Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

53. Remarks by Secretary of Defense Brown¹

San Francisco, California, July 29, 1977

The Framework for National Security Decisionmaking

The headlines always deal with specific issues such as the B–1 or the so-called neutron bomb.² But today I want to talk more about the framework within which those decisions are made more than about the decisions themselves.

As you well know, the security of the United States is the first responsibility of any Administration. The reason is obvious: Unless the safety of the nation is assured, we can have no reasonable chance of responding effectively to more than our most basic domestic needs.

For the last 6 months, with that priority in mind, the President has spent more time on national security than on any other single issue. No doubt, most of you have heard or read about some of the results—the meetings in Moscow on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], the decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea,³ the drive to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, renewed negotiations over the Panama Canal, even discussions with Cuba and Vietnam.

I have heard two conclusions drawn from these activities. The first is that ours is a purely reactive posture that deals with problems only once they have become acute. The second is that beneath the velvet glove of our diplomacy there is another velvet glove. Both conclusions are wrong. Let me tell you why.

Most Americans now recognize why the United States, which became heavily involved in world affairs during and after World War II, continues to remain involved—inextricably—despite Vietnam and the other difficult, if less searing, experiences of the last decade.

We cannot afford to see the rest of the world dominated by another power. Our safety depends in large part on an orderly diffusion of power rather than an attempt to concentrate it in our own hands, let alone having it fall into a single power center elsewhere. We need independence, territorial integrity, and freedom from external attack not only for ourselves but for others as well. We recognize that need through our treaty and nontreaty commitments.

We would, in my view, find it virtually impossible to preserve our internal liberties if we were an island of democracy in a sea of totalitarianism. We could hardly hope to maintain a stable and expanding economy if we were deprived of external markets. Defense in this modern age would become an almost intolerable burden if we did not have allies to contribute both resources and strategic locations to the collective security. In a time of instant communications, we could hardly insist on human rights at home and silently watch their violation abroad.

Maybe it has become a cliche, but we do in fact inhabit an interdependent world. Our own actions have widespread international effects. Decisions by other nations can have a major impact on us as well. The oil embargo of 1973 and the subsequent increase in our petroleum imports—which now make up half our oil consumption—constitute only the more obvious index of interdependence. We are bound to care—and care deeply—about what happens in many parts of the world. Because of our power and influence, other nations are bound to care about us; some of them will always seek our involvement in their problems. Isolation today is about as relevant for the United States as the one-horse shay.

Perhaps we have been too much of an international busybody in the recent past. But no one can doubt that there remains much to busy us in this dynamic world.

The Soviet Challenge

Our principal long-term problem continues to be the Soviet Union. Whether we like it or not, the Soviet leadership seems intent on challenging us to a major military competition. To quote a friend and colleague—someone whose professional efforts over the past 15 years have been focused on arms control and who during most of that time has considered that U.S. actions were driving the competition: The principal factor driving the arms race now is the Soviet military buildup, strategic and tactical.

The most evident—and dangerous—features of this challenge arise from the steady annual increases, in real terms, in the Soviet defense budget, the buildup and improvement of Soviet strategic nuclear forces, the modernization of Soviet ground and tactical air forces in Eastern Europe, and the growing sophistication of Soviet naval forces, which include a gradually expanding capability to project military power at considerable distances from Russia itself.

Whatever the motives behind it, the challenge is serious; we must not underestimate it. At the same time, we should recognize that the resulting competition is not an all-out contest compared with arms races of the past. It isn’t a purely military competition either.

We are spending a little more than 5 percent of GNP on our defense establishment. Our best current estimate is that the Soviets are allocating between 11 and 13 percent of a much smaller GNP to their military effort, with the bulk of it designed to give them a capability against the United States and its immediate allies, although a significant amount reflects the problem posed by the People’s Republic of China.

Both sides—and especially the United States—could invest a great deal more in defense. As of now, however, it would be a mistake to concentrate all our attention or the bulk of our resources on the arms race. The competition reaches into other areas also, and we have comparative advantages in them, whereas in the military arena the present balance and prospective potentials of the two sides are close. In fact we welcome peaceful competition because when it comes to industrial, agricultural, and technological strength; to the efficiency as well as the humaneness of our system; and to relative political influence, we have it all over the Soviet Union, and we can act with the confidence and restraint that knowledge justifies.

We must take account of the Soviet challenge at all times. Failure to do so will be dangerous and could be fatal. But there are other trends in the world that could have long-term effects, either helpful or perilous to our security; we must recognize them as well.

We have every reason to be encouraged by the revival of freedom in Greece, Portugal, and Spain. We may possibly find some hope in the possible rejection by the Eurocommunists—a posture we must view with caution—of Moscow as the sole font of wisdom and authority. It is even conceivable that some “Socialist” nations, particularly those that do not live right in the shadow of the U.S.S.R., are becoming dissatisfied with having no alternative to dealing with and depending on the hardcore Soviet bloc for their security and well-being. That is the good news.

The bad news is that we also face a number of more dangerous developments. Nuclear weapons already are an unprecedented threat to mankind; their continued proliferation—horizontal as well as vertical—can only make matters worse. More generally, the violent settlement of disputes seems to be on the increase. Subversion, terrorism, and organized national force are on almost constant display. And their lethality is being heightened by the expanding trade in nonnuclear weapons and technologies. We live in a tough neighborhood.

Current Issues and the U.S. Role

It is a neighborhood where, as the result of earlier and often neglected developments, a number of current and potentially explosive issues beg for a solution one way or another. The differences in the Middle East may have been narrowed; they have not disappeared. Racial tensions and clashes in Africa are mounting. The Sino-Soviet dispute is quiescent but by no means extinct. The rising price of oil continues to send periodic shocks through the international economy. We still lack an agreed international law of the seas.

The list could be made even longer and more forbidding. But the main point about it is this: While many of the issues may be specialized or regional in nature—and may not even involve the Soviet Union to begin with—they can escalate rapidly to the superpower level unless they are contained, defused, and eventually resolved. We should be concerned about them for many reasons. We must, in any event, be concerned about them on national security grounds.

The analogy of the two scorpions in a bottle may not precisely capture the current situation. (It undoubtedly oversimplified the real situation of the past as well. Now, as then, there are lots of other bugs, ants, crickets, butterflies, and also a few vipers in the bottle.) Nonetheless, we should be wary of letting the two scorpions and their bottle be put on top of a powder magazine built over a match factory. The scorpions may be cautious, but someone else could strike a match.

It would be tempting to turn our backs altogether on this turbulent and dangerous world. But that choice is no longer open to us. The United States is bound to have a substantial but finite influence on the rest of the world. If other nations do not catch colds when the United States sneezes, they will certainly feel the draft.

Our highest hopes for a world of peace and order have not been realized. But our worst fears have not materialized. Utopia is not just around the corner, but Armageddon is not inevitable either. Despite constraints and mistakes, our record of accomplishments has been, on the whole, a good one. Now is not the time to turn away from it.

As a nation, we are less inclined than in the 1960’s to see a threat in every alien event—and that is a part of wisdom. But wisdom and inertia are not the same thing. It is true that we could adopt a passive strategy, reacting to events only in the hope of staying out of trouble rather than acting to shape them. But that is not the President’s style. He does not propose to be an observer or arbitrator; neither do I. He likes to take initiatives; in my own area of responsibility, so do I.

We have learned that we cannot mold the international environment at all precisely to our preferences, however altruistic those preferences may be. But we can still try to help create a world that accepts and respects certain fundamental rights of nations—rights such as national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and freedom from unprovoked attack. We may not have a grand design—and I certainly don’t want to propose a pentagonal model—but we can still seek a reasonably peaceful and stable international environment.

If that is our goal, as I believe it is, then we must pay attention to the major issues and trends I have noted. The peaceful settlement of disputes is to our interest; it is to everyone’s interest. At the same time, we must adapt to where necessary, and control if possible, the trends which could threaten the nation’s security. A strong national defense is part, but only one part, of that process. Short-term diplomacy and longer run programs to create a more benign international environment must have equal priority. Once that is understood, the outlines of our strategy and posture should become evident.

Our actions can be the more restrained, the greater our strength. The glove may be velvet, but friends and foes will find that there is—and will continue to be—a firm hand inside it.

The Approach to Issues and Trends

As we come to grips with current issues and provide support to our diplomacy, it is essential that we in the national security community abandon old stereotypes. Lord Keynes once claimed that: “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. . . .” Where one issue in particular is concerned, some of us give the impression of becoming the slaves, if not to a defunct economist at least to some strategist from a bygone age.

I refer to the Panama Canal. On this issue, in this day and age, it is surely unreasonable to cling to obsolete asserted rights and outmoded claimed privileges at the risk of losing everything—or of preserving our position only at a terrible cost in blood, treasure, and long-term hostility. The issue of the Panama Canal is not the sanctity of treaties or the maintenance of essential U.S. security interests; we have successfully insisted on both.

Successful completion of negotiations will result in the United States and the Republic of Panama signing a new treaty binding the two parties until the year 2000. The treaty will guarantee the neutrality of the canal, the access of all U.S. ships to it in peace and war, and U.S. protection of it in collaboration with Panama.

If we do not obtain such a treaty, those rights will just as surely be in jeopardy. According to the best informed military opinion, we can’t defend the canal from a hostile Panama. It is too vulnerable to a sack of dynamite—or to a glove in the gears. Our relations with Latin America will deteriorate. We will be worse off without a reasonable revision of the existing treaty than with one.

Accordingly, the real issue before us is whether we, as a party to the original treaty, have the imagination, the magnanimity, and the realism to recognize that a number of fundamental social and ethical conditions have changed and that it is in our self-interest to renegotiate the treaty.

I believe we have those qualities and that on this issue, as on others, we can make progress in defusing what could otherwise become an explosive situation into which troublemakers might be drawn.

Where longer term trends are concerned, the desirability of controling nuclear proliferation cannot be in question from the standpoint of national security. The President’s determination to conserve energy supplies and reduce our dependence on foreign oil makes equally good sense on the same grounds. So do efforts to review outstanding issues with old foes and former adversaries.

The Role of Defense

Finally, if we are to achieve a reasonable settlement of explosive current issues and have the time to affect longer run trends before they become explosive, we and our allies have work to do in the realm of defense. If we are to bring other and more constructive instruments to bear on international problems, our collective security system must be effective, reliable, and durable.

Strength breeds the confidence not only to talk but also to institute constructive change. I regret, in this connection, that I cannot review in detail my trip to the Republic of Korea and Japan.⁴ First, I must report on it to the President. But this much I can say: The situation on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia has changed greatly since 1950. The Sino-Soviet dispute is now a fact of life. No one should doubt that the United States will remain a major power in the western Pacific and East Asia. Our capability for the rapid deployment of U.S. forces has been enhanced and will be strengthened still further.

Elements of our tactical Air Force will remain in South Korea, and other units—ground, naval, and air—will be in the theater. The Republic of Korea, for its part, now has twice the population and five times the GNP of North Korea. Above all, we will continue to work with our Korean ally to assure that any attack from the North can be defeated even after the 4–5-year period during which the U.S. ground forces will be withdrawn from the peninsula. Surely those are powerful conditions of deterrence and stability.

Make no mistake about it; we are determined to maintain and modernize our collective security system. We are equally determined, to the extent that the arms competition cannot be brought under control, to strengthen the competitive position of the United States.

Where our allies have developed the necessary strengths, we will adjust the collective burdens to assure that our long-term security arrangements remain commensurate with the capabilities and stakes of the partners. Otherwise those arrangements cannot endure.

Where technology has produced total or partial substitutes for more traditional weapons systems, and has done the job efficiently, we will—with all due caution—begin the substitution. That, in fact, is the main basis for planning to turn over some of the functions of the penetrating manned bomber to long-range cruise missiles and canceling production of the B–1.

Where inefficiencies exist, as in our use of scarce personnel and our maintenance of an excessive base structure—and other overhead—we will attack them as vigorously as our other problems. Furthermore, we will not be deterred from that attack—although we may on occasion be delayed—by domestic political obstacles.

Most important of all, where increases in hostile foreign forces threaten our ability to maintain the conditions of collective security, we will insure the restoration of our position. Nothing in history suggests that we can reach our goals from a position of weakness.

We are not in a position of weakness in those functions and regions we consider vital to our security. The strategic nuclear balance, despite the Soviet buildup, remains in equilibrium. The balance of tactical power in Europe is more precarious, but it has not yet tilted against NATO to the point where deterrence of the Warsaw Pact is threatened. If another war begins in the Middle East, it will not be because of a lack of Israeli strength. The situation in Korea, in our judgment, is and can be kept militarily stable, despite increases in North Korean offensive power. And our naval forces still control the sea lanes to Europe, the Middle East, and northeast Asia.

There is where we would prefer to halt the military competition and begin the process of equitable arms reduction. From the standpoint of the United States, now is the time to stop the buildup—if others are willing, end the folly of nuclear proliferation, and cease the wasteful transfer of conventional arms in excess of their real needs to developing nations.

But we cannot bring about those results unilaterally. If others will not cooperate, we will adapt. Certainly we will not shrink from a world that demands increased strength as well as greater justice.

I realize that I have outlined a complex approach to the problems of national security. At times the approach may appear internally inconsistent. It is not. We can move toward the peaceful resolution of international differences only if the conditions of collective security are maintained. We can maintain the conditions of collective security—without excessive cost and risk—only if we move to resolve current international differences and deal constructively with long-term trends.

To do both we need moral, diplomatic, and economic—as well as military—strength. We also need your understanding and support.

1. Source: Department of State Bulletin, September 5, 1977, pp. 297–301. All brackets are in the original. Brown spoke before the World Affairs Council of Northern California. For the text of the question-and-answer session following Brown’s remarks, see ibid., pp. 301–304.
2. Reference is to the cancellation of the B–1 bomber (see footnote 2, Document 51) and the development of enhanced radiation weapons (ERW). Documentation about ERW is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977–1983.
3. Reference is to the President’s decision to withdraw 33,000 U.S. Army troops from South Korea beginning in 1978 and concluding in 1982 or 1983. On May 11, the Department of State announced that Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General George Brown and Habib would fly to Seoul on May 24 to engage in talks with South Korean officials. (Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. and Seoul to Start Discussion Of Troop Pullout Late This Month,” The New York Times, May 12, 1977, p. 4) On June 5, the administration announced that it had informed the Governments of South Korea and Japan that the United States would remove 6,000 American ground troops from South Korea by the end of 1978. (Bernard Gwertzman, “6,000 Ground Troops in Korea Will Leave by end of Next Year: Timetable is Disclosed by U.S.” The New York Times, June 6, 1977, p. 1)
4. Brown attended the tenth annual Republic of Korea-United States Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul July 25–26. At the conclusion of the meeting, Brown and South Korean Defense Minister Suh Jong Chul issued a joint statement affirming that the ground combat force withdrawals did not signify a change in U.S. commitment to the security of South Korea. The statement also indicated that the majority of U.S. soldiers stationed in South Korea would remain there until the final year of the withdrawal. (Bernard Weintraub, “U.S. Will Keep Bulk of Combat Forces in Korea Until 1982: Response to Plea by Seoul,” The New York Times, July 27, 1977, pp. 1, 6) On July 27, Brown, then in Tokyo, briefed Fukuda and other Japanese Cabinet ministers as to the nature of the agreement. (John Saar, “Brown Allays Japanese Misgivings About U.S. Withdrawal Forces From Korea,” The Washington Post, July 28, 1977, p. A–14) Documentation on Brown’s trip is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIV, Japan; Korea.