We continue to believe that case-by-case decision making holds the best hope
of making our human rights policy effective in varying situations, and of
keeping it in balance with other foreign policy interests. But we also see a
need for agreement on some general principles which would help guide
individual decisions.
Three issues of special concern to us are whether we ever should deny IFI
loans which serve basic human needs to countries under re
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pressive regimes; whether to use economic
sanctions to press for political change as well as for respect of rights of
the person; and how to coordinate all our levers of influence with a given
country.
—A strong policy bias against opposing IFI loans except in response to gross
violations of rights of the person;
—Limiting restrictions on programs designed to help American exporters and
investors to the minimum required by law;
—Distancing ourselves from the security forces of countries which deny
freedom of expression;
—Channeling more of our bilateral economic assistance to countries with a
good or improving record in political as well as personal human rights.
Attachment
Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning
Staff (Lake) to the Deputy
Secretary of State (Christopher)4
Washington, August 10, 1978
SUBJECT
The Issue
Successes of the human rights policy to date may now confront us with a
new problem: whether to continue denying economic and security benefits
(opposition to IFI loans; restrictions on bilateral economic and
security programs) to a country if arbitrary arrest, torture, and other
violations of the person are ended but there is no meaningful
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progress on political rights
and the legal and institutional instruments of repression remain.
Discussion
We believe there should be a strong policy bias against opposing IFI loans except in response to gross violations
of rights of the person and that in general we should limit programs
which are designed primarily to help American exporters and investors
(ExIm, CCC,
OPIC) only to the extent
required by law. The latter would mean no limits on CCC credits (since there is no applicable
law), and might mean using the language of the ExIm legislation (to
“take into account” human rights situations “and the effects such
exports may have on human rights”) to deny credits only if the
particular export in question might be used in human rights violations
or if chances were high that denial might actually produce improvements
in rights of the person.
This would be consistent with laws which specifically cite violations of
the person as those which require denial of US assistance. It reflects various policy statements,
beginning with the Secretary’s April 1977 Law Day Speech in which he
said we can justifiably seek a rapid end to violations of the person but
that promotion of other human rights may be slower to show results. And
it reflects both laws and policy directives (and common sense) which
call on us to consider human rights trends rather than demand sudden
transformations in authoritarian societies.
We can imagine exceptions which we might advocate to this guideline. We
might not, for instance, want to vote in one of the Banks for a major
non-bhn loan to a country when its military had just overturned an
elected government, even if that move did not include arrests of
opposition leaders. Exceptions, however, should be used to express
concern about a human rights deterioration or the reversal of a
trend—not to maintain maximum pressure until all serious problems are
solved.
Chile could be the hardest test of the policy we are advocating.
Violations of the person have virtually ended, in part as a result of
our pressure. There is a good chance that continued pressure from us
could contribute to further progress toward restoration of political
freedoms. The latter would, inter alia, be the
best long-range guarantee of rights of the person. Chile’s democratic
traditions, moreover, make it hard for that regime to argue that our
pressure for a restoration of democracy reflects cultural arrogance. And
our own role in its recent history makes it impossible for us to be
neutral: to begin now to support IFI loans to it, or to open up ExIm
credits, would be seen (in Chile and abroad) as prematurely rewarding
Chile. Finally, those Congressmen who care about Chile are urging that
we intensify pressure until and unless democracy is restored.
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Thus the arguments for keeping the heat on are strong. Similar cases can
be made elsewhere.
Nonetheless we believe that the human rights policy, and American
interests in general, ultimately will benefit if we do not seem to be
using economic pressure to bring down a particular government.
Repressive governments will be more likely to improve their performance
if they believe something short of suicide will bring a lifting of
economic sanctions. Other IFI donors will be more likely to join our
efforts if we do not seem bent on using those institutions not just to
work for an end to torture and arbitrary arrest worldwide, but to topple
a particular government of which we most strongly disapprove. And in
this country, a sense that the human rights policy was hurting American
exports (and jobs) could begin seriously to undercut support for the
policy itself.
The strongest argument seems to us to be one of principle. To deny a
country access to international financial support in order to try to
force political change on it is not qualitatively different from the
Nixon Administration’s
efforts to “destabilize” the Allende government. We have not been as
successful in cutting off Pinochet’s financial sources as Nixon was in doing the same to
Allende, and our efforts have not included jawboning commercial banks.
But the difference is of degree rather than of kind.
In practice of course we cannot suddenly resume economic business as
usual with Chile. Chile is an emotional issue and our attitude toward it
is, rightly or wrongly, a symbol to many of our human rights commitment.
Moreover, present sanctions are also aimed at getting Letelier’s alleged
murderers extradited.5 But if the Letelier issue is satisfactorily resolved and
there is no regression on rights of the person, we should begin phasing
in some ExIm and CCC financing and
supporting bhn loans to Chile in the IFIs, carefully explain both to the Chileans and to human
rights activists in this country what we are doing and why, and test the
political waters for the feasibility of beginning to support some
non-bhn loans.
Promoting Political Rights
Our position is only tenable, however, if we can also demonstrate that we
are working to promote political rights by other means.
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We should avoid supplying the internal security
forces of governments which deny freedom of expression to their critics,
whether or not those governments find it necessary actually to lock the
critics up. Here too there might be occasional exceptions. The recent
approval of a sale of handguns to South Korea’s Presidential guard, even
while denying a similar sale to its regular police, is a case in point.
But in general we should reverse the past practice in which economic
assistance has borne the brunt of the human rights policy, while sales
to police (and military) forces remained relatively unscathed. When
there is an improving but still unsatisfactory overall human rights
situation, we should lift economic sanctions first while continuing to
distance ourselves from the security forces of a repressive regime.
Bilateral economic assistance might be adjusted
to particular situations. You know S/P’s
aversion to denying assistance which furthers the economic human rights
of poor people who have the misfortune to live under a repressive
regime. Nonetheless there are more needy people worldwide than we have
resources, and the President has directed us to channel bilateral
assistance to countries with a good or improving human rights record.
Moreover, there is a significant difference between bilateral programs
which we can control and adjust, and IFI loans, on which we usually must
vote when and as they are presented to us. Thus, we could reprogram aid
levels away from repressive regimes and toward governments showing more
support for political freedom, rather than continuing to use the IFIs to pressure countries which have
ceased violations of the person.
Finally, we need to do more about the positive
promotion of human rights. For all our rhetoric (in speeches
and in PD–30)6 about preferring positive approaches
to sanctions, our policy in practice still is skewed toward the latter.
That is understandable since we have to react to IFI loans and arms
sales requests as they come to us, while devising positive approaches
appropriate to cultures different from our own requires effort and
imagination. Some of our Embassies (e.g., Djakarta, Seoul, Nairobi) have
volunteered interesting suggestions, based on extensive personal
experience in those societies. But too many in the regional bureaus
still see the human rights policy as a “problem” of sanctions; if that
threat is removed they seem to think no active human rights policy is
required of them. If we are going to lift sanctions on governments which
still deny political freedoms it will be essential that we demonstrate
(not least to human rights activists on the Hill) what we are doing
instead to promote the expansion of those freedoms. The reports now
being prepared on steps taken and planned to integrate
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human rights concerns into our policies
toward selected countries could be a useful vehicle for this effort.
