Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

64. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Bonn, November 4, 1974, 11:55 a.m.–1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting Between SecDef and Minister of Defense Georg Leber (Open Session) (4 November 1974)

PARTICIPANTS

• Federal Republic of Germany Side
• Minister of Defense—Georg Leber
• Chief of Staff, Federal Armed Forces, FMOD—Admiral Armin Zimmermann
• Personal Assistant to the Minister of Defense—Dr. Walter Stuetzle
• Director, Information and Press Staff, FMOD—Armin Halle
• Director, Planning Staff, FMOD—Vice Admiral Rolf Steinhaus
• Assistant Chief of Staff, Politico-Military Affairs and Operations, Armed Forces Staff, FMOD—Rear Admiral Herbert Trebesch
• Assistant for Arms Control, Disarmament and MBFR, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Politico-Military Affairs and Operations, Armed Forces Staff, FMOD—Colonel Peter Tandecki
• Assistant for Politico-Military Policy and Nuclear Affairs, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Politico-Military Affairs and Operations, Armed Forces Staff, FMOD—Colonel Wolfgang Altenberg
• Adjutant to the Minister of Defense—Lieutenant Colonel Peter Heinrich Carstens
• Interpreter—Mr. Egon Dudka
• Interpreter—Mr. Karl Freudenstein
• United States Side
• Secretary of Defense—James R. Schlesinger
• Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA—Robert Ellsworth
• United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany—Martin J. Hillenbrand
• Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, PA—William Beecher
• Secretary of Defense Representative to MBFR Negotiations—Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
• Director, Net Assessment—Andrew W. Marshall
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), European and NATO Affairs—Harry E. Bergold, Jr.
• Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense—Major General John A. Wickham, Jr., USA
• Defense Advisor, United States Mission to NATO—Dr. Laurence J. Legere
• United States Defense and Army Attaché to the Federal Republic of Germany—Colonel Hanz K. Druener, USA
• Politico-Military Affairs Officer, United States Embassy, Bonn—Robert A. Remole
• Assistant for Central Europe, European Region, ISA—Colonel David E. Hartigan, Jr., USA
• Interpreter—Major Klaus F. Loehr, USAF

1. (U) Opening Remarks

MOD Leber welcomed SecDef and members of his party to the Federal Republic of Germany and to the Federal Ministry of Defense, noting that the occasion marked the first official visit to the FRG by a United States Secretary of Defense since the Alliance was formed. He emphasized that the visit was highly important, both politically and psychologically, and that, though our contacts at all levels are exceptionally good and close, it is necessary for ministers to meet and talk on a recurring basis, since some matters always require resolution at that level. MOD Leber noted that there was not a fixed agenda for the open-session discussions, but hoped that both delegations might address topics of mutual interest. SecDef responded that he was delighted to visit his friend and colleague, Georg Leber, and added that, though he had visited the FRG on earlier occasions, an extra note of piquancy attended his visit as an official guest of the Minister of Defense.

2. (C) Conventional Force Improvements

MOD Leber began the formal discussions by noting that he and his staff have followed closely the activities of our Congress and are well aware of the pressures being exerted to strengthen the conventional component of U.S. forces. In fact, he continued, the FRG began improving its conventional forces when it became clear that it was in this area that our attention was focused. The restructuring of the Bundeswehr is a beginning move in the direction of an improved conventional force; it should be viewed not simply as an organizational exercise, but as a genuine effort to make the Bundeswehr more effective and to orient it more specifically toward the threat. The overall objective is to make the deterrent more credible and to eliminate those gaps in the deterrent posture which, if not corrected, would lower the nuclear threshold. To attain these goals, the antitank capabilities of the Federal Armed Forces are to be qualitatively and quantitatively increased in the next two years; three additional brigades will be formed to achieve a 36-brigade force; an optimum distribution of all types of weapons and weapon systems is being worked out; and the mountain division, for which there is no viable mission—as presently configured and geographically oriented—is being converted to a mechanized infantry division and reoriented toward the threat from the East. These are but examples of the FRG’s efforts to improve the conventional balance and to raise the nuclear threshold.

SecDef congratulated MOD Leber on the positive steps being taken to increase the combat capabilities of the Bundeswehr. Reflecting that the Soviets have continued to strengthen their forces, overall—and notably those in Eastern Europe—since 1969, he noted that actions being taken to improve the Bundeswehr were not in conflict with, but, rather, in the true spirit of, détente. In fact, the West should adopt the Soviet view in its entirety and, by strengthening its forces, achieve the balance required to sustain détente. With this goal in mind, improvements being made in the conventional combat capabilities of the Bundeswehr are most appreciated. We, too, plan improvements, the most noteworthy of which will be to increase our ground combat power in Europe by more than two brigades. Though it will be necessary to work out a number of details connected with the deployment of additional U.S. forces, the overall effect—regardless of specific deployment areas decided upon—will be that of strengthening the West.

MOD Leber noted that he was especially pleased with our plan to deploy two additional brigades and other combat forces to the FRG. He commented, however, that he is worried about the things he sees happening around us and is very hopeful that our Alliance partners will not view U.S. and FRG force improvements as signals to reduce their forces. There are known existing weaknesses in the area of North Germany, and the Dutch and Belgians progressively are becoming weaker. Aside from what our two nations are doing, there is no evidence of the on-the-spot strengthening of other nations’ forces considered so essential. These matters must be laid out and discussed at the next DPC. Given the state of public and congressional opinion in America, SecDef responded, it is obvious that a collective Europe—even though the term is somewhat ambiguous—must do more, not less. He continued to say that he will not be shy about baring these hard facts to other Alliance partners when and as the need arises. Remarking on the interest shown by the European states in recycling petro-dollars, SecDef noted that some nations might not qualify for the benefits of recycling if they fail to do what is required in the defense sphere. MOD Leber noted that Chancellor Schmidt would be interested in discussing this point with SecDef when they met later in the day.

3. (S) The NATO-Warsaw Pact Conventional Balance

MOD Leber pointed out that, with respect to the conventional balance issue, the FRG has problems where public and parliamentary opinion is concerned, although those problems are not as severe as they are elsewhere in Western Europe. We must exercise reasoned restraint in explaining to the public that we have reached, or are approaching, a conventional balance. If we fail to do so, the attitude no doubt will be that, given a balance, Alliance members can relax and do less. In short, we must be careful not to compute ourselves into a theoretical box. SecDef said that he agreed entirely. The United States has not suggested that a conventional balance exists at this time. There are known deficiencies. On the Hill, SecDef pointed out, he advises the Congress that a conventional balance is not hopeless, but is within reach, if we take appropriate steps. The numeric ingredients exist, but a balance yet is to be achieved. We must do more to improve our forces and to deter Soviet aggression, but what we do must be done within given resource limits. On the one hand, we must not suggest that the Warsaw Pact is so overwhelmingly strong that our case is hopeless; on the other hand, we must demonstrate that, though there are problems, a stalwart conventional capability is not beyond our reach.

SecDef pointed out that we should develop conclusions concerning the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance based upon our military appreciation of the situation and then decide what our objectives should be. We know that the USSR has some very considerable weaknesses; we should be aware of those weaknesses and prepared to exploit them. We should not say that a conventional balance exists, today, or apathy will ensue; at the same time, we must not argue that we are hopelessly outclassed. We must get the military balance problem and issue on the table, but we must not allow our military appreciation to be driven by public opinion. We want to assure ourselves and others that the position of the United States is driven by the best military appreciation we can get. We press for improvements in our conventional forces and improvements are being made. Everyone must look at the hard, cold facts. Each member of the Alliance is entitled to its own views; each member is not welcome, however, to its own facts. The entire matter must be examined practically.

The Soviets, SecDef continued, have some very serious problems; some weaknesses are apparent in MC–161. For example, Soviet naval forces are weak, logistics problems plague the land and air forces, and land forces lag far behind ours in mechanization. To illustrate the latter point, the Soviets’ 69 divisions are equipped with 18,000 APCs, while there are 15,000 APCs in the United States’ 13 divisions. In this and other areas, we enjoy a marked edge. We should capitalize on our strengths and exploit the enemy’s weaknesses. We might, for instance, remind the Czechs of the ignominious outcome of the Bohemian Revolt and Tilly’s defeat of Frederick’s Army in the Battle of White Mountain in 1620; encourage them not to cooperate with the Soviets in an East-West conflict; and assure them that, if an attempt is made to overrun the West, there will be no postwar Czechoslovakia. Signals and clues along these lines would add to the Czechs’ already somewhat ambivalent attitude. Similar approaches could be made with respect to Poland and the GDR. These are areas of opportunity we should be investigating. We must think in terms of our opponents’ vulnerabilities and seize the opportunity to exploit them. We must not continue to brood, as we have since the 1952 Lisbon session of the North Atlantic Council, over our imagined overwhelming weaknesses. We continue to outspend the USSR in the defense sphere, and there is no reason to be apologetic about our capabilities. The threat, inherently, is not one that we cannot handle. Admiral Trebesch commented that the intelligence community, alone, cannot develop a valid assessment of the conventional balance. Politico-military planners also must be involved in such an assessment. In this connection, he remarked that the trilateral working group charged with assessing the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance had met in Bonn in early-September and that the initial phase of study was progressing satisfactorily.

MOD Leber commented that he had pointed out at a recent senior commanders’ conference that members of the Ministry of Defense and commanders in the field must be cautious about what they say concerning the Pact’s strengths and NATO’s weaknesses. On the one hand, the public must be made aware of existing asymmetries in order to prove that additional resources are needed; but, on the other hand, we must be careful that, in pointing out those asymmetries, we do not exert a deleterious psychological impact on the armed forces, since they take such matters seriously. When one emphasizes the fact that NATO’s 6,000 tanks are opposed by the Pact’s 26,000, young officers quite naturally ask what chance they stand of avoiding defeat, given such an imbalance. We must, Leber continued, get away from such weapon-for-weapon analyses as are presented in Brussels briefings.

4. (C) Nature and Strategy of the Alliance

MOD Leber conjectured that it would be a good thing if the defensive nature of the Alliance were highlighted more clearly and less emphasis placed on quantitative weapons comparisons. Recalling a recent conversation with the USSR’s ambassador to the FRG, Valentin Falin, MOD Leber said that he told Falin that the West doesn’t plan to take offensive action against the East and sees no need, therefore, to match, tank for tank, the Pact’s continuing buildup. Furthermore, for each new offensive weapon system added to the Eastern arsenal, the West will develop and field a technologically superior weapon to counter it. By any method of calculation, defensive weapon systems are less expensive than offensive ones. Minister Leber emphasized that the same message should be conveyed to other members of the Pact. The West has no aggressive intentions, but it is resolved to develop so credible a defensive capability that, regardless how the Pact computes relativity, the East will be forced to recognize that there is no possibility for a successful outcome should it attempt to overrun the West. MOD Leber suggested that this should be a subject for discussion at the next DPC. SecDef agreed that the defensive nature of the Alliance and the aggressive nature of the Warsaw Pact should be highlighted for our publics and parliaments. However, we should not be so defensive-minded as to rule out necessary planning for counteroffensive actions to rectify the situation when penetrations have been made. In other words, don’t let the opponent know that you can’t come back at him. Impress on him that his territory is not entirely safe. SecDef agreed, too, that poor-mouthing the capabilities of our forces is bad. If members of the forces are convinced that they are going to be defeated, they will be. Thankfully, however, the farther one gets from the headquarters and the closer one gets to the troops, the higher the level of confidence. MOD Leber noted his agreement with SecDef’s conviction that we must possess tactical offensive forces and the capability to counterattack.

In response to SecDef’s remark that he hopes that our planners are taking into account these contingencies, Admiral Zimmermann assured SecDef that NATO has a number of plans which provide for offensive action. None of those plans, however, provides for a major attack into Pact territory, though some, as everyone knows, do provide for such offensive actions as may be required to insure that West Berlin is not seized. In the education and training of young German officers, every effort is made to inculcate an offensive spirit, and that spirit is not lacking. One must not forget, however, that their political masters have assigned NATO forces an essentially defensive mission, as set forth in MC–14/3. Regardless, FRG leaders are not unmindful that their nation is the one most subject to disaster, and plans for local offensive action do exist. MOD Leber interjected that a troublesome aspect of the strategy of forward defense is that no adequate definition yet has been developed concerning how one defends forward after a Pact attack. The problem has been staffed many times, but it requires additional consideration. Admiral Zimmermann pointed out that staff-level military planners have been talking for years about the need to investigate, in detail, the strengths and weaknesses of both sides and, as SecDef suggested earlier, to capitalize on our strengths and to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses.

Agreeing with Admiral Zimmermann that the best defense is a good offense, SecDef noted that, in addition to capitalizing on our known strengths, we should devote more energy to correcting our weaknesses and, thereby, to increasing our strengths. Historically, NATO has looked for weaknesses to brood over—so much so, in fact, that it has developed a “NATO neurosis.” To spend 364 days looking at one’s own weaknesses and but one day examining the enemy’s is not a precisely correct balance!

Admiral Trebesch sounded a note of caution when he noted that NATO’s use of the term “conventional component” could be misinterpreted by the Warsaw Pact as a signal that there was some weakening of the strong bond between complementary conventional and tactical nuclear forces. He fears that the East might view our heightened emphasis on conventional forces as a reversion to the old “screening-force” concept, which could be ruinous to the strategy of forward defense.

Where forward defense is concerned, SecDef said, he would like to think of a line extending through Leipzig and Stettin, rather than one along the FRG’s borders with the GDR and Czechoslovakia. He agreed with Admiral Trebesch that a “screening-force” concept would create tremendous psychological problems. What we need is a solid forward defense capability which the Soviets will respect and hold in awe. The USSR remembers German forces at the gates of Moscow, and those recollections cannot help but exert a deterrent effect on the Soviet leadership. It is for this reason that, in MBFR, the Soviets want to see the FRG’s forces reduced and the forces of Western Europe integrated.

MOD Leber noted that the duration-of-conflict issue remains unresolved and must be addressed. His judgment is that the longer the conflict lasts, the weaker the West will become. If the war should extend beyond 20 days, given the highly industrialized and populated nature of Western Europe, industry and the populace would be devastated; the war-making capacity of West Europeans would be neutralized. For this reason, it is imperative that strong forces be disposed well forward and that the strongest possible defense be conducted in the initial phase of a war.

5. (S) Elements of Ministerial Guidance

MOD Leber emphasized that the FRG is particularly concerned that, in the U.S.-tabled paper on ministerial guidance, our emphasis on improving conventional forces might be viewed by the Warsaw Pact as a decoupling of Alliance conventional and nuclear capabilities and, hence, as a change in strategy. Such a perception could be arrived at by the Pact, if, given continued European negligence in the conventional field, it deduces that the United States will not employ tactical nuclear weapons to close the gaps created by that neglect and will opt not to introduce tactical nuclear weapons until first use is made by the opponent.

Also, with respect to our proposed ministerial guidance, Leber went on to say that to increase defense expenditures by three percent, in real terms and on an annual basis, would pose near-insoluble problems for the FRG and other West European nations. The fact of the matter is that defense budgets can’t be stretched by three percent. This is true, for example, in the cases of Italy and the United Kingdom, which cannot increase their defense outlays for economic reasons, and of Belgium and the Netherlands, which are politically constrained. He noted that the FRG’s defense budget is growing, albeit modestly, and that a greater share of each year’s defense budget is being devoted to capital expenditures—31 percent this year and 32 percent next year—in order to insure that necessary modernization of the Bundeswehr is financed.

SecDef acknowledged that he recognizes Leber’s, and others’, concerns about some elements of the U.S.-tabled paper on ministerial guidance. It could be interpreted, he noted, as placing disproportionate weight on conventional capabilities, but it is in this area that we historically have been weakest. Reminding Leber that the French, for many years, had devoted a disproportionate share of their resources to developing nuclear forces, SecDef noted that France now recognizes that its conventional forces—deteriorated over time—must be built up. This is becoming an orthodox view throughout the West. Today, we continue to hold a tactical nuclear advantage; for the next few years, the strategic balance will be maintained. But, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the Alliance’s conventional-force deficit is its most serious problem. We, individually and collectively, must devote the necessary energy to resolve that problem.

On the other hand, SecDef continued, the United States is prepared—if necessary—to put more stress on the tactical nuclear component of the NATO Triad, if that is the way the Europeans want to go. It would be less expensive and involve less risk for the U.S. to go “all nuclear;” the risk for Europe—particularly the FRG—would be extremely high, however, were it to rely exclusively on nuclear weapons to counter Warsaw Pact aggression. In short, our emphasis on enhanced conventional capabilities looks out for Europe’s best interests; a credible conventional force is the best deterrent against a large-scale attack and, if needed, can counter and defeat small-scale attacks.

There has been no decoupling of tactical nuclear from conventional forces, SecDef emphasized, and actions taken in the past year were designed to forestall perceptions in the USSR that there has been, or will be, a decoupling of tactical and strategic forces. The three legs of the Triad are mutually supporting; their existence should deter a Warsaw Pact attack. There must be no question in the minds of leaders on either side: the Alliance will use nuclear weapons when needed and advantageous. This will continue to obtain when a conventional force balance is achieved. We will not forfeit the initiative to use tactical nuclear weapons; on the other hand, we don’t want to be forced to resort to their use. This principle has underlain the United States’ strategy for years. We want and seek a range of options designed for selective use in a variety of circumstances.

Admiral Trebesch noted his agreement with what SecDef had said, and remarked that he had read with great interest the text of SecDef’s speech at the AUSA’s Marshall Memorial Dinner in October. He was struck, in particular, by SecDef’s intellectual approach to the problem of balancing conventional and nuclear capabilities.

In addition to improving our conventional forces, SecDef continued, we also must attain appropriate stock levels of conventional munitions, if we are to have the capability to outlast an opponent in a nonnuclear war. We don’t want to run out of nonnuclear munitions and be forced to turn to tactical nuclear weapons. The British, for example, favor going short on their conventional munitions stocks. The logical counterargument, of course, is to visualize a situation in which the West is winning and to ask oneself whether, because all conventional munitions have been expended, we want to be forced to resort to the use of nuclear weapons. The alternative would be to withdraw or to accept eventual defeat—a situation similar to Prescott’s at Bunker Hill, where, though winning the battle, he ran out of ammunition in the course of Howe’s second assault on the center redoubt and was forced to retire from the field.

MOD Leber responded that he found SecDef’s views to be most interesting and that he agreed that the best scenario one might envisage would be one in which the West possessed sufficient capabilities at all levels of conflict. Hopefully, our obvious capabilities would be so convincing to the Pact that there would be no war. In his judgment, the West must retain its capability for flexible response, it must be prepared to defend well forward, and strong conventional forces—complemented by tactical nuclear forces—must be built and maintained.

6. (S) Internal Problems of the Warsaw Pact

SecDef reflected that the Soviets are not yet confident of their hold over the East European satellites, and that their lack of confidence disadvantageously influences their attitudes toward MBFR. This is, to some extent at least, a disingenuous argument; but the fact is that the USSR is concerned about that part of the battlefield’s rear area which would lie in Poland and about the reliability of Czech forces. The Soviets fear they may lose in an all out confrontation with the West. Admiral Steinhaus speculated that the East European nations would become less reliable and less inclined to look upon their territories as sanctuaries if they could foresee and meditate upon the catastrophic effects that an expanded use of tactical nuclear weapons would exert on their industries and people. SecDef replied that that message can be conveyed to the East Europeans. Furthermore, they should be made aware of the fact that their success on a conventional battlefield would result in their total destruction.

7. (S) Overall Nuclear Strategy

Colonel Altenberg pointed out that he has made an intensive effort to understand SecDef’s policy on the use of nuclear weapons. As a matter of fact, he said, he has become known in the FMOD as the “Schlesinger expert.” He continued to say that the Alliance has worked hard over the past decade to develop its nuclear strategy, but that the strategy still is missing some elements. At the 56th Military Committee-Chiefs of Staff Meeting, he recalled, Admiral Moorer presented the United States’ strategy for the initial and follow-on use of nuclear weapons. Now, the “R-Hour” concept has been introduced. What, Altenberg asked, is SecDef’s interpretation of the R-Hour concept? Could nuclear weapons be employed before R-Hour? If so, would consultations take place? SecDef responded that consultations must take place. He continued to say that he sees no problems with the overall strategy; the purpose of having options is to protect Western Europe, not the North American continent. Our objective is to make the Soviets realize that they cannot be secure and that there is nothing that we won’t do in the service of our vital interests. Tactical nuclear weapons are a better deterrent in non-crisis than in crisis situations. In periods of crisis, we must be able to demonstrate to the East that the West has capabilities it won’t hesitate to use. However, we don’t want to take precipitous actions which would result in the destruction of Western Europe, especially in that of the FRG.

Continuing, SecDef emphasized that the Alliance always will need options, we don’t want to have our hand forced because of doctrinal rigidities. Our stress on conventional forces derives from the fact that it is in this area that our argument for the need for additional resources must be made. Once the conventional-force malaise has been cured, we shall want to improve our tactical nuclear weapons and the doctrine for their use. In this respect, SecDef noted that he is dissatisfied with the doctrine for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons. Now that we no longer enjoy a preponderance, a new doctrine—arrived at in consultation with our allies—is needed. Altenberg laughingly rejoined that “Schlesinger doctrine” becomes NATO doctrine.

8. (C) Standardization and Armaments Cooperation

MOD Leber commented that one of our great problems is that the Pact forces possess uniform equipment, whereas NATO’s is tremendously diverse. We have made very little progress toward standardization. The two questions foremost in his mind Leber noted, concern the standardization of short-range air defense systems and of main battle tanks. In his judgment, we must reach early decisions in these areas, and the sooner the better. SecDef answered that, though competitive evaluations are not complete, we expect to select a European product where SHORADS is concerned. The MBT problem is somewhat more complex. Ideally, we would like to see a three-way runoff among the Chrysler and General Motors Corporations’ products and the Leopard II. Practically, however, it appears that modifications to the Leopard II cannot be completed in time to permit a three-tank competitive evaluation without completely skewing the schedule against which Chrysler and General Motors are working. SecDef urged that the Leopard II be modified as soon as possible, and assured MOD Leber that the modified tank would be a welcome competitor against either both U.S. products, if the FRG’s modified tank is delivered in time, or the winner of the Chrysler-General Motors runoff.

Admiral Zimmermann mentioned that the FRG is experiencing some difficulty in negotiating a memorandum of understanding with the United States Navy which will permit moving forward on the AIM–9L air-to-air missile. He reminded SecDef that the FRG had withdrawn from its cooperative venture with Norway to develop the Viper air-intercept missile, and now was working with us to marry the German-developed infrared seeker to our H-model Sidewinder. If our cooperative endeavor is successful, the product will be an outstanding air-to-air missile that could be used by all of NATO’s air forces. SecDef assured Admiral Zimmerman that we would look into the matter and determine what needs to be done to get things moving.

1. Summary: Schlesinger, Leber, and U.S. and FRG officials discussed various issues in U.S., FRG, and NATO defense.

   Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–77–0054, 333 Germany 20 Nov 74. Secret. Drafted by Assistant for Central Europe, European Region, Colonel David Hartigan, Jr.; and approved by Ellsworth on November 20.