216. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Summary: Kissinger recorded a meeting among Heath, Trend, Nixon, and himself.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 62, Country Files, Europe, General, UK Memcons (Originals), January–April 1973 (2 of 2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger did not initial the memorandum. Heath made an official visit to the United States from February 1 to 2.

217. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Summary: Kissinger recorded a meeting among Heath, Trend, Nixon, and himself.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 62, Country Files, Europe, General, UK Memcons (Originals), January–April 1973 (2 of 2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger did not initial the memorandum. A tape recording of this conversation is ibid., White House Tapes, Executive Office Building, Conversation 406–56; the tape also records a conversation among Heath, Trend, Nixon, and Shultz on economic issues that took place immediately after the meeting among Heath, Trend, Nixon, and Kissinger.

218. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Summary: Kissinger recorded a meeting among Heath, Trend, Nixon, and himself.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 62, Country Files, Europe, General, UK Memcons (Originals), January–April 1973 (2 of 2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger did not initial the memorandum. The meeting began at 4:15 p.m. and ended at 6:45 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

219. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Summary: Kissinger requested Nixon’s guidance on U.S. support for a British submarine missile.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 63, Country Files, Europe, General, Exchanges with the UK—Nuclear. Top Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of Kissinger’s recommendation.

220. Message From British Prime Minister Heath to President Nixon

Summary: Heath discussed his recent talk with Pompidou on the possibility of UK-French nuclear collaboration.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 949, Pompidou/Nixon Mtg. Iceland PM JOHANNESSON, May 31–June 1973 (1 of 3). Top Secret. Nixon underlined the first three words and the last four words of the first sentence of the third paragraph; he also underlined the phrase “about the need to avoid any reference to this subject in public” in the same paragraph. Kissinger forwarded this message to Nixon under cover of a May 29 memorandum, in which he also provided talking points for Nixon’s Reykjavik meeting with Pompidou. Kissinger forwarded the separate message from Heath concerning his non-nuclear discussions with Pompidou to Nixon under cover of a separate May 29 memorandum. (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 64, Country Files, Europe, General, Exchanges with the UK—Other, July 12, 1973 (1 of 3))

221. Memorandum From the President’s National Security Adviser (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Summary: Kissinger forwarded Heath’s letter on the proposed British sale of Rolls Royce Spey airplane engines to China.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 764, Presidential Correspondence, United Kingdom, Prime Minister Edward Heath, 1972. Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not published is Tab A, a June 12 letter to Heath that Nixon signed; and Tab B, an April 25 letter from Heath to Nixon. On June 30, Kissinger spoke to Cromer about the Spey issue. Advising the UK to “stay cool,” Kissinger asserted that after his August trip to China “we can overrule the bureaucracy. Can you wait that long? I’ll talk to the Chinese.” Cromer replied, “Well, I don’t know. I hear rumblings from London that if the reply in COCOM is negative, our people will go ahead anyway.” Kissinger asked Cromer whether he could wait two weeks; Cromer promised to check with London. (Memorandum of conversation, June 30; ibid., NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 64, Country Files, Europe, General, Exchanges with the UK—Other, July 12, 1973 (1 of 3))

222. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Summary: Sonnenfeldt discussed the proposed British sale of Rolls Royce Spey airplane engines to China.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 64, Country Files, Europe, General, Exchanges with the UK—Other, July 12, 1973 (1 of 3). Secret. Sent for urgent action. Attached but not published is Tab A, a draft memorandum to Nixon; Tab B, the UK aide-mémoire and draft COCOM submission; and Tab C, an undated paper entitled, “Procedures on COCOM Exceptions Requests.” Kissinger wrote at the top of the memorandum, “Put Pres. memo into files. Tell State + Defense to oppose low key. I’ll handle with Rush.” On July 10, Cromer told Kissinger that the UK wanted “to tie the Chinese into the West in a way that gets them on board, and incidentally it is of some commercial benefit to us.” Kissinger replied, “Our problem is tactical. For reasons of our own we want to strengthen China.” After noting DOD’s opposition to the proposal, Kissinger stated, “We favor it. The only question is whether to give it a low-key protest or bless it.” (Memorandum of conversation, July 10; ibid.)

223. Memorandum From Philip Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Summary: Odeen discussed the modernization of the UK SLBM force.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 63, Country Files, Europe, General, Exchange with the UK—SLBMs (2 of 2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Completely Outside the System. Sent for action. Attached but not published is Tab A. In a July 26 note to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt wrote, “With the exchange with Heath now underway on Year of Europe and Trend coming over, I don’t see how the message Phil suggests can now be sent.” In an undated note to Kissinger, Scowcroft agreed with Sonnenfeldt and suggested talking to “Schlesinger, on whom we have depended for all our technical data and guidance.” (Ibid.) Kissinger clarified the U.S. position on the MIRVed Poseidon in a July 30 talk with Trend; see Document 27. Memoranda of conversation on Kissinger’s May 10 talks with UK officials are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 62, Country Files, Europe, General, UK Memcons HAK London Trip (originals), May 1973.

224. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Springsteen) and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Porter)

Summary: Springsteen and Cline discussed whether legal action might be taken to impede the flow of private American financial support to the IRA.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 23–9 UK. Secret; Exdis. INR Deputy Director George C. Denney, Jr. initialed the memorandum on Cline’s behalf. Drafted by Stephen Dawkins of EUR/NE; with concurrences in INR/DDC/OIL, EUR,H, and EUR/NE. In an August 30 memorandum to Stoessel and Cline, Porter noted recent assertions “that American money buys 75% of the guns and explosives used by the IRA Provisionals” and asserted that the U.S. had “to take new measures against this particular brand of terrorism.” Porter asked whether the FBI could investigate the veracity of the financial information contained within the foreign agent registration forms filed by Noraid and INAC and, if it found that funds were being improperly used to buy weapons and explosives, take action. (Ibid.)

225. Telegram 11720 From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 730, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom—Vol. #8 (October 1972–September 1973). Top Secret; Flash; Nodis. 4 pages not declassified.]

226. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Springsteen) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: Springsteen discussed attached pressure point options in light of British policies during the October 1973 Middle East war.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL UK–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Carroll Floyd in EUR/NE on October 29; with concurrences by William A. Buell in EUR/NE and Stabler.

227. Memorandum of Conversation

Summary: Schlesinger and Cromer discussed U.S.–UK and U.S.-West European relations in the aftermath of the October 1973 Middle East war.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330–76–117, 333 UK 26 Nov 1973. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, European and NATO Affairs, Harry Bergold; coordinated by Wickham; and approved by Hill. The meeting took place in Schlesinger’s office. A memorandum of conversation on Schlesinger’s November 7 talk with Carrington in The Hague is ibid., 333 UK Approved 26 Nov 1973.

228. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Summary: Kissinger discussed the UK decision on Polaris improvement.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 28, Great Britain, Chronological File, January–April 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Attached but not published is Tab A, an undated message from Nixon to Heath; and Tab B, an undated memorandum signed by Scowcroft on Kissinger’s behalf to Schlesinger, Ray, and Rush. Tab C was not attached. Kissinger did not initial the memorandum and Nixon did not indicate his preferences among the recommendations; however, an attached undated note from Scowcroft reads, “Action approved verbally by the President, January 17, 1974.” Heath’s undated message to Nixon, sent under cover of a January 2 letter from Cromer, is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 63, Country Files, Europe, General, Exchange with the UK—SLBMs (2 of 2). Nixon’s reply, in message WH40301 to Heath, January 19, is ibid., NSC Files, Box 431, Backchannel, Hotlines (all circuits) PRESUS IN/OUT thru Aug. 9, 1974.

229. Backchannel Message Tohak74/WH40189 From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in Jerusalem

Summary: Scowcroft forwarded talking points concerning Diego Garcia and Super Antelope left with him by Cromer that morning.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 43, HAK Trip Files, HAK Trip—Europe & Mid East, Dec 8–22, 1973, TOHAK 71–124, January 10–20, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger initialed his approval of Scowcroft’s recommendation. During a January 17 meeting in the Oval Office, Nixon notified Cromer of his approval of U.S. assistance to the UK Super Antelope program. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1028, Presidential/HAK Memoranda of Conversation, Memcons, 1 Mar 1974–8 May 1974, HAK + Presidential (1 of 4))

230. Telegram 4301 From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

Summary: The Embassy forwarded its thoughts on U.S.–UK relations and EC renegotiation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, the Mission to the EC, the Mission to NATO, and the Mission to the OECD. As a result of the February 28 UK general election, Heath’s majority Conservative government was replaced by a minority Labour government led by Harold Wilson on March 4. On March 28, Kissinger met with Callaghan and Wilson in London; memoranda of conversation on their talks are ibid., Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 7, Nodis Memcons, Mar. 1974, Folder 5.

231. Memorandum of Conversation

Summary: Kissinger, Hunt, and other U.S. and UK officials discussed the U.S.–UK nuclear release agreement, the Labour government’s defense review, and the UK Polaris program.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 24, United Kingdom (16). Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text remains classified, or omitted by the editors. The meeting took place during a luncheon in the Eighth Floor Dining Room at the Department.

232. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Summary: Kissinger discussed the forthcoming general election in the UK, set for October 10.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, UK (3). Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger did not initial the memorandum. Scowcroft wrote at the top of the memorandum, “Pres. has seen.” Wilson’s Labour Party emerged from the October 10 general election with a slim majority government. On December 2, Kissinger sent Ford a memorandum, prepared at Ford’s request, on the prospects for Heath and the Conservative Party. (Ibid.)

233. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Summary: Kissinger forwarded for Ford’s approval a message to Wilson concerning the UK defense review.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 24, UK (18). Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action. Ford initialed his approval of the message, which he also signed. In telegram 252408 to London, November 15, the Department reported on the November 12 meeting referred to by Kissinger in his memorandum to Ford. (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, UK—State Dept Tels from SECSTATE—NODIS (1)) In telegram 253747 to London, November 18, the Department forwarded detailed comments on the UK defense review. (Ibid.)

234. Message From British Prime Minister Wilson to President Ford

Summary: Wilson replied to Ford’s message on the UK defense review.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 24, UK (18). Secret. A notation at the top of the message indicates that Kennedy forwarded the message to Scowcroft for Kissinger. In telegram 15372 to London, January 22, 1975, the Department forwarded the British response to U.S. comments on the UK defense review. (Ibid., Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, UK—State Department Telegrams NODIS—From SECSTATE (2)) In telegram 4000 from London, March 14, 1975, the Embassy assessed the UK defense review. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975, [no film number])

235. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Summary: The memorandum explored the topic, “The UK: Present Problems and Short-Term Prospects.”

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Secret; [text not declassified]

236. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: Lord discussed the importance of the UK on the eve of a visit by Wilson.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy Planning Council, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–1977, Entry 5027, Box 352, Jan. 16–31, 1975. Confidential. Drafted by Bartholomew and John Kornblum in S/P. Wilson and Callaghan paid an official visit to Washington from January 29 to 31. Memoranda of conversation recording their January 30 and 31 meetings with Ford and Kissinger, which covered economic policy, energy, and the Middle East, among other issues, are in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 9.

237. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Summary: Kissinger discussed the crisis in Northern Ireland.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs Staff Files, Box 12, Ireland (2) WH. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger did not initial the memorandum. Clift forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger for his signature under cover of a March 6 memorandum, on which Scowcroft wrote, “Discussed with the President.”

238. Memorandum From the Counselor (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: Sonnenfeldt forwarded an attached memorandum concerning the possibility of UK restrictive trade measures.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 4, Britain 1975. Eyes Only. The attached memorandum is confidential, exdis; drafted by McCarthy in EUR/RPE on November 20; and concurred in by Glitman and Hormats. Also attached but not published is a draft telegram containing the text of a letter from Kissinger to Callaghan. Kissinger did not indicate his preferences among the options proposed in the attached memorandum. At the top of Sonnenfeldt’s memorandum, Kissinger wrote, “Hal—You do it with Ramsbotham.”

239. Telegram 289664 From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Summary: The Department forwarded a message from Kissinger for delivery to Callaghan concerning the possibility of further UK defense cuts.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, UK—State Department Telegrams from SECSTATE—NODIS (4). Secret; Flash; Nodis. Sent immediate for information to the Mission to NATO. Drafted by Vladimir Lehovich and Gerald Helman in EUR/RPM; cleared by Lowenstein, Sonnenfeldt, and C. Arthur Borg in S/S; and approved by Kissinger. In a February 19 memorandum to Scowcroft, Clift summarized a February 17 message from Mason to Rumsfeld on the UK defense cuts. (Ibid., Box 15, UK (6))

240. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Summary: Scowcroft discussed gun-running and other foreign support for the IRA.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 7, Ireland (2). Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it; Ford also initialed the memorandum. The January 22 CIA report on “Sources of Support for Dissidents in Ulster” and Attorney General Edward Levi’s February 27 letter to Scowcroft reviewing the status of Northern Ireland gun-running investigations are both ibid. On March 20, UK official John Moreton thanked Scowcroft for “the forthright terms in which the President and the Prime Minister of Ireland condemned support for violent organizations operating in Northern Ireland in the joint communiqué which they issued on 18 March.” (Ibid., Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 25, UK (21)) The memorandum of conversation of Ford’s March 17 meeting with Cosgrave is ibid., Memoranda of Conversation, Box 18.

241. Telegram 4202 From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

Summary: The Embassy discussed the reasons behind, and implications of, Wilson’s resignation as Prime Minister.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976, [no film number]. Confidential; Priority. Sent priority for information to Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Luxembourg, Paris, Rome, Lisbon, Madrid, Oslo, Stockholm, Vienna, Helsinki, Cairo, New Delhi, Tokyo, Peking, the Mission to the EC, the Mission to NATO the Mission to the OECD, CINCUSAFE, USDOCOSOUTH, USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAREUR, and USNMR SHAPE. Wilson resigned on March 16; Callaghan took over as Prime Minister on April 5. In telegram 5600 from London, April 9, the Embassy concluded that Callaghan would “have little room to maneuver and that his capacity to impose significant change on current government policies and programs, should he desire to do so, will be severely limited.” (Ibid.)

242. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Katz) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Summary: Katz discussed the declining value of the British pound.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 10, POL 2 United Kingdom. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Thomas Forbord in EB/IFD/OMA; cleared by Ernest Preeg in EB/IFD and Norman Achilles in EUR/NE. Katz did not initial the memorandum. In a July 22 message to Ford, Callaghan discussed the UK budget cuts announced that day. (Ibid., Box 4, Britain 1976) In a July 29 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt said “that the British economic actions are almost certainly right in economic terms;” however, he cautioned that “there should be no illusion as this process of retrenchment proceeds, hopefully bringing with it a measure of economic stability, the British defense and international role will continue to diminish. It may be quite true that there is no immediate impact on the UK NATO contribution but obviously there will be an impact as weapons and equipment procurement gets slowed down; and there is also a ripple effect as other countries similarly retrench.” (Ibid.)

243. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Summary: Scowcroft discussed a message from Callaghan on the UK economic situation.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC International Economic Affairs Staff Files, Box 3, Country File, United Kingdom (2). Secret. All brackets are in the original. Attached but not published is Tab A, a September 30 message from Callaghan to Ford. Scowcroft did not initial the memorandum. In an October 2 memorandum to Kissinger, Rogers reported that he, Scowcroft, Hormats, Greenspan, and Yeo, had concluded “that the U.S. Government must be exquisitely careful not to give a false signal to the British, publicly or privately, about our willingness to plead their case with the Fund” and “that this financial issue is becoming too important to be left exclusively to the Treasuries. We are therefore institutionalizing the interagency consultations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 18, NODIS Memcons, September 1976 (Folder 6)) Yeo discussed the situation in London with UK officials. (Backchannel message 325 from London, October 3; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC International Economic Affairs Staff Files, Box 3, Country File, United Kingdom (2))

244. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Summary: Scowcroft relayed a message from Simon on his discussions with UK officials concerning the pound’s declining value.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, United Kingdom (8). Secret. Sent for information. Simon was in Manila for the IMF and World Bank annual meetings.

245. Letter From British Prime Minister Callaghan to President Ford

Summary: Callaghan discussed the UK economic situation.

Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, Box 15, United Kingdom (9). Secret. A November 17 note from David Passage, Kissinger’s Special Assistant, to Sonnenfeldt attached to another copy of this letter indicates that Lever brought the letter with him from London to Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 4, Britain 1976) In a November 10 message to Ford, Callaghan proposed sending Lever to Washington to discuss the UK economic situation. (Ibid.)