Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

63. Telegram 229458 From the Department of State to All North Atlantic Treaty Organization Capitals¹

Washington, October 18, 1974, 1535Z.

Subject: NATO Ministerial Guidance. Ref: USNATO 5132 (NTTAL).

1. For Paris: You are authorized to draw on substance of following letter from SecDef to NATO DPC MOD’s for use in discussions with senior country officials as appropriate.

2. For Athens: We would appreciate Embassy views on following alternatives: A. Deliver letter in present form to Averoff, B. Send letter with covering note from Ambassador which would put letter in Greek perspective, C. Provide oral briefing to Defense Ministry on letter’s substance, or D. Do nothing.

3. For USNATO: You may make text available to SYG Luns for his information. Please pouch complete text of US discussion paper on Ministerial guidance to US DEL MBFR, Vienna, if not already furnished.

4. For other NATO capitals: Request Embassies pass the following message of October 17, 1974, from Secretary of Defense James R Schlesinger to Minister of Defense (Reykjavik to Prime Minister or Minister of Foreign Affairs as appropriate).

Begin text: Dear Mr. Minister: The United States has tabled in NATO a draft text dealing with key elements of Ministerial guidance and embodying a proposed long-range concept for NATO defense. Ambassador Rumsfeld has furnished a copy to your permanent representative in Brussels.

I would like to share with you the reasoning which led to our submission.

We see NATO’s success in assuring peace in Europe since World War II as bringing with it a new generation that knows no war and questions the need for large expenditures on defense. We face a public that challenges the utility and even the necessity of NATO defense.

We see the Warsaw Pact as strengthening its military position facing NATO, even in a period of negotiations on SALT, CSCE, and MBFR. To maintain a credible deterrent in this situation, we must provide for improvements in NATO forces, although not necessarily on a one-for-one matching basis.

We are clearly in difficult economic times, when we can expect no major increases in defense funding. We face the challenge, therefore, of going before Finance Ministers and our people and parliaments with defense resource requests which will provide an acceptable and coherent defense at a reasonable price.

These difficulties did not arise overnight and are complicated by recent trends: the Soviets have steadily continued to increase their military capabilities (e.g., Soviet attainment of strategic nuclear parity and the expanded deployment of the Soviet fleet); Allied costs for supporting military personnel and procuring modern equipment have risen sharply; and public expectations for improved East-West relations have been heightened by CSCE, MBFR, and SALT negotiations.

In the Atlantic Declaration recently signed by heads of governments, Allied nations pledged renewed commitment to collective security.

We believe that NATO must now agree on a long-range defense concept, in support of the agreed NATO strategy, which will permit us to meet these major concerns and permit us to put together a stalwart conventional capability, as a major part of the NATO triad, that will provide the underpinning for the political stamina of NATO nations for the long haul.

The US draft tabled in NATO addresses these concepts. It adds a long-range defense concept to the traditional Ministerial guidance. It also expands the traditional guidance to cover country and common program efforts, as well as guiding the NATO military authorities.

Agreement to specific language in the US draft is not so important as the serious examination and discussion of the key elements. We are particularly anxious to have a thorough discussion of the problems by Ministers in December, under the agenda item of key elements of Ministerial guidance.

We think the key elements of a defense concept for NATO over the long haul would include the following:

—Rationale for the continued need for an effective NATO defense;

—Projection of requirements for increasing resource levels, involving marginal annual increases in real terms (three percent);

—Continued emphasis on conventional capability within the framework of NATO’s current strategy;

—Attainment and maintenance of a perceptible conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact within projected resource levels;

—Search for additional defense effectiveness within roughly present resources through rationalization, standardization, increased common support programs, and other forms of cooperation, and through rigorous application of priorities in force improvements;

—Increased flexibility in planned use of NATO forces, both those forward deployed and reinforcements.

Clearly, an indispensable part of the concept would be a more comprehensive mechanism for monitoring its implementation.

In summary, we have tabled in NATO what we consider to be a major proposal for supporting and directing the NATO defense effort in the long term, and we hope that this proposal will be considered seriously in NATO committees this fall.

I look forward to a full exchange of views among Ministers in December in Brussels on how NATO can best deal with its defense problems over the long haul.

Sincerely,

James R. Schlesinger

End text.

Kissinger

1. Summary: The Department instructed recipients to relay information on NATO Ministerial guidance to their host governments.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974. Confidential. Also sent for information to the MBFR Delegation in Vienna, USNMR SHAPE, USCINCEUR, USLOSACLANT, CINCLANT, USDEL MC, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and CINCUSAFE. Drafted by James Tyler in OASD/ISA; cleared by Wickham, ASD/ISA, PM/ISP, EUR/RPM, EUR/WE, EUR/SE, C, and S/S; and approved by Lowenstein.