343. Telegram 10323 From the Department of State to the Embassy in France1
Paris for Gammon only. Subject: Letter to Foreign Minister.
1. Please transmit following confidential letter as soon as possible to Foreign Minister DeGuiringaud.
2. Dear Louis:
I want you to know personally how much we welcomed your government’s statement last month barring further reprocessing exports and emphasizing nuclear fuel supply and services. We indicated at the time that we view this as an important French contribution to worldwide nonproliferation efforts; I am convinced that our increasing cooperation in this field cannot fail to have a positive influence on the nuclear export policies of other states.
As was agreed in Brussels, we have contacted Prime Minister Bhutto, after reviewing this matter with the new administration, with a view to achieving indefinite deferral of his reprocessing project. We are speaking to him in terms of our concern about the implications of this project for our future bilateral relations, our belief that the costs will far outweigh any conceivable benefit in going ahead, and our conviction that a compromise on this problem is in Pakistan’s own best interests. Mr. Bhutto understands, in particular, that our preference is for Pakistan to acquire nuclear reactors, fuel and perhaps a fuel fabrication plant from France, instead of the proposed reprocessing facility.
Prime Minister Bhutto’s initial response suggests to me that he is coming to recognize both the force of these arguments and the potential benefits of deferral for Pakistan. He has intimated that he may be prepared to consider, on a very private basis, the kinds of arrangements [Page 1054] which might facilitate deferral, but has stressed that finalization and announcement would have to follow the national elections which he intends to schedule for this March. In any event, the arrangement would involve indefinite deferral and not abrogation of the contract.
The Shah of Iran has told us very recently that he has advised Mr. Bhutto not to proceed with reprocessing and to concentrate instead on strengthening his conventional military capabilities. We have discussed with both the Shah and the Prime Minister the possibility of Pakistani movement to an arrangement along the lines of Iran’s own agreements with France and the FRG. Mr. Bhutto seems interested in the concept, but he considers that he faces a political imperative not to be seen to have taken the initiative in modifying the terms of the reprocessing sale. In this connection, a possibility which seemed to interest him was that in order to avoid explicit unilateral initiative on either side of the reprocessing issue, the agreement to defer could be characterized as a decision jointly arrived at by both parties to the contract, when the time came.
In view of the political pressures the Prime Minister must face until his elections, I believe it is necessary to respect his desire not to make public the increased possibility of deferring the reprocessing project. On the other hand, we are preparing to do what we can on a confidential basis to increase Pakistan’s incentives to accept deferral.
As we proceed, I wish to assure you that we have very clearly in mind the considerations you raised during our meeting in Brussels, and that we would not desire to pursue any aspect of a final negotiating package which either side may consider unhelpful. In particular, the device of joint deferral may significantly facilitate a solution, and I would hope that you will give it sympathetic consideration. Meanwhile, of course, pending further negotiations with Pakistan, it is of great importance that France continue to avoid further movement on the reprocessing contract.
I can also confirm on a strictly confidential basis that we have contacted the Brazilians indirectly along the lines we discussed in Brussels. Based on their informal expressions of interest, we are now preparing to explore with Brazil and the FRG in official channels the parallel possibilities of deferral and alternative nuclear fuel services, based also on the principle of no commercial disadvantage for either party to the existing contract. I expect that both parties are clearly alert to the effects of possible change in the status of the Pakistani sale and are likely to be interested in exploring alternatives. In this process, I believe that successful resolution of the problem will involve our joint readiness not to derive commercial advantage from any alteration of the FRG commitment to Brazil. On the other hand, we might consider the possibility of guaranteeing nuclear fuel supply for the contracted reactors if this [Page 1055] would be helpful to the parties. This is clearly an aspect of the longer term potential for future fuel service cooperation which we should both discuss at an early date.
In closing, I can tell you that I have reiterated to the new administration my sense of the fundamental importance of close cooperation between our two countries in the security field. I believe it will share my view that the forward movement we are making in the non-proliferation field is important not only in its own right, but for the bearing it will be bound to have on our overall relationship.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely, Henry A Kissinger
3. Signed original follows by pouch.
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Summary: The Department forwarded a letter from Kissinger to De Guiringaud
concerning nuclear non-proliferation.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy Planning Council, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–1977, Entry 5027, Box 367, WL Sensitive/Non-China Jan ’77. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Jan Kalicki in S/P and Leon Fuerth in C; cleared by Robinson, Lord, Sonnenfeldt, and Sebastian; and approved by Kissinger.
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