Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

192. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 17, 1979

SUBJECT

• The Soviet Union and Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea and Uganda

Your memorandum of August 21, 1979² asked us to review how we might publicize Soviet, Cuban and East European support for the former regimes in Equatorial Guinea and Uganda which violated human rights so grossly. The Department has looked at the evidence and has concluded there is no basis for a US effort to pinpoint support by these countries for the two African regimes.³

While the Soviets provided Equatorial Guinea with military equipment and training and the Cubans at one time had as many as 400 advisors in the country (probably half of them military), the Chinese virtually dominated the local market with their goods, built major telecommunications projects and helped train Macias’ National Guard. There is even an unconfirmed report that Chinese advisors helped protect Macias from rebel troops almost up to the very end. For this reason we believe any specific criticism of the Soviet Union and Cuba for helping Macias would also implicate the Chinese. A number of African states, including Nigeria and Cameroon, also maintained friendly relations with Macias and may well be offended by a US campaign on Soviet support for Equatorial Guinea.⁴

Soviet support for Uganda is clearcut (although there was virtually no Cuban involvement).⁵ At the same time, however, a large proportion of Soviet military equipment provided to Uganda was transported through Kenya or by airlift over the Sudan. Amin remains popular in the southern Sudan, his tribal home, and according to a recent unconfirmed report, is in the southern Sudan at the present time. All Uganda’s POL, on which Amin’s regime depended, came through Kenya. The Kenyans maintained friendly relations with Amin almost to the end of his rule and consistently refused to interdict supplies to Uganda until the very end. Moreover, several US business concerns, with US Government approval, were involved in providing equipment and advice to Amin.

Both Kenya and the Sudan are, of course, among the African states most critical of the Soviet Union and of Soviet policy. We believe it would be embarrassing to both countries if their own relations with Amin, broad tolerance of his regime and facilitation of Soviet military supplies through or over their countries were subsequently to be brought to the fore in some way as a result of US efforts to increase international awareness of Soviet support for Amin.⁶

The East Europeans do not appear to have played a pivotal role in supporting either the Macias or the Amin regime (although the East Germans may have provided some arms to Uganda).

Peter Tarnoff⁷

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memos to/from Tarnoff/Wisner/Perry—1979. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote Tarnoff’s name on the first page. Thornton sent a copy of the memorandum to Brzezinski under an October 2 memorandum, indicating that S/P drafted and Vance vetted the Department’s response. (Central Intelligence Agency, CADRE Files, CO3425168)
2. See Document 191.
3. An unknown hand placed a parallel line to the right of this paragraph, underlined the last sentence of the paragraph, circled the words “there is no basis,” drew a line from the circled text to the bottom of the memorandum and added the following: “Not correct” and “‘that on balance it would be counterproductive’ (this would be more accurate formulation).”
4. An unknown hand underlined the last sentence of this paragraph.
5. An unknown hand underlined this sentence.
6. An unknown hand underlined this paragraph.
7. Seitz signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff’s typed signature.