Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

75. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter¹

Washington, April 19, 1978

SUBJECT

• Observations on Your Presidency

The Camp David discussions were very helpful in focusing our attention on ways in which we can all better serve your goals.² Below I outline some observations which I hope will be of some value in determining how we should proceed from here:

Speeches

My most basic recommendation is that you should dramatically increase the degree to which you emphasize the public education role of your presidency. In retrospect, I believe that this function has been seriously under-emphasized and that the Administration’s efforts have suffered as a result.

Where you have given major speeches—such as those at Notre Dame, Charleston, Wake Forest and ASNE—they have served as useful basic charters which have provided the comprehensive factual and philosophical framework of a particular policy to experts and editorialists, to our allies and adversaries, and especially to the public.³ Each of these speeches has been enormously valuable.

I propose that you undertake a much heavier speaking schedule, not only in Washington but around the country, on issues of greatest importance to your Administration. Such a schedule will provide opportunities for comprehensive articulation of the basic philosophy and direction of your Administration. You could focus on a series of issues, spelling out to the American people where you’re going, how you intend to get there, and what kinds of problems you see in the way.

I suggest you put Stu Eizenstat in charge of a small task force, which would work closely with Jody, to map out a long-term public speaking strategy. It would recommend forums for and prepare speeches on such matters as government reorganization and responsiveness, the economy, education and the environment. The series might appropriately begin with a speech on the difficulties of grappling with many of today’s difficult problems, emphasizing that you became President in order to tackle tough issues such as government reorganization, health care, tax reform, illegal immigration, social security financing, Panama Canal, SALT, and others which have been festering for years but which cannot be ignored.

I have sensed a much greater disposition on your part to articulate comprehensively your positions on foreign policy than those in the domestic area. I sense you are reluctant to define your own approach and philosophy regarding domestic issues. I may be wrong, but I sense that when you feel you are being characterized as being too liberal, you react in a way designed to counteract that definition; similarly, when you are being characterized as too conservative, you react in the opposite way.

In short, I have the impression that you intensely dislike being defined or “labeled”. That may have some value, but I fear it also contributes to the feeling that people don’t know you, they can’t feel you, they don’t know where you are going. I believe that by giving more major speeches, you will not only perform your public education role but it will require those of us serving you to help define and describe the Administration’s goals more effectively than we do now. Also, these speeches hopefully will become the documents on which the next election is fought.

I believe a lot of work has to be put into your speeches. If Stu mapped out a long-range schedule, we would have more lead-time to prepare them and could make better use of thoughtful outsiders. Most of your speeches tend to be descriptive and detailed demonstrations of what you know and the amount of work that went into a particular decision; but at the same time they tend to be, for many listeners, fairly heavy and incomprehensible, lacking the eloquence and persuasiveness that a Presidential address should possess. I would hope a good deal of thought could be put into how we can make these speeches more persuasive and eloquent.

Public Perceptions of Your Presidential Leadership

Your critics make many charges directed at your leadership, including the following:

• You are allegedly weak, uncertain and indecisive. They point to the absence of vetoes and attempt to make your views appear to be uncertain, equivocal and subject to bending under pressure. There have been no public displays of anger. Your efforts to de-imperialize the Presidency have resulted in diminishing the awe of the office.

• That you are preoccupied with foreign affairs;

• That you live a cloistered and private life and that you don’t really enjoy the company of others in informal settings;

• That you are a manager and not a leader;

• That you become overwhelmed by minutiae;

• That your staff tends to be limited, at least in terms of Washington experience, and that you are not getting sufficient advice from persons of stature and experience other than the original friends you brought from Georgia.

I find very few people ever arguing that you’re not bright, honest, decent or hard-working; rather, they argue that you are ineffective.

The great potential and exciting opportunity of this public perception is that, in most instances, it is inaccurate and can be quickly remedied by simply letting the public see more clearly what those of us who work with you see daily. This argues that you should undertake the much stronger public education role outlined above. It argues for some vetoes and/or strong rhetoric. It argues for strong discipline of disloyal persons to reverse the present complete lack of fear that anyone will pay a price—any prices—for unauthorized leaks or damaging statements. (As Strauss puts it, “There is no penalty for screwing up in this Administration.”) It argues for the political engagement of your cabinet officers in an effort to serve your broadest goals. It argues for other steps that demonstrate visibly the strength of your leadership. Finally, I think we should look for proper ways for you to perform that will enable people to “look up” to your office without returning to the Nixon imperial presidency.

I believe the “indecisive” issue is due largely to leaks which purport to show uncertainty when, in fact, it is an essential part of the decision-making process to hear different views. If we can start plugging most of these leaks, I think we’ll be hearing much less of this criticism.

I fear there is a good deal of validity to the argument that you spend too much time poring over staff memos in your office, and not enough time in public giving speeches and appearing with people. As someone said, when we elect a President, we don’t want a manager. We can hire them. We want a leader.

Your perceptions, philosophies and objectives for America can be explained only in the public role. I think you do too little of it. If there’s one element of your Presidency that cries out for correction, in my judgment, that is it.

Limited Range of Advice

I know you get all kinds of advice, but I’m afraid that much of it comes in a way that is not always helpful. I think you should have informal meetings—perhaps bi-weekly—with some of the wise and experienced people in this town and elsewhere, people who want nothing from you and who have no axes to grind. Getting together periodically with small groups of these people—preferably in the evening, away from the press and off the record—could be invaluable.

I can think of people who would be candid with you in such meetings, who would not talk about them afterwards, and with whom you could try out new thoughts and ideas. Several who come to mind are Jim Rowe (Roosevelt, Johnson), Clark Clifford (Truman), David Ginsberg (Truman), Ted Sorensen (Kennedy), John Gardner (Johnson), but there are others. Nearly anyone you wanted would be very flattered to be asked and very willing to help.

Foreign Policy

I think there has been inadequate strategic political thinking in the development of our foreign policy. Most of our foreign policy initiatives do not enjoy the same kind of congressional and political appraisal when they are being developed that their domestic counterparts do. You tend to get too personally identified with foreign policy initiatives whose chances of success are slight. I can think of many such instances with which the Secretary of State is closely and personally identified, and others with which you are as well.

I have long sensed an attitude among the foreign policy advisers that there is something suspect about looking at a foreign policy problem in the context of the political environment in which it must be fought. I couldn’t disagree more profoundly with this attitude, and I think we must do everything possible to reverse it.

I don’t believe, for example, that the option you finally selected on the neutron bomb issue—which I think is a good one—ever appeared in the options paper given you. Rather, the paper simply dealt with absolutes and it was only after a broader public debate that the option that you ultimately settled on emerged as the sensible answer.

Also, I think you get too personally and too deeply involved in too many minor foreign issues. I have talked repeatedly about the number of foreign visitors. But it is hard to think of any issue—whether it is Belize, Cyprus or Namibia—in which you don’t become deeply immersed once you learn of it. I realize that seeing foreign visitors and working on foreign problems is important, but I think we need a better balance.

My Role

I believe I should also make a basic re-evaluation of the ways in which I have been serving you. In reviewing the last few months, I have concluded that I have been spending too much time on routine work which parallels and often duplicates the efforts of others and which they could do just as well on their own; at the same time I have not been doing those things that others cannot do. I have in mind such things as the western trip, which produced more benefits for the Administration than I expected.⁴ It put the problems in focus and identified where we should be concentrating our efforts, which before the trip had been diffuse and uncoordinated. I have been told that there has been a substantial improvement in western attitudes towards us as a result of that trip, and especially our follow-up efforts.

I should be doing more of this kind of domestic travel and giving more comprehensive speeches articulating our policies. I should also have a heavy campaigning schedule which will enable me to play a stronger role as spokesman for our programs. I don’t know if you concur with this conclusion or not, but if you do I think it would be helpful in gaining greater public understanding of and support for our goals. I don’t in any way wish to de-emphasize my role with Congress or my advisory role with you, but I believe my public education role has suffered somewhat.

The Mood of the Country

I would like to mention just one thing about the so-called “conservative” trend in the country that everyone is talking about. If you ask people whether they are conservative or liberal, there is no question but that more will identify themselves as conservatives than would have been the case several years ago. But if you ask people whether government should help provide more and better housing, education, health care, environmental protection and the rest, a very high percentage of the population still strongly supports government activity of that kind.

There is obviously great public concern about inflation and the management of government. I don’t consider trying to deal with inflation or trying to improve the management of government to be illiberal undertakings. Rather, I consider them to be necessities if we are to have progressive government.

Indeed, there is broad support for progressive efforts. If we look at those issues on which we have had the greatest success so far—in the progressive areas of housing, jobs, economic development, strip mining, educational funding, etc.—they have all been controversial initially but they all enlisted strong and positive support in the Congress. Polls show your tax reform proposals are supported publicly by better than 2 to 1 margins.

It is my hope that your Administration will demonstrate that we can have both jobs and price stability. If we can, we will have a decisive advantage over the Republican opposition which clearly favors trying to beat inflation at the expense of jobs, a position which I consider to be insensitive.

1. Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Mondale Papers, Vice Presidential Papers, Foreign Policy Material From the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Office of the Vice President: June 2, 1977–December 3, 1978, Memoranda: Vice President to President, January–June 1978. No classification marking. There is no indication that the President saw the memorandum.
2. Reference is to the April 16–17 retreat at Camp David for Cabinet and White House staff members. In White House Diary, Carter indicates that he took notes during the retreat for subsequent dictation. (p. 185) During the discussions, Carter explained the genesis of the retreat: “I wanted you here because I could see a deterioration of our esteem in the public eye, and I don’t disagree with the public. What has bothered me is a lack of cohesion and team spirit, which is almost inevitable. We have a damn good administration, a fine cabinet, a good staff. I wish you knew each other as well as I know you.” (ibid., p. 188) Christopher’s talking points and handwritten notes of the meeting are in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Deputy Secretary: Records of Warren Christopher, 1977–1980: Lot 81D113, Box 1, Camp David Mtg.—4/16–17, 1978.
3. For the Notre Dame, Charleston, and Wake Forest speeches, see Documents 40, 52, and 72. Mondale is also referring to the President’s April 11 remarks before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, which were broadcast live on television and radio. For the text of his remarks, see Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pp. 721–727.
4. Presumable reference to Mondale’s January 10–13 trip to New Mexico, Utah, Colorado, Montana, Washington, Idaho, and Nevada.