Young has proposed a
multinational food corps which the group supports in principle, and which is
currently being reviewed by the State Department.9
Attachment
Summary of the Report of the Interagency World Hunger
Working Group10
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY WORLD HUNGER
WORKING GROUP
Introduction
The President’s memorandum of September 29 established a World Hunger
Working Group charged with developing a set of U.S. Government policy
options designed to make a significant impact on world hunger.11 We have actively sought
the views of key agencies represented on the Working Group, the
Congress, international organizations, and more than 150 individuals and
institutions in the private sector, including farm, business, labor,
religious and philanthropic groups. This summarizes the major findings
which we hope can form the basis for a Message to the Congress at the
time the President signs
[Page 786]
the
Executive Order establishing the Presidential Commission on World
Hunger.12
The Nature and Scope of the World Hunger
Program
Hunger persists in the world today despite abundant harvests in the past
two years. One person in six suffers from chronic hunger and
malnutrition, which directly or indirectly cause nearly twenty million
deaths each year. Seven hundred million people are seriously
malnourished. Nearly half of them are children. In many countries
children under five make up less than one-fifth of the population but
account for four-fifths of the deaths. Cyclical famines, such as that
which occurred in the Sahel in 1973–74,13 take in addition
the lives of millions more. The specific causes of hunger vary from one
country to another, as do the potential solutions. However, there are
certain underlying contributing factors that exist worldwide.
—The world’s readily arable land is reaching its limits.
—Untapped supplies of fresh water for irrigation are shrinking.
—Food production in developing countries barely keeps pace with
population growth, so that most of the increases in food production are
absorbed.
—Hunger is intimately linked with poverty, and only in rare instances has
hunger been relieved without dealing with the general problems of
underdevelopment.
—Pressure on total world food supplies is growing because of increased
consumption in affluent nations.
—Distribution problems internationally and within countries are severe.
Transportation systems in many developing countries remain rudimentary.
Farmers in developed countries with only 30 percent of the world’s
population grow 60 percent of the world’s food. Lower income groups
cannot afford adequate quantities of food.
—Land tenure patterns and persistent poverty discourage improving
productivity in developing nations, by making the use of expensive
fertilizers (the cost of which is tied directly to rising energy costs),
pesticides and machinery economically inaccessible. At the same time,
land in developed countries is reaching the limit at which these
agricultural aids can increase production.
[Page 787]
—Agricultural research overemphasizes temperate zone and cash crop
agriculture, rather than food cropping needs in tropical zones. Also
there appear to be no dramatic technical breakthroughs on the horizon to
create another “green revolution”.14
—At least 15 percent of all food produced is lost post-harvest, due to
poor storage and vermin.
—Optimistic projections that the seas would become an important new
source of protein worldwide have been replaced by fear that we may be
reaching the maximal sustainable limits, and overfishing is already
starting to occur.
Solving the Problem
The problem can be solved. Reduced to a highly oversimplified form it
involves the following elements:
—Although 49 countries are defined as food deficient, the majority of
malnourished people in the world are in four countries (Indonesia,
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh). Solutions aimed at these countries will
therefore have the greatest impact on the total problem. With the
exception of certain parts of Indonesia, where the population may
already be expanding beyond the limits the land can support, these
countries have the potential to substantially increase production of
existing land under cultivation, and to solve their own problem by
establishing a stable balance between food production and adequate
consumption. An annual increase of 3–4 percent in agricultural
production, a comparable 3–4 percent annual increase in the GNP, and most importantly, a stabilization
of population growth can help achieve the goal by the end of the
century. The critical element is establishing the commitment at the
highest level in the governments of these countries. The key to the
solution lies in their ability to mobilize the prestige and status of
the political, ethnic and tribal power systems down to the lowest level
around this issue, placing it ahead of all other priorities. In many
countries this will require difficult decisions to redistribute
assets.
—While it has received considerable publicity, the Sahel involves a
relatively small part of the total problem. Unlike Asia, the primary
food source is livestock products from grazing herds that have been
devastated by cyclical severe droughts which dried up the grazing land.
This has been compounded by a steady destruction of the forests for
firewood, leading to the spread of the desert; and the use of animal
dung (which should fertilize grazing land) in place of scarce firewood.
Starving nomads are migrating to urban centers that are already unable
to feed their populations. The solution here, unlike Asia, cannot be
ar
[Page 788]
rived at alone by the
countries of the Sahel. A major international effort is necessary and is
already underway.15 It involves reducing
the devastating impact of the predictable periodic droughts by creating
domestic and international food reserves, developing improved food grain
production technologies for semi-arid areas, exploring for untapped deep
water reserves, and developing surface water supplies, reversing the
desertification process and shifting the food base away from a total
reliance on grazing animals. As elsewhere, stabilizing population growth
is critical.
—In many Latin American countries poverty and malnutrition surround
pockets of great abundance. The problem is above all else one of
internal distribution, and a need for recognition of social equality of
all segments of the population. Racial, social and economic prejudice
must be overcome. Overall economic growth and population control are
important, but the fundamental solution again requires political will
and difficult decisions.
—Increasing food supplies is almost synonymous with increasing the
productivity of currently cultivated land in the developing nations.
There are, however, a few places where the fertile new land can be
brought under cultivation; the tsetse fly belt in Sub-Saharan Africa
(assuming the tsetse fly can be eradicated), parts of the interior of
Latin America, and most important, the Sudan. FAO estimates one billion hectares of “potentially arable”
land. Exploitation of these resources could have dramatic regional
effect since the Sudan could become a major breadbasket of Africa.
—Since World War II the United States has become the unchallenged global
food supplier. While saving millions from starvation, U.S. policies may
well have had the secondary effect of reducing the motivation to make
the fundamental internal changes in developing countries that would lead
to food self-sufficiency. In the future, food exports from the United
States and the other major producers, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and
Argentina, should be used to deal with acute famine situations, and to
stabilize world food prices. In particular, it should be used to reward
those countries setting the highest priority on internal changes to
increase food production.
—The ability to increase food production is not, as we have often
believed in the past, dependent on either massive transfer of expensive
technology with heavy energy consumption or highly trained technicians,
but more upon appropriate incentives and the ability to develop
[Page 789]
culturally appropriate,
generally village-level technology. There must be more willingness to
[not?] wait for paid professionally-trained experts, even though they
are important, and more emphasis upon the immediate use of simpler
voluntary efforts stressing self-help and a sense of dedication similar
to that which allowed the Chinese to overcome their food deficit.
Status of Current U.S. Policies
Our past and current efforts to address the world hunger problem have
been marked largely by the lack of a cohesive policy and clear-cut
goals. At the World Food Conference in 1974,16 we joined other food donor nations in pledging
our support for a number of actions, but we have failed to do our part
to provide sufficient leadership. Our problems in the past have arisen
largely from our inability to separate our motivations and objectives
with regard to world hunger from the domestically inspired need to
dispose of large commodity surpluses.
At present our contribution to solving the world hunger problem involves
five loosely associated strategies, all of which have been reasonably
successful; but which have developed separately over time rather than as
part of an overall policy.
• Bilateral Development Assistance—Aimed
fundamentally at stimulating increased food production as part of
overall development. Some earlier problems have been improved by the
“New Directions” mandate established in the Foreign Assistance Act of
1973,17 which instructed the
Executive Branch to:
—give priority to programs that benefit the poor majority;
—emphasize the needs of small farmers and activities that are labor
intensive; and
—help expand access by the poor to local institutions.
• Multilateral Institutions—We have supported
multilateral institutions working in the areas of agriculture, food and
nutrition. These include the FAO,
UN Development Program, World Food
Program, UNICEF, the World Bank and
other international financial institutions, the World Food Council, and
the International Fund for Agricultural Development.
• International Food Reserve System—We have
supported a system of nationally-held food reserves to stabilize world
grain prices and to promote increased world food security.
• Food Aid Through P.L.
480—This program has been successful in providing
265 million tons of food, valued at $26 billion, to developing
[Page 790]
nations since first
implemented in 1954. However, battles over administrative control,
vulnerability to domestic grain prices rather than responsiveness to
world hunger needs, profiteering by the wealthy and influential of
developing countries, and use of the program as a tool for unrelated
foreign policy objectives have severely compromised its effectiveness in
reducing world hunger.
• Negotiation of Trade Liberalization at the
Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva—Reduction of tariff
and non-tariff barriers on products of particular interest to developing
countries are being sought in order to help them earn the foreign
exchange with which to purchase necessary food imports and promote rapid
and balanced growth.
Shortcomings of Present Policies
The President’s recent decisions to double foreign aid over the next five
years, and to target our assistance primarily to the poorest people
throughout the world represent major steps forward in our ability to
improve the effectiveness of the U.S. effort to deal with basic human
needs, and particularly world hunger. However, major impediments
remain.
—The longstanding and persistent intrusion of domestic agricultural and
foreign policy priorities into our decisions regarding world hunger has
been an impediment. While this is inevitable to some degree, at present
our motivations are not only suspect but our strategy is often
counterproductive.
—There has been no effective interagency coordinating mechanism for world
hunger policy. There are 26 U.S. agencies involved directly or
indirectly in world hunger and food issues. This mirrors the general
problem of organizational structure and development assistance that
Henry Owen is attempting to
redress. The very serious coordination and policy formulation problems
within the Executive Branch are reflected by the fact that the Congress
has assumed a leadership role in this area, producing the “New
Directions” mandate, and more recently, the Humphrey/Case Bill.18
—Some international organizations, especially FAO, have been generally ineffective and poorly
administered, severely compromising
[Page 791]
their ability to bring to bear available resources
in a coordinated strategy or capitalize on world concern about hunger.
In addition, the Americans that we have assigned to those organizations
have not always been of the highest caliber.19
—There has been a failure by the United States and other nations to
instill in the leaders of most developing countries the political will
to give this problem a sufficiently high priority. This is improving,
but remains the single greatest impediment to eradicating world
hunger.
—The overall level of commitment of resources by the developed nations
has been insufficient to meet the needs of developing countries
necessary to produce the rate of change we would like to see in the
well-being of the poor. The President’s recent decisions and increased
commitments by West Europeans will begin to remedy this, but more should
be done.
Proposed Strategies
Ideally our world hunger policy would be one that, (a) maintained our
domestic farm prices at levels high enough to ensure continued expansion
of production, (b) kept domestic consumer prices low, (c) enhanced our
balance of payments, and (d) met humanitarian objectives in the nations
where people are starving. Obviously any real policy must involve hard
compromises in some or all of these areas. People in other countries
understand the domestic dilemmas we face, and more than any specific
commitment, they want from the United States a clear concise statement
of our policy on world hunger, an understanding of the role the United
States intends to play, and an affirmation of continuous and long-term
U.S. support for alleviating the world food problem.
The key themes we should establish are:
• The right to food is the most basic of human rights. The President is
committed to providing the leadership to see that the problem is
[Page 792]
eventually solved. The
President invites the leaders of other nations to join in giving this
issue the highest priority.
• The President is aware that this must be more than a short-term
initiative, and therefore is making a long-term commitment for the
United States. There is some problem because of cynicism in the LDCs
about our past commitments.
• The key to solving the world hunger problem must be to increase food
production in those countries where hunger exists. It is above all their
responsibility to deal with their own problem.
• Hunger cannot be separated from underdevelopment, poverty, disease and
the need to stabilize population growth.
• The United States will continue to provide food for the world, but will
seek to do so in a way that is at a consistent predictable level, based
on need and free from past vulnerability to transient political
pressures.
• We will seek to use our aid in a way that provides incentives to
countries which insure that food reaches those who need it rather than
those who can pay for it; which demonstrate the will to make the
internal changes necessary to increase agricultural production; and
which implement effective programs to promote economic growth.
• We will also seek to use our food aid and contributions to
international reserves in a way that will minimize wild fluctuations in
international food prices.
• We will work to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the
multilateral organizations in their efforts to coordinate global
response to world hunger. We should encourage the involvement of third
world countries that already have expertise to share.
Tactical Considerations
In considering ways to improve the effectiveness of the United States’
effort to deal with world hunger, four preliminary issues must be taken
into account:
(1) Existing United States programs have been of varying effectiveness
and any new initiative should emphasize strengthening and rationalizing
existing efforts.
(2) The effectiveness of any future U.S. strategy to deal with world
hunger is tied to a resolution of longstanding interagency conflicts,
and the overall organization of our development assistance effort.
Because any recommendations relating to world hunger may be superseded
by recommendations Henry Owen is
now working on, and by the President’s response to the Humphrey/Case Bill, we have deliberately omitted any
organizational recommendations. We feel strongly, however, that a major
statement on world hunger should not be delayed and made hostage to
broader reorganization issues.
[Page 793]
(3) An Administration initiative on world hunger must be tied to a major
effort to build public support. The Presidential Commission will help to
do this, as will Richard
Harden’s efforts with the President’s mother and Shirley MacLaine.20 If done skillfully, we can gain spillover
effect for the larger foreign aid issue.
(4) Although our recommendations do not address the continuing problem of
hunger and malnutrition within the U.S., we feel that a world hunger
initiative must be combined with stepped-up efforts to deal with the
needs of the malnourished poor in our own nation. This is in part
reflected by the President’s commitment to establish a Commission on
Domestic and International Hunger and Malnutrition. Nevertheless, any
statement on this subject should address the domestic aspects.
Issues and Recommendations
1. Presidential Commitment
Nothing is more important than explicit Presidential leadership and
commitment to demonstrate political will and ensure that appropriate
priority is given by the agencies to overriding development
considerations, and to encourage other nations to support integrated
rural development aimed at the small farmer and landless laborer. It is
equally important that the President communicate the priority he
attaches to this issue personally to national leaders in those countries
where hunger exists. They have to believe that their stature in our eyes
is tied to their willingness to deal with hunger as a priority issue and
transmit the same message to other leaders in their governments.
Recommendation
Make an explicit Presidential commitment to the reduction of hunger,
malnutrition and poverty as a major foreign policy initiative of the
U.S., and in this way mobilize public support behind this initiative in
particular, and development cooperation overall.
2. Food Production and Consumption Strategies
Anticipating a food deficit of between 95 and 108 million tons by 1985,
poor countries must significantly increase their current annual 2.7
percent food production rate. The World Food Council meeting in
197721 reaffirmed the 1974 World Food Conference’s
target of a 4 percent food production growth rate in the developing
world as desirable and achievable.
[Page 794]
Consistent with the Congressional “New Directions” mandate and the
President’s own earlier decisions in this area, we should take certain
specific actions that demonstrate U.S. Government support for efforts to
increase production. The President has already made the commitment to
double foreign aid over the next five years. Most of what is recommended
here would fall within that planned budgetary increase.
Recommendations
• The U.S. should demonstrate this Administration’s commitment to “New
Directions” by publicly stating its support for a set of actions which
will assure that the Executive Branch is moving to implement the
Congressional development assistance guidelines.
• U.S. World Food Production and Consumption Strategies should emphasize
and strengthen the following current elements through bilateral and
multilateral efforts by:
—supporting self-help activity at local levels in rural and community
development voluntary agencies;
—providing food development experts in food deficient countries;
—pilot testing sustainable food cropping systems which promote rotation
and pest control and reduce soil erosion;
—stressing the need to conduct food production programs within the
natural resource base of developing countries to prevent loss of soil
nutrients, waterlogging and degradation of lands;
—facilitating increased production by small farmers and fishermen;
—providing technical and financial assistance to ensure that existing and
future programs include efforts to reduce post-harvest food losses (the
FY79 budget would allocate $3 million to FAO’s program on post-harvest loss);
—improving and expanding food distribution systems including
transportation, wholesaling and retailing food chains; and
—incorporating efforts in food and agriculture with related policies
designed to reduce population pressures and integrate these programs
with other development efforts such as health, nutrition and education
programs.
• Emphasize and assist in the development of national food and nutrition
plans in low-income food-deficient countries to ensure that food
production policies and actions are consistent with nutrition
objectives. Such support can be made available through AID programming; the cost can be absorbed
within planned budget allocations and the President’s decision on
foreign aid increases.
• Declare a policy of support for countries undertaking changes in
inequitable land tenure patterns. Ask also that existing international
institutions examine whether they adequately encourage such changes.
This policy should be further elaborated in the U.S. Government state
[Page 795]
ment for the 1979 FAO Conference on Agrarian Reform and
Rural Development.22
3. Research, Training and Technical Cooperation
Strategies
Science and technology are essential factors in all aspects of the food
system. U.S. Government expenditures for agricultural research have been
estimated at about $700 million annually, with an additional $350
million for similar purposes from State governments. Of the $700
million, $120 million is reportedly used for human nutrition research,
although recent Congressional scrutiny of that figure reveals that at
most, $60 million annually in Federal research funds are actually used
for that purpose. Although the private sector spends about as much on
research as does the U.S. Government, most of it is market oriented.
The National Academy of Sciences World Food and Nutrition Study on
Research reviewed this area comprehensively in a report to the President
in June, 1977.23
Among their important findings they reported that less than one percent
of global food research is done in the developing world. Much of the
research and technology originating in high-income countries has been
inappropriate for the social conditions of developing countries. Most
agricultural research has been directed towards temperate zone
agricultural production, and toward cash crops. There has been
insufficient attention to viable nutrition and intervention programs or
to local adaptation of existing technology to food production. It is
generally agreed that in addition to the capacity to adapt and modify
sophisticated technology to their own needs, developing countries also
need research on specific common problems that are likely to generate
findings which they can usefully share with each other.
Recommendations
• The report to the President of the National Academy of Sciences World
Food and Nutrition Study on Research should be used as the basis for
establishing a new strategy and clear priorities in research that relate
directly to world hunger. Those priorities should include:
—the encouragement of research on tropical rather than temperate zone
agriculture;
—the nurturing of indigenous agricultural research capability in
developing countries;
—the development of culturally and socially appropriate technology
including focus on methods to achieve reduction in post-
[Page 796]
harvest food loss through improved storage
and low cost methods of food preservation and conservation; and
—expansion of U.S. and LDC research into
food prices and grain reserve management systems with greater emphasis
in general being given to the social and behavioral sciences
approach.
• The U.S. should expand food and agriculture research (the NAS report recommends an amount of $120
million) targeted to developing countries needs, bilaterally and through
the Consultative Group on International Agriculture Research.24 There should also be a reallocation
of funds from existing programs to those with greater impact on the
hungry portions of the population both domestically and
internationally.
• The U.S. Government should prepare for the 1979 UN Science and Technology Conference25 a proposed international set of guidelines and
proposed funding for research and technical collaboration in solving
problems of world hunger.
• Since the current responsibility for agricultural research of potential
benefit to developing countries is diffused throughout a number of
agencies (including USDA, HEW and AID), OMB should accord
high priority in its review to this aspect of its reorganization study
of food and agriculture policy and recommend to the President by
September 1, 1978, a plan to improve coordination of research efforts in
this field.
• The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) should head an interagency review of all the major
recommendations from the National Academy of Science’s study on food and
agricultural research and submit a report accompanying the OMB paper on research organization
recommended above. The results of the review should be reflected in the
FY80 budget submissions of the appropriate departments and agencies.
4. An International System of Food Reserves
A food authority was discussed at the end of World War II but was not
created. More recently, the 1974 World Food Conference called for the
establishment of a world food reserve system. Recognizing that food
reserves dropped from 90 days’ supply in 1971 to 30 in 1975
[Page 797]
(though current foreseeable
harvests have now raised this to 45 days), 72 governments, including the
United States, have endorsed the FAO-sponsored International Undertaking on World Food Security
designed “to avoid acute food shortages in the event of widespread crop
failures or natural disasters”.26
Reserves in one form or another have been called for in various
international settings: The Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly,27 the World Food Conference, the World Food
Council, UNCTAD, the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, and the International Wheat Council. In the United
States last year the President signed the Food and Agriculture Act of
197728 which has several
reserve provisions.
The International Emergency Food reserve would be a U.S. resource to back
up our food aid program. Its 2–6 million tons of grain (preferably 6
million) could also become the U.S. component of an eventual world food
reserve for the protection of developing countries. Having encouraged
the Administration to create such a reserve, Congress is now considering
legislation to specifically authorize it. On August 29, 1977, the
President made the decision to establish a 6 million ton reserve.29 However,
the Administration’s bill, or even the Administration’s position on the
Congressional bill, has been held up for more than five months in
interagency discussions. As a result, valuable time is being lost and
the credibility of the Administration undermined on the Hill and in the
private sector.
The domestic market stabilization reserve has also been delayed, largely
due to issues regarding the trigger mechanism for the purchase and
release of grain. As in the former instance, USDA, along with Congressional, farm, industry and world
hunger groups, have supported the creation of such a reserve and have
become increasingly uneasy that the process is not proceeding with
dispatch. USDA has the authority to
provide additional incentives to farmers to reseal their grain under the
program. The Secretary of Agriculture’s actions during the week of
February 13th, which increased incentives for farmers to participate in
this program (increased Federal storage payments), repre
[Page 798]
sents a welcome step.30 However, in the absence of
continuous surveillance and commitment on this matter over the next
year, the Congressionally mandated minimum amounts of wheat and
feedgrains required to be resealed under this program will be difficult
to meet. With the time being propitious for the placing of farmer-held
stocks under government loans, with world demand and prices capable of
rising in the future, and with world food security still plaguing many
developing countries, now is the time to act.
Many reasons are put forth for establishing grain reserves: to provide
reasonable price stability for U.S. farmers and consumers; to take care
of natural disasters such as the Sahel famine; to provide food security
for developing countries that are trying to improve agricultural
production; and to reduce price fluctuations in the world market. While
all of these purposes may not be fulfilled by a single reserve system,
it does not seem necessary to wait for a reconciliation of all of them
before taking action on any one of them. Establishing food reserves at
both national and international levels, with either centralized or
decentralized management, should be included in our overall plan.
The United States now faces large surpluses in major grains and announced
a set-aside of up to 20 percent of U.S. acreage planted for wheat and of
various other percentages for feed grains. The 35 million metric tons of
wheat alone which the United States will carry over into the next crop
year represents roughly half of the total world wheat trade, more than
one-third of the world’s carryover, and about 9 percent of the world’s
consumption. The United States clearly has the capacity and should play
a leading role in establishing and maintaining two reserves: a
food-security reserve and a reserve for stabilization of the
international grain market.
Recommendations
• Establish a U.S. food security reserve of up to six million tons. A
draft Administration bill is already under review by the Food and
Agriculture Policy Committee. A request by the President for a draft
bill on his desk by March 1st will ensure no further delay.
[Page 799]
• Direct USDA to follow up on the
action to increase farmer incentives to assure that at least the minimum
amounts of grain (wheat and feed) mandated by the Congress are under
loan by the required time so that a farmer-held domestic market
stabilization reserve will provide a certain amount of much needed world
food security for developing countries.
• Pledge 25 percent of the next annual replenishment of the UN emergency gain reserve. The U.S.
contribution would be up to 125,000 tons, and could be supplied under
the emergency relief provisions of P.L.
480, Title II at no additional cost.
5. Improve the Management of Our Food Aid
Program
Many Americans think of world hunger as simply a shortage of enough food,
and look to U.S. food aid to provide an immediate and adequate response.
Since 1954, when P.L. 480 was
enacted, 265 million tons, valued at $26 million, have been made
available on grant or concessional terms to various nations. There is
little question that there is a continuing need for U.S. food assistance
for the foreseeable future.
In recent years, as world hunger has come to be perceived as a chronic
condition in the developing world, some have questioned the desirability
of continued massive P.L. 480
shipments. Others feel that an expanded P.L.
480 program is needed, but much of this comes from farm
groups who want to see a market maintained for agricultural surpluses.
Significant legislative changes have been made in the last decade to
align P.L. 480 more effectively with
the needs of the hungry. Since 1974, U.S. food aid policy has moved in
directions recommended at the UN World
Food Conference, although still further changes are required if we are
to realize progress in reducing hunger and malnutrition and answer the
criticism of development advocates that U.S. food aid is no more than a
commodity export program.
Major problems remain in ensuring that food aid reaches the most needy,
effectively meets emergency needs, and contributes to advancement of
LDC development objectives. In
order to meet the President’s mandate that our aid reach the poorest
people, it will be necessary to streamline the currently cumbersome
decision making process used in administering the U.S. food aid program.
The President has made a highly important decision in setting a minimum
U.S. commitment to contribute 4.47 million tons annually under the new
Food Aid Convention.31
[Page 800]
Recommendations
• Direct that the Food and Agricultural Policy Committee recommend
administrative reforms to ensure that P.L.
480 better serve development and humanitarian purposes in
chronic food-deficit developing countries. These changes should include
accelerating the utilization of the Food for Development Authority
(Title III),32 provide cash and
other incentives to make food aid more developmentally oriented, make
Vitamin A and iron (and technical assistance and technology) available
to countries for fortification purposes, and streamline the
administrative process.
• Direct the Food and Agricultural Policy Committee to recommend
legislative changes to improve the development nature of P.L. 480. Simultaneously, it should also
consider separate farm export legislation to ensure that market
development for U.S. commodities remains a major objective, with
assurances that it will be pursued in ways which do not undermine the
developmental purposes of P.L.
480.
• Direct the Food and Agricultural Policy Committee to study the
following issues and make recommendations to the President by September
1, 1978:
—the costs and benefits of an expanded food aid program in relation to
such considerations as U.S. domestic food prices, the need for U.S.
acreage set-asides, price, support payments to U.S. farmers, and
environmental effects;
—the relative efficiency or complementary nature in the LDCs of U.S. food
aid in relation to capital and technical assistance and their
comparative availability vis-à-vis food aid; and
—the value and acceptability of various schemes to deal with crop
shortfalls in developing countries through food import bill insurance
and the establishment of buffer stocks.
6. Pursuing Trade and Investment Policies
Favorable to LDC Needs
Those aspects of the problem of hunger and malnutrition discussed in
previous sections have led to recommendations for measures to improve
LDCs’ lack of foreign exchange and capital to import sufficient food
supplies and agricultural production inputs and technology.
The self-reliance of the LDCs depends in the long run on their capacity
to earn and to attract the necessary capital resources. Interna
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tional trade and foreign
investment are the primary international economic vehicles for
establishing longer run LDC economic
capability to deal with their hunger problems. The magnitude of trade
with and investments in LDCs far exceeds official development resources
and therefore has a significant potential for contributing to world
hunger solutions. Trade barriers exist which inhibit food supplies. And
similar barriers exist for food imports which act to inhibit
distribution of food to the poor. In addition, U.S. foreign investment
by multinational corporations often conflicts with developing country
needs for access to food for the poor.
The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is currently involved
in negotiations of tariff reduction on agricultural and industrial
products, including those from developing countries. It is expected to
conclude the latter part of 1978. Despite general agreement on the
importance of trade and investment to developing countries and the need
to address these issues as part of a world hunger initiative, no clear
direction, much less agreement, emerged from the World Hunger Working
Group regarding what specific steps should be undertaken by the U.S.
Government. Considerable concern, for example, was expressed by several
agency representatives about the economic costs to this country of major
changes in trade and tariff policies and the domestic political
difficulties which trade policies favorable to LDCs would encounter.
Recommendations
• That the President direct that the Food and Agricultural Policy
Committee, with other affected agencies, prepare a report for the
President by September 1, 1978, which assesses the impact of U.S. trade
and investment policies on hunger and malnutrition among the poor in
developing countries and recommends appropriate steps to be taken by the
U.S.
• In connection with the above recommendation, and following the
conclusion of the Tokyo Round, the Office of the Special Trade
Representative and other appropriate agencies should review the
implications of its outcome for developing countries and recommend
additional steps in the area of trade which the U.S. should take to
enhance their ability to reduce hunger and malnutrition.
7. Improving and Expanding Private Sector
Involvement in Development
One of the distinctive features of American life is the ethos of
voluntarism. In addressing emerging social issues, Americans generally
look in the first instance to local, civic and private associations and
only later to government.
Private organizations provide a major vehicle through which Americans
express their active concern for meeting human needs
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abroad as well as at home. Recent data
indicate that Americans now contribute, for overseas relief and
development to the private agencies of their choice, as much money each
year as the U.S. Government provides in bilateral assistance through
AID. Land grant colleges and
universities, research institutions, foundations, and other private
agencies have also been active in overseas efforts directed toward the
needs of hungry people. People-to-people efforts have always had a
special appeal to developing countries.
U.S. policy has generally sought in specific but modest ways to draw on
the strength of the U.S. private sector in meeting basic human needs
overseas. Recent legislation has directed the U.S. Government to
facilitate the work of indigenous non-governmental groups in interested
LDCs. However, the U.S. Government has been considerably less creative
than other industrialized nations in supporting private sector efforts.
The U.S. private sector remains one of the distinctive resources which
the U.S. can make more fully available to other nations.
The establishment of the Presidential Commission on World Hunger will be
an important element in creating a sense of involvement for private
voluntary groups, as well as generating publicity and momentum
generally.
Recommendations
• The U.S. should establish high-level focal points in USDA, AID, State and HEW for
private sector involvement liaison, and enlist the participation of
informed private sector representatives in periodic advisory meetings
with key departmental and Executive Branch food and development policy
decision-making mechanisms (e.g., the Working Group on Food and
Agricultural Policy and the P.L. 480
Task Force33 mandated in recent
legislation).
• The Agency for International Development should establish an
information clearinghouse on all U.S. Government activities concerned
with World Hunger. It should publish periodic reports for dissemination
to private sector groups interested in this information.
• The U.S. should create a special grant program for U.S. PVO’s to establish voluntary activities in
the developing countries which are designed to reduce hunger and
malnutrition and related development problems.
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8. Food Corps
Last fall in a speech to the FAO meeting
in Rome, Ambassador Young proposed the establishment of an international
food corps. There are some problems with such a concept and an
interagency committee has been meeting over the last several weeks to
iron them out. The group will submit a decision memo to Secretary
Vance this week.34
We do not want to preempt this process, but do feel the U.S. should
support the general concept of an international corps of rural
development volunteers, and make a commitment to provide financial
assistance to those nations or multilateral organizations willing to
establish indigenous rural development corps programs.
