Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

76. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 21, 1978

SUBJECT

• NSC Weekly Report #55

1. Opinion

A Contractual or Flexible Foreign Policy?

One thought has been gnawing at me recently that might be worth a minute or two of your reflection. As I think about our foreign policy, I am struck by the degree to which it can be rightly called a “contractual” foreign policy: i.e., the major thrust of it is on negotiating agreements or devising formulas. It is reminiscent of legal negotiations and it does not adequately take into account the need to manipulate and influence political processes.

We have thus put a lot of effort into negotiating new proliferation restraints, in negotiating new agreements with the Soviets, in negotiating new verbal formulas for dealing with the Middle Eastern problem, in negotiating and then ratifying the Panama Canal Treaties,² etc., etc.

Yet foreign policy, though involving the foregoing, also involves the need to influence attitudes and to shape political events. This requires a combination of additional steps, none of which we have yet truly employed. In some cases, what is needed is a demonstration of force, to establish credibility and determination and even to infuse fear;³ in some cases it requires saying publicly one thing and quietly negotiating something else;⁴ in many cases what is needed is prolonged and sustained exchange of political views, so that even our enemies share or at least understand our perspectives. Often it does not require solving problems but striking the right posture and sometimes letting problems fester until they are ripe for action.

Examples of the foregoing would include quiet efforts to manipulate African leaders to obtain desired results; a willingness to back some friendly country very strongly, so that it in turn is prepared to use its force on our behalf (for example, I think there is a good chance that by tangibly backing Morocco with arms we could get Hassan to use his troops for us the way Castro is using his on behalf of the Soviets);⁵ readiness to use black propaganda to stimulate difficulties for our opponents, for example by encouraging national sentiments among the non-Russian Soviet peoples or by using deception to divide the Soviets and Cubans on African policy.⁶

I will be developing some ideas for you regarding the above,⁷ but at this stage I simply wanted to register with you a basic point: namely, that our foreign policy has to operate on many levels and use many tools. The world is just too complicated and turbulent to be handled effectively by negotiating “contracts” while neglecting the need also to manipulate, to influence and to compel.

Asian Neglect

I have received recently a letter from a colleague who summarized for me some criticisms of our Asian policy, which are shared by a number of Asian specialists.

In summary form, his key points are these:

—Pacific Asia has been accorded too low priority.

—The Korean troop withdrawal has been unsettling; the timing was precipitate.⁸

—Our naval posture is inadequate to deal with the growing Soviet presence.

—U.S. weakness vis-a-vis Moscow justifiably causes China to view us as a less attractive partner.

—We have not pursued our bilateral relations with China with sufficient vigor.

—Our emphasis on normalizing relations with Vietnam makes little sense, compared to the need to strengthen our ties with ASEAN countries.

—Our human rights policy has been poorly implemented, particularly its emphasis on punitive measures against the violators rather than providing incentives to those with improving records.

—We have failed to use the China card against the Soviets.

—Our weakened relations with Japan concern the entire region.

—In the absence of confidence in U.S. policy in Asia, normalization becomes more difficult, for our assurances to Taiwan of our continued commitment to its tranquility become less credible.

We will be correcting some of these shortcomings shortly: the meeting with Fukuda and the Economic Summit⁹ ought to improve the economic relationship with Japan and infuse new political vitality into the Alliance; the adjustment of combat troop withdrawals from Korea should be welcomed by the Koreans; the Vice President’s trip to the ASEAN countries¹⁰ will properly place higher emphasis on collaboration with our friends than on our earlier (and in my judgment premature) efforts to normalize relations with Vietnam; we hope to activate step by step our relationship with China. In your comments to the press you might consider placing more emphasis on Japan, Korea, and China

[Omitted here is information unrelated to foreign policy opinions.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 126, Weekly National Security Report: 2–4/78. Secret. The President initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. On March 16, the Senate approved the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal by a vote of 68–32. (Congress and the Nation, vol. V, 1977–1980, p. 55) On April 18, the Senate voted to ratify the basic treaty by the same vote of 68–32. (Adam Clymer, “Senate Votes to Give up Panama Canal; Carter Foresees ‘Beginning of a New Era,’” The New York Times, April 19, 1978, pp. A–1, A–16; Congress and the Nation, vol. V, 1977–1980, p. 56)
3. The President underlined “demonstration of force” and wrote “Like Malaguez [Mayaguez?]?” in the left-hand margin next to that portion of the sentence. He also underlined “to infuse fear.”
4. The President underlined “saying publicly one thing” and “negotiating something else” and wrote in the left hand margin “Lying?”
5. The President underlined “to use his troops for us” and wrote “Proxy war??” in the left-hand margin next to that portion of the sentence.
6. The President underlined “by using deception” and placed a question mark in the left-hand margin next to that portion of the sentence.
7. The President underlined this portion of the sentence and wrote “You’ll be wasting your time” in the left-hand margin.
8. See footnote 3, Document 53.
9. Fukuda visited Washington May 1–3. Documentation on his visit is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIV, Korea; Japan. The next economic summit was scheduled to take place in Bonn July 16–17. For the minutes of the meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy, Documents 142–145. For the President’s remarks at the conclusion of the summit, see Document 92.
10. Reference is to Mondale’s trip to the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Guam, and Hawaii April 29–May 5. Documentation on the visit is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific.