Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

237. Letter From Orville Freeman to the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne)¹

New York, November 4, 1977

Dear Dr. Bourne:

Your October 5th letter² was on my desk when I returned from an extended trip in Asia. I would like to respond in considerable length to all five of the questions to which you direct my attention.³ However, your letter calls for response by October 21st, so let me quickly summarize where the first four areas you name are concerned by emphasizing, as I sure others to whom you have written will do, that the key is “political.”

I could name on the fingers of one hand the developing countries where strong and determined programs to accomplish the necessary increase of food production and distribution have been carried out. Historically, few political leaders have had the will or strength to develop and carry out the necessary programs to affect the major changes that are essential if the long and complex chain of relationships, running from land ownership to finance, inputs, technology application, production, storage, processing, and, finally, marketing is to be altered in a fashion designed to accomplish the necessary increase in productivity. In my judgment, the President could do nothing more important for the food and hunger cause than to press, in every way possible and on all occasions personally, on the chiefs of state that they must put their “back” into agriculture and food development. No country in history (except a few city-states), has enjoyed marked economic progress without a vigorous and successful agricultural base. As you are well aware, only about half of the good land in the world is being used, and probably only about one third of the technology is currently effectively applied. The “makings” are all there; what is needed is the political will to put together and carry through programs (including outside support) to expand production and distribution in the country where it is needed. The political risk to do so is usually high and payoff in visible results comes slowly.

In question five, you refer to private investment in low income countries, and in the last sentence of the first paragraph of your covering letter you call for participation of the private sector.⁴ This is, of course, elemental, for most of the applied agricultural technology is held in the private sector and the ability to efficiently apply that technology is peculiarly within the private sector. The problem, of course, is that the risks and the potential for return are disproportionate. In a world that is largely capital and technology short, under present circumstances private sector leadership feels compelled to apply their limited resources in areas more likely to bring returns to the shareholders to whom they are responsible. Here, again, a clear, sharp, powerful commitment by the political leaders at the very highest level in the countries that are most desperately in need is necessary. Assurances that commitments made will be met, and that support committed will be forthcoming, and that cooperation, up and down the line, is assured, are necessary. Such has seldom been forthcoming, with commitments frequently breached, although solemnly entered into. I believe it can be fairly said that most multinational agribusiness companies wish to invest in less developed countries and recognize their responsibilities to contribute to the world hunger problem. Attention should therefore be given—carefully and methodically—to the conditions under which they are able to meet their responsibilities to their shareholders and still involve themselves in the hunger problem in the developing countries.

For some years I have been advocating that there should be somewhere a cadre of highly experienced and competent business political leaders who have had experience and credibility at the highest levels, in both public and private sectors. Such professionals could play the part of “honest brokers,” identifying opportunities in developing countries, and notifying companies who have the technology and knowhow to meet that need. They must, of course, be able to reach leadership at the very highest level in both government and the private sector. By definition, their credibility must be the highest, so that they can bring about a thorough examination of the potential on both sides of the project in question; i.e., in government and by multinational agribusiness companies. Once the possibilities are called to the attention of top leadership in both private and public sectors, the negotiations, looking to results, will take care of themselves. Attention might also be given to some effective backing by the US Government or an international organization so that the kind of protection that has been extended by the US OPIC program; i.e., insurance against various contingencies, might be put in place. Some capital inputs or credit availability might also help in consummating agreements.

These are just a few observations, hastily dictated. I also presume to include an article which appeared in the United Nations publication, Development Forum, on the possibilities for reaching and training small cultivators.⁵ Many variations of this are possible.

So far as direct food aid is concerned, there are many more expert than myself. It is necessary, but very difficult to manage so that real people-needs are met without depressing prices for farm products in the marketplace. The importance of price and resulting return as an inducement to using proper technology should be given top priority. Over the years, the mistake of following a cheap food policy for humanitarian reasons, with resulting low market price and no progress on the production front has been made again and again. I can say quite factually that “I have met farmers all over the world who can’t read or write, but never one who can’t count.”

I hope this brief response to your inquiries is helpful. Good luck in your very important project.

Sincerely yours,

Orville L. Freeman

1. Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Central Files, AG 8, World Food Problem. No classification marking. In a November 7 note to Mondale, Freeman wrote that he had sent the letter to the White House. (Ibid.) The letter is typed on stationery of the Business International Corporation of which former Secretary of Agriculture Freemen was President and CEO.
2. Reference is to an October 5 letter Bourne sent to various addressees; see Document 231. A copy of Bourne’s letter to Freeman is in the Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Central Files, AG 8, World Food Problem.
3. Reference is to the five “possible hunger policy areas” outlined in an attachment to Bourne’s October 5 letter. (Ibid.)
4. The fifth policy area listed in the attachment, Trade and Investment, posed the question: “How can U.S. trade and investment policies facilitate access of the poor to food?” (Ibid.)
5. Not found.