Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

209. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, March 1, 1977

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON KEY GLOBAL ISSUES

I. Introduction and Overview

This report assesses the significance for the US of selected global issues. It is most immediately concerned with the international political implications of recent and prospective developments in the areas of (1) energy dependence, (2) LDC demands for a “New International Economic Order,” (3) food and population, (4) terrorism, and (5) nuclear proliferation. The report is designed to assess the impact of these global issues, both individually and collectively, on general trends in international relations as well as on specific US interests. What challenges do the issues pose for the US in terms of threats and opportunities, policy constraints and choices?²

Although the issues chosen for study are each distinctive in important ways, they do have some notable common characteristics:

—While none is a new concern in the strictest sense, all have taken on increased prominence for the US over the past decade—some dramatically so, as in the case of dependence on imported oil.

—While each is global in that it affects US relations with nearly all countries, the most immediate policy focus as a rule is US relations with nonindustrial countries (the LDCs).

—The issues all have vital economic or technological aspects.

—They represent direct or indirect challenges to the influence and freedom of action and potentially to the wealth and power of the industrial democracies and at times of the Communist powers as well.

—Since the manner in which the major countries manage these issues will affect global and regional power relationships, they also represent opportunities to optimize relative influence and freedom of action—not least for the US vis-à-vis traditional adversaries and allies.

A systematic explanation of whether and how these key global issues are either causes or symptoms of a “new era” in international relations would be well beyond the scope of this brief introduction. The common characteristics listed above, however, underscore the importance of several relatively recent and closely related developments affecting world politics, which, in turn, help to explain the prominence of the issues selected for study.

First, the industrial democracies face increased domestic obstacles to controlling developments much beyond their peripheries, especially where the use of military power overseas or large amounts of economic assistance would be required. This abatement of domestic support for an assertive foreign policy reflects (1) a decline in the perception of immediate security threats associated with the height of the Cold War, (2) disenchantment with the costs and risks of extensive overseas involvement, and (3) constraints caused by slower rates of domestic economic growth amidst intensifying demands for social and economic benefits.

Second, these domestic inhibitions on assertive foreign policies, together with the growing wealth and regional influence of certain LDCs (e.g., Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Venezuela) and the rise in assertiveness concerning their “rights” on the part of LDCs generally, have contributed to a diffusion of power in international relations. Even as the wealth and military power of the industrial nations increase on an absolute scale, their ability either to control or to ignore global problems is constrained. This is manifested most clearly in the increased frequency and effectiveness with which the nonindustrial countries, individually and collectively, challenge the general authority and specific policies of the industrial powers. The ability of certain transnational or nonstate actors (e.g., the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), terrorists, multinational corporations) to influence events augments the tendency toward power diffusion.

Domestic and external constraints to some extent affect the efficacy of an assertive foreign policy on the part of the USSR and China as well as the industrial democracies. While the Communist powers may at times attempt to take advantage of opportunities for foreign adventure (as in Angola), their cost-benefit calculations are also conditioned by domestic problems and by the diffusion of power, especially in regard to the growth of nationalism among LDCs and even within the Communist parties of many countries.

Third, the heightened sensitivity of the industrial democracies to their dependence on imported oil and other raw materials, the periodic reliance of the Communist powers on imported technology and food, and the persistent economic strains in nearly all LDCs have helped to politicize a wide range of international economic issues. The growing sensitivity to economic pressures of nearly all countries is reflected in intensive high-level “bargaining” on economic issues not only between industrial and nonindustrial nations, but also among the industrial democracies and between them and the Communist powers.

Finally, the three broad trends summarized above have produced increased complexity and uncertainty in international relations. In part, the complexity reflects the growing interconnections among global issues (for example, among energy dependence, LDC demands, and nuclear proliferation). It also reflects the strains global problems place on harmonious alliance relationships, because of the varying degrees of sensitivity and vulnerability to these issues among the industrial democracies, and on the management of crises in the Middle East and elsewhere. As a result, the difficulties of dealing with any of the global issues singly are, as a rule, magnified by the reverberations among related issues. The difficulties of attempting “national solutions” to one or all of the issues are similarly increased.

As previously mentioned, the causal relationships among global issues and international trends are difficult to align with confidence. What does seem clear, however, is that the need to manage these global issues effectively—whether to reduce risks or optimize opportunities—will remain a central challenge to US foreign policy at least for the remainder of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Such issues will represent an important part of the international agenda in their own right. In addition, as the following chapters will demonstrate, they will have an important and at times major role in shaping the character of our relations not only with LDCs but also with traditional allies and adversaries. On each of these issues, the individual industrial democracies and Communist nations have their own calculations of risk and opportunity which can serve not only to frustrate immediate US objectives but also to complicate East-West and alliance relationships generally.

Despite these explicit and implied limitations to freedom of action, the US (especially in the context of basically harmonious relations with the other industrial democracies) remains the single most powerful and influential country in the international arena. Most LDCs remain poor, weak, and problem stricken and thus potentially susceptible to US influence and power when the latter are clearly delineated and forcefully projected. Countries with some of the attributes of wealth and power remain highly dependent in key areas (e.g., the oil-rich countries for technological development and military security). And while the Soviet Union is a superpower in strategic military terms, it generally cannot match potential US influence and freedom of action vis-à-vis global issues when it comes to economic wealth and power, technological prowess, and alliance and other diplomatic networks. Therefore, although the US can now rarely expect to control the outcome of complex international events to the extent it did from the late forties to the early sixties, its ability to affect how global issues will be addressed and what kinds of bargains may be struck is still impressive.

[Omitted here is information unrelated to food and population policy.]

World Food and Population Trends

Individually and in combination, food and population trends are likely to complicate the definition and pursuit of US foreign policy interests. Production increases in the last couple of years have eased the pressure on global food supplies as compared with the early 1970s. But the world is likely to remain in a period of food uncertainty—where many countries cannot be confident of consistently adequate supplies—for at least the next decade. And the US may have to decide how to distribute its agricultural bounty as against competing political, economic, and humanitarian concerns.

The discretionary allocation of food exports would probably involve opportunities to exercise international political leverage. At times, US positions on global problems might be enhanced. The utility of such leverage would depend on the interaction of a number of complex considerations, however. And during a period of food uncertainty, only rarely would it be capable of effecting fundamental changes in the basic domestic or foreign policies of other nations.

There is a small chance that several decades hence the world could move into a period of chronic food scarcity (e.g., because of climate change). The potency of US food leverage would increase dramatically if stockpiles were exhausted and food production was insufficient for a prolonged period. But, in this unlikely event, threats to US interests posed by the impact of food-related issues on international politics would become more intense and dangerous. Strident LDC demands for their “fair share” of a scarce resource—even the employment of terrorism and “nuclear diplomacy” to affect US decisions—might result, for example.

In addition to its impact on the precarious balance between food supply and demand, world population growth is likely to contribute, directly or indirectly, to domestic upheavals and international conflicts that could adversely affect US interests. Population growth will also reinforce the politicization of international economic relations and intensify the drive of LDCs for a redistribution of wealth and of authority in international affairs. Over the long term, the ecological and environmental consequences of population growth might physically threaten US interests. Implementation of long-term goals for slowing world population growth will at times necessarily come into conflict with such immediate requirements as maintaining stability in and effective ties with certain poor countries.

[Omitted here are two short segments on terrorism and nuclear proliferation, Chapter II: Energy Dependence, and Chapter III: LDC Demands for a “New International Economic Order” (NIEO).]

IV. World Food and Population Trends

A. The Setting

In the early 1970s, unfavorable weather, crop failures, massive Soviet grain imports, the depletion of grain reserves, declining fish catches, and skyrocketing food prices caused an unprecedented focusing of international attention on the precarious balance between food supply and demand, and politicized the issues of population growth and food distribution. As the world’s pre-eminent food exporter, the US is uniquely situated to realize significant gains—and imposing problems—from increasing international reliance on its agricultural production. This dependence could help the US manage some of the global issues discussed in this report and increase US influence over international affairs generally, but world food and population trends portend threats as well as opportunities. Interconnections between population and food-related developments and other global issues, moreover, complicate the challenges that the US will face in foreign policy generally.

B. Food: The Dynamics of Demand and Supply

Worldwide demand for food is rising primarily because the earth’s population increases by some 65–75 million each year. This increase stems in large part from the failure of birth rates in the populous LDCs to decline as rapidly as have death rates. The tremendous reservoir of young people in these countries constitutes a momentum that will keep their populations expanding for decades even if they suddenly achieved a preponderance of two-child families, i.e., “replacement level” fertility.

Estimates of the earth’s population (now some four billion) in the year 2000 range from about six to over seven billion. Population projections vary according to different assumptions about whether, when and under what conditions fertility in the developing countries will drop to complete the so-called “demographic transition,” the movement from high to low birth and death rates. Experts disagree over the extent to which the demographic transition experienced in the past by the industrialized nations will be indicative of trends elsewhere. Population projections also are undependable because they implicitly exclude unpredictable events like massively destructive war, widespread famine, pandemic disease, and natural disaster.

Demand for food depends not only on population growth but also on individual affluence, wants, and tastes. As personal incomes rise, people tend to seek variety in their diets and to increase protein content through, for example, greater consumption of meat. The availability and price of the food items people want regulate their ability to indulge these desires. The ability of suppliers to respond to an increase in demand induced by affluence is limited by patterns of trade, economic conditions generally, and by food-related decisions by national leaders—especially by those in charge of centrally planned economies.

Demand for food clearly is on the rise, but precisely how far and how fast it will go is problematical. Uncertainty over demand naturally complicates forecasts about the ability of food supply to keep pace.

In physical terms, there is great potential for dramatic food production increases in the LDCs. The wide gap in per acre yields between farms in the developed and developing countries can be narrowed by increased incentives to producers, expanded investment in technology and fertilizers, and more intensive cultivation.

But there also are considerable political, economic, and cultural impediments to increased production. These include the high cost of energy and fertilizer, inefficient land tenure patterns, disincentives to farm production caused by national policies aimed at keeping food prices down in urban areas, and reluctance by national leaders (who tend to equate development with industrialization) to expend limited resources on agriculture. In some instances, (e.g., Indonesia) poor agricultural practices such as deforestation and overgrazing are resulting in immediate production increases, but they are threatening the basic ecosystems upon which food production depends and are likely to have severely counterproductive consequences in the long run.

Technology and climate figure heavily in the outlook for supply, especially over the long term. New food production techniques, such as those using hydroponics and single-cell proteins, eventually could be of great importance if proven technically, economically, and esthetically feasible. A change in world climate that impacted negatively on traditional food sources, however, might more than offset any technological gains. Climatologists hold widely varying opinions on the direction, pace, and permanence of climate change, and there is no consensus about the interaction of natural and man-made causes. Most knowledgeable observers agree, though, that it would be unwise to count on an indefinite continuation of the climate of the last half century or so, which has been unusually stable and favorable for agriculture.

Food supply in any given year will also depend on the size of carry-over stocks. Generally strong world agricultural performance over the past couple of years has made some stockpiling possible, but it has also helped dissipate an international sense of urgency about the future. With immediate sufficiency in production breeding complacency about long-term trends, prospects for the establishment soon of an international grain reserve (or even an international system of nationally held reserves) are not particularly promising. Stockpiles, therefore, probably will continue to be held mainly on an ad hoc and transitory basis.

C. Food Supply—Uncertainty and Scarcity

The unpredictability inherent in each component of the balance of world food supply and demand is compounded when one attempts to project how the components will interact in the future. It is the assumption of this study, however, that the world already has entered a period of food uncertainty in which it is likely to remain for at least the next decade. The world has, to be sure, always lived with some uncertainty over food supplies. Because of its interconnection with other global issues, however, the scope and international political impact of the current situation are much greater.

A significant number of nations, to varying degrees, cannot now take for granted their ability to produce or procure enough food to meet—in the case of poorer countries—basic subsistence requirements, or—in the case of more affluent food importers—desired nutritional standards. There will of course be year-to-year variations in world food supply during the period of food uncertainty. A coincidence of good harvests will at times mean relative abundance and some stockpiling, but there may also be crop failures and famines. The extent of malnutrition and localized starvation will also fluctuate, but both are likely to be ever present.

The period of food uncertainty could continue indefinitely, or it could end in dramatically different fashions. Increased production and advances in technology might combine with a slowing of world population growth to usher in an era of assured sufficiency of supply. Should population growth and other demand factors outstrip food production and exhaust stockpiles, however, the world might move from food uncertainty to a period of chronic and widespread food scarcity that could have severe human consequences.³

Foreign dependence on US agricultural production is increasing. As long as the period of food uncertainty persists, demand for US food exports will probably fluctuate within relatively high parameters. Income from foreign food sales will contribute to US economic strength and to foreign perception of its overall strength as a world power.

The possession of plenty amidst uncertainty will also give the US an opportunity to derive political influence from the discretionary allocation of its agricultural exports, i.e., the ability to decide to whom to sell or give food. Assuming US willingness and ability to use food as an instrument in international politics (discussed below), its effectiveness as leverage will hinge on the interplay of a number of complex considerations.

Foreign countries’ preoccupation with food supply and the extent of dependence on US production will vary from time to time and place to place. Food leverage stands to be more effective when applied to countries that are vulnerable, rather than merely sensitive, to an interruption in imports from the US. The distinction will be conditioned by such factors as the use to which the imports are put (e.g., the proportions used for human consumption and livestock feed), the importing country’s capacity to produce more, its wherewithal to purchase substitutes (provided they are available), and its ability to simply do without. Attitudes of national leaders toward high prices, shortages, hunger, and popular discontent could determine their judgment of how essential imports from the US are to them, and hence their country’s potential susceptibility to food leverage. In some areas in Africa and South Asia, for instance, malnutrition, starvation, and even famine might be viewed as neither unusual nor particularly disruptive politically.

The effectiveness of US food leverage during a period of food uncertainty would also depend on the attitudes or actions it sought to induce, i.e., on the degree of conflict between the outcome sought by the US and the preferences of those upon whom the leverage is brought to bear. The factors the US might want most to affect, such as political ideologies and alignments, development strategies, and population policies, might be those least amenable to outside pressure. Except perhaps for the poorest and most populous countries, needs for US food in the period of uncertainty are unlikely to be so critical that they will affect long-term nonreversible changes in basic national domestic or foreign policies. Attitudes or behavior on less fundamental issues—transitory political stands or specific tactical disputes, for example—would be more amenable to the influence of food leverage. Even in these cases, however, the US would have to take into account the cost in resentment among those on whom the leverage was applied.

[Omitted here is a chart entitled “Net Grain Trade for Regions of the World, Selected Periods.]

The utility of food leverage would also be affected by the ability of other nations to bring countervailing leverage to bear on the US. Countervailing leverage could arise from exploitation of US dependence on such imports as petroleum, for example, or from a nation’s strategic location, political alignment, membership in the nuclear club, or status as a super or regional power.

Movement from a period of food uncertainty to one of chronic scarcity would enhance the political leverage obtainable from discretionary allocations of food. For an increasing number of countries, need for imports from the US would tend to be permanent and essential. With heightened competition for available supplies and the exhaustion of alternative suppliers, food leverage could affect the basic national policies of a widening circle of nations.

D. International Tensions

There is, however, another side to the coin. Food and population trends portend threats as well as opportunities for the US. These trends seem likely to make the world a more turbulent setting for the conduct of foreign policy—a setting in which the definition and pursuit of US interests will be more complicated. One aspect of this complexity already is manifest in the politicization of international economic relationships and their polarization along North-South lines.

Agitation by the LDCs for more advantageous terms of trade, aid, and investment between themselves and the industrialized nations, and for a redistribution of power and authority in international affairs (as exemplified by demands for a “New International Economic Order”) is attributable partly to food uncertainty and the pressures of population growth.⁴

The poorer food-deficient countries view the world food problem as one of inequitable distribution and consumption as well as shortage. They claim that affluent nations’ absorption of a disproportionate share of world food resources is contributing to the problem, and their solutions are articulated in terms of “distributive justice” as well as increased production.

These countries direct most of their criticism against the industrial democracies. Colonial legacies of commercial crops, encouragement of modernization through pursuit of comparative advantage and participation in the world market economy, and the regular availability—until quite recently—of surplus US grain on concessionary terms are some of the factors they cite in support of the contention that the developing countries were misled into believing there was no need to be concerned about balancing food supply and demand within their borders.

Considerations related to food and population trends thus are spurring efforts by developing countries to improve their terms of trade and eliminate alleged inequities from international economic relationships through price preferences or structural arrangements to compensate for their disadvantageous position. US interests could be adversely affected even if the developing countries remain incapable of imposing most of their demands. Political and economic relations between the US and its industrial allies could also be seriously strained if differing degrees of dependence on the material resources of developing countries cause sharp disagreements over how their demands should be dealt with.

Should a period of chronic food scarcity ultimately occur, it would bring considerably more formidable and dangerous threats. Antipathy between rich and poor nations would intensify and the international economic order would be subjected to tremendous stress as food-deficient countries of varying economic power struggled to increase their export earnings in order to pay for agricultural imports. If spiraling prices were to force more and more nations out of the bidding for available supplies, there would be mounting pressure for the replacement of market distribution by some sort of internationally run “equitable” system of allocation.

Should anxiety over feeding expanding populations give way to desperation, the world might have to contend with international disruption caused by attempts at climate control, intensified conflict among nations, foraging populations, and perhaps even with nuclear or terrorist blackmail. The US—and perhaps other major food producers—might be the focus of an intense international struggle over food, in which it would stand to attract the enmity of others no matter how its agricultural resources were allocated.

E. Population-Related Disruption and Conflict

Food uncertainty is only one of a number of US interests that will be affected by population growth. As population pressures increase, there inevitably will be strains on existing political, economic, and social structures at the local, national, and international levels, and thus some impact upon politics within and among nations. But racial, religious, and cultural animosities, regional differences, irredentism, economic disparities, and a host of other sources of conflict between peoples and nations are almost always intertwined with demographic factors. Population growth will thus be part of a complex dynamic in which causative and contributory factors are likely to be indistinguishable.

In any case, whether population problems help precipitate socio-political upheaval will depend only partly on the intensity of the pressures population growth generates. Ability to deal with these pressures will be crucial, and this will hinge on the availability of resources and on the political will and managerial skill in particular countries.

Over the mid-to-long term, apathy and despair probably will prevail in some nations where resources and administrative talent are woefully inadequate to cope with population growth. But educated young city dwellers whose expectations will tend to exceed available opportunities are likely to be key destabilizing forces in many countries. Intense political turmoil and social disintegration could occur in some cases, leading ultimately to chronic instability. Then too, population pressures probably will propel some governments to strive for greater administrative efficiency, more emphasis on food production and population control, and labor intensive economic development. Such movement probably will often be accompanied by more repressive styles of rule on the part of governments already in power and by the rise of additional authoritarian regimes.

The significance for the US of the destabilizing consequences of population growth will vary according to how the US defines its foreign policy priorities and other national objectives. Instances in which population pressures directly and immediately involve the US (for example, problems related to Mexican immigration) are likely to be few and far between in the near-to-medium term. In other cases, whether US interests are affected will depend on how they relate to the particular actors and circumstances involved, e.g., how concerned the US is with maintaining political stability and fostering economic well-being among the LDCs.

Over the very long term, moreover, the impact of population growth and the need to feed expanding populations could range beyond traditional politically defined national security considerations.

F. Ecological and Environmental Factors

The US has a fundamental interest in the health and welfare of its people and the preservation of their way of life on a planet that might eventually be physically threatened by the consequences of world population growth.

No one can say for sure how many people the earth can support. Technological innovation and man’s managerial skills will help determine the upper limit. It does seem clear, though, that population growth tends to increase the risk of ecological and environmental damage in a variety of ways. The long-run impact of the greatly increased use of fertilizer and insecticides on the environment, for example, is likely to prove highly detrimental.

The extent to which the US will be able to insulate itself from the adverse environmental and ecological consequences of population growth will of course depend on how pervasive and intense the damage becomes. This will not necessarily correlate precisely with incremental population increases, but the cumulative impact of close to 15 billion people on earth would almost certainly be considerably greater and potentially more dangerous than that of 8 or 10 billion.

Population growth is likely to impede international cooperation on matters such as resource conservation and pollution abatement. Nations with pressing needs to provide food and jobs for their people will tend to be less concerned about the long-run consequences of their agricultural, fishing, or industrial activity. Food-deficient countries might attempt to link their cooperation to assurances of adequate food supplies. Developing countries, moreover, will maintain (with some justification) that the earth is threatened less by the impact of their population growth and modernization than by the consequences of overconsumption and pollution in the highly industrialized countries.

G. Policy Constraints and Alternatives

The ability of the US to use food as an instrument of its foreign policy depends in part on the degree to which it controls the disposition of its agricultural production. Power to apportion this production for domestic consumption, sale abroad, and foreign aid is currently shared by the government, private institutions, and market forces. The same is true for allocation among various paying customers. Moral inclinations, economic considerations, and international political challenges posed by food and population trends, however, may lead to expanded and regularized government involvement.

The prominence of food as a domestic and international issue increasingly calls into question complete reliance on the international marketplace as a mechanism to allocate food among nations; when demand exceeds supply the market takes no cognizance of moral or political considerations. There also appears to be growing interest in the idea that US farmers and consumers should be insulated from adverse effects of international price fluctations. As principal custodian of an object of occasionally intense international competition, moreover, the US might find it necessary to guard against market manipulation and possible attempts by wealthy nations—or coalitions such as OPEC—to employ purchases, stockpiles, investments, or other devices to gain a measure of control over world food supplies.

Agreement on increased government involvement in food distribution would probably not, however, be accompanied by consensus as to what the criteria for allocation should be. Whether the US should use its unique position to maximize economic returns through sales to the highest bidders, seek primarily political gains with food as leverage, or emphasize humanitarian values with food aid could be the focus of intense domestic and international controversy.

Deciding to which nations, in what order and proportion, and on what terms agricultural exports should be allocated during an era of food uncertainty will, moreover, be complicated by the need to reconcile domestic farm and foreign food policies. As needs for imports from the US fluctuate from year to year, so too will the ease with which domestic and foreign policy considerations can be harmonized. The US may be faced in one year with having to decide which nations to feed, and in the next with determining how to dispose of massive surpluses.

The fact that key food-deficient countries have major stakes in maintaining the allocative status quo is yet another complicating consideration. Political relationships with allies and adversaries alike (e.g., Japan and the USSR) will be affected if the US moves toward greater restrictions on purchases in order to use food as leverage or to serve humanitarian ends.

Although food leverage remains a potentially powerful source of international influence, its productive use during the period of food uncertainty ahead will require selectivity and careful calculation. The negotiation of extended grain purchase agreements that assure US export markets and relieve other nations of food uncertainty for several years may be a particularly promising area for the application of food leverage. The economic and political benefits obtained from such arrangements must, of course, be weighed against the consequent reductions in future flexibility.

Long-range US policy considerations in regard to world population growth will have to be measured against more immediate domestic and international imperatives. Any US efforts to foster a slowdown in population growth are likely to be complicated by domestic controversy over the posture the US should assume toward regimes that advance population policies the US favors by coercive methods it abhors. The US will also need criteria for determining when broad population-related policies (such as a general linkage between US aid and foreign population control efforts) should take precedence over more specific shorter range considerations (e.g., maintenance of political stability in a particular country).

World food and population trends thus are adding considerable complexity to the definition and pursuit of US national interests. Clearly, though, the threats posed by these trends will have to be faced even if the US would prefer not to seize the opportunities they may offer. Earnest desires that the bounty of America’s farmers never be used as a weapon of influence in international affairs are likely to be frustrated if the disposition of this bounty increasingly becomes both a domestic and international political issue. The US may be unable to avoid having to decide how to use food leverage to help manage global issues and cope with international challenges.

[Omitted here are Chapter V: The Problem of Internationalized Terror and Chapter VI: Nuclear Proliferation.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 64, PRC 028, 7/27/77, North/South Issues [2]. Confidential. Prepared in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis.
2. This report is based on the following studies and working papers: World Oil Trade and International Politics: A Preliminary Study of Trends, Prospects, and Implications (March 1976, Unclassified); European Energy Politics and Atlantic Relations (February 1977, Confidential); Dynamics of “Small-State” Leverage: Implications for North–South Relations (PR 10059–76, August 1976, Secret/NF); Impact of Food Uncertainty and Scarcity on the US and the International System (September 1976); World Population Growth and US Strategy Interests (November 1976); International and Transnational Terrorism: Diagnosis and Prognosis (PR 10030–76, April 1976); Managing Nuclear Proliferation: The Politics of Limited Choice (OPR–408, December 1975, Secret/NF). [Footnote in the original.]
3. Except in the case of a dramatic shift in climate that adversely affected production, there is only a small chance of chronic food scarcity for the next 20 years or so. [Footnote in the original.]
4. See Chapter III, on LDC demands. [Footnote in original. Chapter III is not printed.]