Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume II, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

166. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman Mathews of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 20, 1978

SUBJECT

• Human Rights and The Olympics

In winning their bid to hold the Olympics in Moscow the Soviets scored a great potential coup for both their foreign exchange earnings and international prestige and propaganda interests. However it is also a big risk, for the spotlight could easily shift from the Games to the human rights issue. I believe we should be looking at ways to exploit that risk, and to exact the highest possible price in terms of advancing our own human rights interests.

—There are already rumors in the USSR that Jewish emigration will be cut off some time before the Games. Some believe that the high current rate of emigration is designed to ease the tension before the Games (though visas are being granted only to first time requesters and not to any refuseniks or to any prominent dissidents). Are there ways to exploit this situation: Can we accelerate emigration between now and 1980? Should we suggest to the Soviets that they grant visas to a particular list of individuals who are of concern to us, with the quiet implication that otherwise these individuals will be a focus of attention at the Games? Are there other ways to reach the same end?

—What about access to Russian citizens by press and athletes during the Games? Should we be pushing for maximum access in the true Olympic spirit? What are the terms of the NBC contract? After paying through the nose (a record high price) for the broadcast rights has NBC insisted on anything in the way of freedom of coverage or will they only be allowed to film designated glories of Soviet culture? If you watched any of the last several Olympics you will remember all the “color” stories—scences in Munich beer halls, the quaint beauties of Innsbruck, Canadian folk dancing, etc., etc. There will be an even greater incentive to do such coverage of a country that is of such great interest to Americans about which they know so little. Should we be offering NBC any help in these negotiations and in their subsequent planning? For example, if they do a piece on Soviet ballet, should they also have film (taped in advance) on the stories of Nureyev, the Panovs, etc.?² The same with music, science, etc.³

—What will be our policy if RFE/RL are denied press credentials? What about other individual press? Should we quietly encourage the media to send a few of their Soviet experts—perhaps including individuals who were earlier asked to leave the USSR? What about denials of visas to individual spectators? In short, should we push the USSR to the maximum extent to live up to the spirit in which the Games are supposed to be held and to the promises they must have made to the International Olympic Committee, or should we just accept the fact that these Olympics will be different from those held in the West? I think we should push.

—What will be our policy if the Israeli team or the South African team is banned from the Games—especially if the Soviets announce the decision at the last minute?

—What will we do during the Games if an American or other participant gets into trouble of some kind that relates to human rights (e.g., press interview with a forbidden dissident) and gets deported? If we can develop an answer should we inform the Soviets in advance so that they will have no doubt as to how we would react?

—Should we do anything in the way of informing American participants about this issue—perhaps briefings made available to those who are interested? Or perhaps that is going too far.

—Finally, beyond the human rights issue, what about the intelligence opportunity? With security and administrative forces strained to the limit—or beyond—and so many people in Moscow, there are bound to be opportunities that are not otherwise available. Are we prepared to exploit this to the maximum?

Recommendation:

That you give me some guidance on this. Do you feel these issues should be pursued? What about a PRM? Other?⁴

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 94, Human Rights: 1978. Secret. Copies were sent to Bartholomew and Schecter. Aaron wrote the following handwritten notation in the top right-hand corner of the first page: “ZB, She is getting better on this issue. DA.”
2. Reference is to Soviet ballet dancers Rudolf Nureyev, Valey Panov, and Galina Ragozina.
3. Brzezinski drew an arrow in the margin from this paragraph and wrote: “Convene an inter-agency meeting to discuss—then let’s decide if a PRM needed or WG instead. Good idea. ZB.” In August 1979, Bloomfield, who had inherited Tuchman Mathews’ human rights portfolio upon her departure from the NSC Staff (see footnote 2, Document 188), indicated that he planned to meet with Shulman and Brement regarding the Moscow Olympics. Bloomfield intended to discuss the feasibility of using an existing interagency committee on Soviet policy “to have an airing of the lists of opportunities and hazards concerning the Olympics (you had asked Jessica last fall to convene an interagency meeting to decide if a PRM was needed).” (NSC Global Issues Cluster August 15, 1979, evening report; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues—Oplinger/Bloomfield Subject File, Box 37, Evening Reports: 4–8/79) No PRM on the Olympics was issued.
4. Aaron added the following handwritten notation at the end of the memorandum: “I say unleash Tuchman! Play the Olympic card! DA.”