I am sorry they didn’t have a doggie bag for the dessert, it was
fattening.2
Chris got started by asking the first question on our discussion list on
page 3 and never really got beyond that, although the essential issues
involved in the second paragraph of page 1 on our memo3 were batted back and forth (with
Patt doing most of the batting) for nearly one hour and a half. Chris
essentially listened to Patt’s complaints
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about Vaky and
Holbrooke (Moose is great, the problems in NEA are understandable and Patt sympathized,
EUR is unhelpful but not hostile,
Jules Katz is actively hostile
but totally open in his hostility which Patt finds refreshing). Christopher was quietly resistant to most
of Patt’s arguments (a good deal which was explicitly directed against what
she and Mike Schneider clearly feel was a reluctance on Chris’s own part to
defend HA by giving them access to
information on ARA issues). The lunch went
on so long, largely I think, because Chris wanted to let Patt get her
frustrations off her chest. (At one point in describing her existential way
of getting access to the Secretary, Patt noted that she had had a “quickie”
with the Secretary last week—a metaphor I would not have urged her to
repeat!) It is conceivable that Chris may do
something about Patt’s concerns that HA have
more access to NODIS and that its views
be solicited more actively on policy issues, but I doubt it. He is clearly
sensitive to the confrontational and ideological approach HA takes, and Patt’s comments at lunch
underscored these, although she emphasized her own awareness of broad
strategic policy issues such as Korean security several times.
The only really concrete outcome of the lunch was the clearance of the
cable4 you
brought in.
Attachment
Action Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the
Policy Planning Staff (Kreisberg) to the Deputy Secretary of State
(Christopher)6
Washington, October 23, 1979
Human Rights Goals and Objectives
Patt’s memo to you7 deals with three broad issues:
1. Her belief that human rights considerations (and HA as a bureau) should carry greater weight
in foreign policy decisions. She cites the Nicaragua special mission;
the decision to support seating Pol
Pot’s
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representative at the UN; and South
Korean policy as examples of instances when HA was cut out of the decision-making process.
We believe she is right that there is a widespread perception in the
Department that the emphasis given earlier to human rights has gradually
taken a backseat in Administration concerns to security factors, and
therefore that neither human rights considerations nor HA need be given as much attention as
formerly. This has led a number of Bureaus to downplay human rights
issues and may have increased the sense of an adversarial relationship
between HA and the rest of the
Department on both sides of the issues. The key conceptual divergence
from the bureaus is at the end of Patt’s memo where she emphasizes the
need for us to convey a “consistent message” on human rights where the
Bureaus argue human rights is only one of our policy interests and we
must also convey other messages as well.8
Patt makes three procedural suggestions for better routine integration of
human rights concern in decision making, all of which are at least as
much complaints about what decisions are being
made as how:
—Fuller integration of human rights considerations into economic
decisions such as Ex-Im and CCC
programs. Our sense is that these are being adequately considered in the
Interagency Group.
—Restructuring the AECB. Patt’s right
that there is now no systematic factoring of human rights concerns into
specific decisions, as there is with the Interagency Group for economic
assistance. But S/P’s attempt to assess
the decision record on these issues (in February of 1979)9 led us to conclude
that the policy is about right even if the procedures are somewhat less
neat than they might be?
—Earlier notification to other donor governments of MDB votes. Patt is right that decisions a
few days before major votes may reduce the seriousness with which other
governments take our “consultations”. Part of the problem is the
inability of the US representatives on
the MDB to give us sufficient advance
notice of pending loans.
2. Personnel issues, and especially better staffing of HA and human rights training for other
officers.
—Too few slots. Our impression is that HA
does not now have a numbers problem but that stronger management would
help inside the bureau.
—Personnel’s “failure” to fill slots—quickly—with quality people; and
—Lack of interest in human rights training on the part of other FSOs.
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The last two issues are related. I’m not familiar with the details of
either problem but suspect both relate to HA’s adversarial relationship with much of the building and
the consequent reluctance of many to become more directly involved with
the human rights policy. We can’t force human rights assignments, or
training, on unwilling officers.
3. HA priorities.
—Strategy papers for problem countries (with particular emphasis on how
to promote human rights in violating countries with which we have
security relationships). The results were disappointing when we and
others tried a few examples earlier in the administration. The strategy
paper concept may be overly rigid.
—Senate Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties. We agree
this should remain an Administration priority and you will recall it is
also on Roberts Owen’s priority
list for L.
—Better US human rights performance. We
agree with Patt that a mechanism to permit effective response to
complaints about US domestic performance
would be useful, especially for the Madrid CSCE review conference. You may want to ask whether there
is any mechanism for this at present. We’re less sure what she has in
mind with the recommendation for closer cooperation with the NSC to coordinate activities of, and
promote acceptance by, domestic agencies of the human rights policy. You
may want to explore this.
—A “more creative” human rights approach at the UN. We believe HA already
has an adequate voice in such decisions.
—Full funding of the Inter-American Court. We aren’t sure what’s involved
here, and HA’s memorandum arrived too
late for us to try to find out.
—CSCE. This will indeed be a major
HA concern for the next year. We
agree on the need to appoint an Ambassador promptly as does EUR and we assume Patt is aware of the
state of play.
Questions for Discussion
You might want to explore the following questions with Patt and her
colleagues:10
—Does HA perceive that it has an
adversarial relationship with the rest of the building? If so, what
might be done about it?
—Can specific examples be cited of what country strategy reports might
enable us to do better?
—What military assistance decisions does HA think would have been different had the procedural
changes they recommend in the
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AECB been in effect? Would human
rights situations actually have been improved as a result of these
changes?
—Should a leadership succession in the Soviet Union affect our human
rights posture toward it? What stance should we take at the CSCE review, for instance, if a new
Soviet leadership is shaking itself down?
