Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

93. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter ¹

Washington, August 4, 1978

SUBJECT

• NSC Weekly Report #69

1. Opinion

Negotiations/Consultations

In our foreign policy we have placed primary emphasis on two different efforts:

1. Obtaining Congressional support for major but controversial (and hence politically costly) undertakings;

2. Negotiating the resolution of genuinely important issues (notably SALT, the Middle East, and Southern Africa).

We have done well on the former; we are making some progress on the latter.

I believe, however, that we need to engage also to a greater extent in consultations, the explicit purpose of which is to generate mutual understanding and the implicit consequence of which might be also some greater accommodation with the parties concerned.

For example, Andy’s² great success in Africa is based not only on our approach to Rhodesia and Namibia but also on the series of consultative trips he has taken to the region and the rapport he has helped you establish with African leaders. Moreover, I believe it is fair to say that the Chinese would have never agreed to the kind of flexibility and movement that has now developed in our relationship if I had simply put a negotiating proposal before them on the table. Prior to my visit, they were insisting that everything depended on normalization; now they have in effect accepted the segmentation of the relationship into three parts (the process of normalization; the expansion of governmental bilateral relations; consultations on international issues). But that emerged as a byproduct of prolonged discussions (some 15 hours) on broad subjects, which contributed to greater mutual understanding.

I think we need to do that also with the Soviets. Nixon himself, using Kissinger in addition to negotiating with them, would occasionally engage in discussions in depth and at length, regarding our respective world viewpoints, interests, trends, etc., thereby also creating the context for some accommodation. We have not done enough of that—and Dobrynin has hinted to me as much. Given the present frictions, an effort to clear the air—but on the basis of firmness regarding those matters which we consider important (notably their military buildup and their conduct in the third world)—is needed.

Historically, a phase of friction in U.S.-Soviet relations has contributed to the emergence of new “rules of the game,” regarding either restraint in the use of conventional forces, or on strategic matters, or even regarding espionage. We now need to develop similar understandings regarding restraint and accommodation on such matters as the use of military proxies or direct military intrusion into third world conflicts. But that will require candid and prolonged discussions.

In general, our approach has been one in which we have focused on the negotiation of specific issues, in a legal-contractual fashion, somewhat neglecting the need to develop and sustain a political dialogue.

I would think that it would be especially useful if you would dispatch periodically Cy, me, Andy, and others—to talk to the principal leaders with whom we are trying to maintain or develop closer relations: this would be flattering even to Giscard, or Schmidt, or Fukuda—and certainly to the Shah, or Fahd, or Obasanjo, or Desai; and it would also be useful with Hua, or Tito, Gierek, Ceausescu, etc. This could supplement your direct personal contact with these leaders, and in some cases could reinforce any ongoing negotiations.

From the domestic point of view, doing the above would also convey the feeling that you are deliberately orchestrating some of the diversity of viewpoints around you on behalf of your strategic goals. Incidentally, the Soviets have long used, and quite effectively, the tactic of occasionally sending “hard” spokesmen to convey a soft message, and “soft” spokesmen to convey a hard message, in order to enhance the credibility of that message, and to show that the “soft” and “hard” options are deliberate instruments of policy and not merely reflections of internal vacillation. FDR did some of the same, and it is in your interest to promote also such a perception of yourself.

Finally, there is the fact that such consultations—conducted on a regular basis with ten or so top leaders around the world—would reduce some of the foreign misunderstandings and anxieties regarding our policy.

Cy is departing tonight for the Middle East where he will, in effect, carry out at least in part the kind of consultations I have in mind with leaders there.³ In addition, I would suggest the following as further examples:

—A meeting on your behalf with Hua this fall when he visits Eastern Europe, or you personally might meet with Teng at Princeton if he comes to the UNGA (and that would be quite dramatic).

—A mid-fall swing through Africa by Andy to consult on how the Rhodesian situation is evolving and the Namibian settlement being implemented. This might be accompanied by a special side visit by an emissary to South Africa.

—A consultative visit to key European capitals (including some East European) and the Shah in the fall both on foreign policy and key economic issues.

—If there is no U.S.-Soviet summit this year, broad consultations in Moscow (maybe even involving not only Cy’s but also my participation).

2. Analysis

Key Foreign Policy Votes in 1978

There have been four key votes on foreign policy issues this year: Panama,⁴ the Middle East Arms Sales,⁵ lifting the embargo against Turkey,⁶ and Rhodesia.⁷

—Fifteen Senators (11D/4R) have sided consistently with the Administration; 5 are not returning to the Senate (marked by an asterisk), and none are up for reelection.

Democrats:
Bumpers	P. Hatfield *	McGovern
Culver	Hodges *	Ribicoff
Glenn	Humphrey *	Sparkman *
Gravel	Inouye
Republicans:
Chafee	Pearson *
Mathias	Stafford

—Twenty-five Senators (19D/6R) have voted with the Administration 3 out of 4 times, including: Robert Byrd, Church, Hart, Long, Muskie, Baker, Hayakawa, Percy.

—Forty-seven Senators (26D/21R) have voted with the Administration half the time, including: Cranston, Jackson, Kennedy, Moynihan, Nunn, Stennis, Goldwater, Javits.

—Four Senators—Dole, Domenici, Laxalt and the Allens—have never voted with the Administration.

Based on the above, here are a few observations:

1. The 3 out of 4 votes must be watched most carefully for defections. It probably contains many Democrats who think they have done enough and many Republicans who may think they have done too much already.

2. We should probably work the most on those who have voted with us half the time. The split seems to be on liberal/conservative lines, based on fairly emotional issues. Less emotional issues may produce different divisions, thus we must work with this group closely.

3. Those who never vote with the Administration are clearly doing it for party reasons and are hopeless.

4. Baker’s support and that of the Republicans is what has made up for Democratic defections. It should be noted, however, that the Republican group that supports us shifts and that we won without Baker on Rhodesia.

Public Views on U.S. Military Strength

Recent polls indicate that a majority of Americans are now dissatisfied with how U.S. military power compares to that of the Soviet Union. The proportion of the public feeling such dissatisfaction has been rising since late 1976, when it stood at 41 percent. Late this spring, it reached 55 percent.

The number of Americans who prefer the United States to be “superior” to the USSR has stayed between 46 and 48 percent over the past 18 months (47 percent prefer the U.S. to be “about equal”). The increased dissatisfaction with America’s relative military power comes from the increased number who have come to perceive the United States as being weaker than the USSR.

In a poll taken last month, 42 percent of the public said the United States was militarily weaker than the USSR (up from 27 percent in late 1976). Only 12 percent said the United States was militarily stronger (down from 29 percent in late 1976).

Brezhnev on Foreign Economic Relations

Two years ago Brezhnev had this to say about the relationship between foreign policy and economic relations: “In foreign economic relations, politics and economics, diplomacy and commerce, industrial production and trade are woven together. Consequently, the approach to them and the management of them must be integrated, tying into one knot the efforts of all departments and, our political and economic interests. This is precisely how the Party’s Central Committee has posed this important question.”

4. National Security Affairs Calendar (Tab A)⁸

5. Foreign Media Reaction (Tab B)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 7–9/78. Secret. The President wrote the following notation in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum: “Zbig—more on non-testing of depressed trajectory flights of SLBM’s—J.”
2. Andrew Young.
3. Vance met with Middle East leaders in the United Kingdom. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 266–273.
4. See footnote 2, Document 76.
5. On May 15, the Senate voted to approve plane sales to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. (Robert G. Kaiser, “Senate Approves Mideast Jet Sales, 54–44,” The Washington Post, May 16, 1978, pp. A–1, A–10) The President had announced the sales on February 14 but agreed to defer formal notice to Congress of the sales until the Panama Canal treaties had passed. Carter submitted the contracts to Congress in late April. The package included 15 F–15s for Israel, 50 F–5Es for Egypt, and 60 F–15s for Saudi Arabia. (Congress and the Nation, vol. V, 1977–1980, p. 64)
6. The Senate on July 25 approved the repeal of the 1975 Turkish arms ban. The McGovern–Byrd amendment to the International Security Assistance bill specified that the arms be used for defensive purposes only and required that the President report to Congress every 60 days on progress made toward a settlement on Cyprus. (Graham Hovey, “Senate Acts to Lift Arms Ban on Turks, But Adds Warning: Help Tied to Cyprus,” The New York Times, July 26, 1978, pp. A–1, A–4) For documentation on the administration’s efforts to lift the embargo, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece.
7. On July 26, the Senate considered the repeal of economic sanctions against Rhodesia, instituted during the Johnson administration. The Case–Javits amendment to the International Security Assistance bill required the Carter administration to lift sanctions but only after the President had certified that certain conditions in Rhodesia had been met. The Senate approved the bill, which contained both the amendments on Turkey and Rhodesia, the evening of July 26. (Graham Hovey, “Curbs on Rhodesia Upheld by Senate, But Conditionally: Carter Could Lift Sanctions,” The New York Times, July 27, 1978, pp. A–1, A–6)
8. Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.