Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

342. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Brussels, December 10, 1976, 8:20–9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Louis deGuiringaud, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France
• Francois deLaboulaye, Director. Political Affairs
• Louis Andreani, Director, European Affairs
• Gerard Errera, Technical Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
• Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
• Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
• Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

SUBJECTS

• Djibouti; Submarine Device; Non-proliferation

[Photos were taken of the Secretary and Foreign Minister. Then the party moved to the breakfast table.]

DeGuiringaud: You suggested we have this breakfast in order to discuss proliferation.

Kissinger: Yes.

DeGuiringaud: But I have one or two other subjects to put on the table, if you don’t object.

Kissinger: No.

DeGuiringaud: One is the future of Djibouti about which we are concerned. The other is the submarine device about which we have talked.

Kissinger: Why not talk about these two first?

DeGuiringaud: Djibouti. You know we are in the process of giving independence to Djibouti, which we call the Territoire Français des Affars et Issas.

Kissinger: Reflecting all the French cultural, political and national qualities of the 19th century! How many call themselves Djiboutians?

DeLaboulaye: They call themselves Affars or Issas. That’s the problem!

Kissinger: Will you keep troops there?

DeGuiringaud: It is not decided, but it is very likely that we will offer them to instruct their small defense and police force. They already accepted some. Should they accept some base, we have this in mind also. Something like 3–4,000 troops. It is not already decided, but we have it in mind with their agreement. But anything we do in this respect might be in danger from Somalia.

Kissinger: And Ethiopia.

DeGuiringaud: And Ethiopia. It is difficult to say what they will do if we leave a base.

I want to discuss it for two reasons, because Djibouti will need some substantial economic aid.

Kissinger: Why more now?

DeGuiringaud: No more. We are spending 15 billion francs.

Kissinger: It can’t be $2–3 billion.

Andreani: It must be old Francs.

DeLaboulaye: $20–30 million.

Kissinger: That [$2–3 billion] would be as much as we spend on Israel.

Sonnenfeldt: For 200–300,000 people.

DeGuiringaud: We are still spending a large amount of money for a few people, but we think it will be good to muster some international support. We already mentioned it to the Saudis and they are interested. We mention it to you because it would be a good example to set.

The most important argument is not an economic one but the threat from Somalia or an irresponsible move by Ethiopia.

Kissinger: No question.

DeGuiringaud: Somalia always had the thesis that all that area is Somaliland. There is danger that after independence. . . . .

Kissinger: When is that?

DeGuiringaud: Between May and July.

Kissinger: I understand why you’re doing it but of course it’s an absurdity. The necessity for it is not self-evident.

DeGuiringaud: If you had not urged the idea of self-determination on others. . . . [Laughter]

Kissinger: You’re probably right. And India would be better off. And wouldn’t have the atomic bomb, which would make my friend Win Lord infinitely happy.

DeGuiringaud: If you could use your influence, if you still have any, in Addis Ababa.

Kissinger: That last remark is unnecessary. [Laughter]

DeGuiringaud: They have American equipment.

Kissinger: I’m a household word in Addis Ababa.

We have a difficult time knowing who’s in charge. They refused Godley.

We have difficulty preventing them from using these arms against Eritrea. You’re right, we have little influence. They are probably shifting to Soviet arms; there have been several Soviet missions there.

The only way to stop it is with a force on the ground, which we could support.

DeGuiringaud: But this is unpopular with other Africans who say why a foreign base is an independent state. Of course we have the argument because of the Soviet base in Somalia.

We could, however, urge the Soviets to exert restraint on Somalia.

Kissinger: I think a démarche with the Soviets would be useful.

DeGuiringaud: I have raised it with Gromyko in New York. Mr. de Courcel mentioned it in Moscow, with complete silence on the part of Moscow. The time is for a new statement in Moscow.

Kissinger: This should be coordinated with the new administration.

DeGuiringaud: Yes, this is one of the points I suggested you mention to the new administration when they make their new approach to the Russians—that they mention their interest, your interest, in the independence of Djibouti, and your fear that any irresponsible move in that part of the world could have irreparable consequences.

If the Russians could control Djibouti, they could control the Red Sea and threaten South Yemen, and the situation could move in an unwanted direction.

Kissinger: I agree. I personally think we have to talk to the Russians about all of Africa. I frankly think, as I said yesterday, they’re partly responsible for the situation in the Rhodesian negotiation, by holding out the prospect of military victory. And they could certainly stop a Somali move.

I will talk to Mr. Vance about it.

DeGuiringaud: Your advice is we keep a base there.

Kissinger: My personal view, I have to say, may differ from the new administration.

DeGuiringaud: But we want your personal view.

Kissinger: My personal view is you should keep a base there. It would give everybody an excuse not to act. The Saudis would be relieved.

DeGuiringaud: Of course the Africans don’t like it; the cost is great.

Kissinger: The Ethiopians might be glad you have a base there.

DeLaboulaye: We can’t do it in the face of an African objection.

Kissinger: They don’t object to what Guinea does for the Russians.

DeGuiringaud: The Russians have 2,000 men, 500 tanks and 200 planes.

Kissinger: My recommendation is you at least attempt to keep some troops there. Second, you should talk to the Russians. But talking to the Russians is nothing without some threats. So your talking to them alone is not enough. We would have to support it.

DeGuiringaud: To tell the Russians we would consider any Somali action is a breach of détente.

Kissinger: Exactly. I consider Soviet action in Africa very aggressive. There is nothing they can gain there; but they can do much to hurt us.

Submarine Device

DeGuiringaud: My second point is very short—that submarine device we talked about and the Law of the Sea negotiation.

There has been one round of talks but not a second.

Kissinger: What the hell? Why? If the French in October requested another round of discussions, why have they not taken place within two weeks?

Sonnenfeldt: It is not within our Department’s jurisdiction.

Kissinger: It is too late now to do anything about it. I’m sure our Navy Department is not eager for these discussions to take place; I am sure I could overrule them. Why have they not taken place?

Sonnefeldt: It is a problem of getting a coordinated position.

Kissinger: There are two problems—information about results and information about equipment. You had asked us only about results.

DeGuiringaud: We asked you first about results and we had a conversation about equipment. Not all your secrets but something about the kind of research and the kind of equipment. Because we are also doing such research.

Kissinger: When governments reach a certain level of complexity, they have to spend half their time coordinating their own positions.

DeGuiringaud: In Paris too!

Kissinger: This arose because of the placement of equipment in certain areas. And you asked if we had anything off your coast and whether the Soviets did.

Sonnenfeldt: We said we had nothing on your Continental Shelf and the Soviets did not, and we will consult in the future if anything should arise.

DeGuiringaud: Can we say discussions on this between our experts can take place in January?

Kissinger: Yes, I will see to it personally. I can’t guarantee about equipment, but further discussions about results.

DeGuiringaud: We respect your right to keep some secrets.

Non-Proliferation

DeGuiringaud: Well, you want to talk about proliferation. I am listening to you.

Kissinger: I want to talk about the Pakistan problem and the Brazil problem. The new Administration will almost certainly make a push on this issue. You can reserve your position for the new administration.

I talked with Genscher. I had the impression he was less certain about the Brazilian deal than before. It will depend on what pressures can be generated. We have also heard reports the Pakistanis may be having second thoughts, but we have not talked to them.

We are in agreement about the future. Isn’t that right, Win?

Lord: Yes.

Kissinger: Of course, like in all these issues, at the precise moment we solve reprocessing, new technology will develop.

The Brazilians approached us in a funny way: Their Ambassador said that if we approached his President in a certain way, they might delay. The Foreign Office was a problem.

What is your view?

DeGuiringaud: Henry, first I would say I appreciate very much the talks we had on this subject in Washington. The way we have been doing it has been very helpful. Please convey the feeling of my President and myself of the appreciation for following my suggestion.

Kissinger: He did it at some price, because to announce his program earlier would have been better for him in the election. But from the foreign policy point of view. . . .

DeGuiringaud: From the foreign policy point of view and the non-proliferation point of view, it was helpful. It would have been harder for us to make the declaration after an American initiative.

Kissinger: You have kept your side of it.

DeGuiringaud: We also are concerned about reprocessing—if the deal were being discussed with Pakistan now, we would almost certainly not go ahead with it. But it is very hard to come back on our signature. We will certainly not take the initiative to go back on our signature.

We had the impression in Tehran in talks with the Shah that Bhutto might be willing to change his mind. So we raised it and the only result was that Bhutto reaffirmed it. He even went so far as to say his political future was at stake. But he gave no convincing economic reason.

Kissinger: There is no economic reason; he wants it for military reasons.

DeGuiringaud: His Foreign Minister, Aziz Ahmed, came to Paris and discussed with our military and technology people. He discussed plans to build automobiles in Pakistan. He never mentioned once the reprocessing.

Kissinger: He says you’re charging excessive prices for military equipment.

DeGuiringaud: I don’t know!

After he went back, an article appeared in the Pakistani paper associated with Bhutto that the French reaffirmed their desire for a reprocessing plant. I never uttered a word!

Kissinger: Great minds communicate without saying anything. [Laughter]

DeGuiringaud: Our position remains as our President said—if the Pakistanis want an electrical plant, or more military equipment, we would do it.

Kissinger: As we told your President, if the Pakistanis wanted a generator instead of reprocessing, we would see that credits were available, so French industry would not suffer. But it’s a problem of honor too.

DeGuiringaud: It’s credibility.

Kissinger: You would prefer not to go through with it but you don’t want to go back on your signature.

DeGuiringaud: There is a concern now that wasn’t true before.

Kissinger: The same with the Germans. Although I have the impression they’d prefer to go through with it.

Would you want me to talk to the Pakistanis again?

DeGuiringaud: Yes, if you do it quietly.

Kissinger: The last time I spoke to Bhutto alone, but the maniacs [the press corps] on my plane asked me about the Symington amendment.

I think Bhutto is saying he’ll do it [cancel] if you do, knowing you won’t do it. But I think you genuinely want to:

DeGuiringaud: We want to get rid of it if the Pakistanis can take the initiative.

Kissinger: I will talk with the Pakistani Ambassador in Washington, who’s an unusually able and intelligent man. Don’t you think, Win?

Lord: Yes, definitely.

Sonnenfeldt: He’s sympathetic too.

Kissinger: The problem is when do you start construction?

DeGuiringaud: The Pakistanis want us to start on the groundwork to show something is started. But the groundwork is something that can be converted easily to another kind of plant. So nothing related to this kind of plant has been done.

Kissinger: Maybe we can suggest they postpone construction rather than cancel it. I will try not to have it leak, so we avoid an incident like last summer.

I will try to get their agreement to delay it. We will promise some of the kind of military equipment they want. We can approve it on the administration side before January 20; we can’t guarantee the Congressional side.

DeGuiringaud: The Pakistanis won’t accept unless they know it is something that applies to everyone, including Brazil and Germany.

Kissinger: I’ve talked to Genscher. Now that I’ve talked to Genscher, we will talk to the Brazilians. We’ll do it in a complicated way, to the Brazilian President through a semi-official person who will be authoritative.

The Germans may delay if you do. You have to be a quarter of a step ahead of them so they don’t hide behind you.

Sonnenfeldt: They’ve done only a framework agreement.

DeLaboulaye: They’re not ready yet.

DeGuiringaud: We don’t want to do anymore. We’re finished now.

Kissinger: I will send someone to Brazil and I’ll talk to the Pakistani Ambassador next week. In Brazil it will be someone from the Inter-American Bank because we can’t do it through the Foreign Office. But he will speak in an authoritative way.

DeGuiringaud: We would like to have talks on the experts level and on the political level on the new administration’s approach to nonproliferation. We would like to know your view as soon as possible because we have to make our decisions. Our announcement of October 11 was a framework of principles, and we now have to implement them.

Kissinger: I can authorize talks for our administration. But they haven’t appointed their people yet and I doubt if they are ready.

DeGuiringaud: I met Carter once or twice. In New York when he made his main speech on nonproliferation.

Kissinger: Yes, I know the speech.

When I saw Carter, I told him that whatever he does on nonproliferation he should do in closest cooperation with your President, that he not take unilateral steps, that if he would let you take the lead once in a while, it would be easier to implement. I explained why our statement was late; he wasn’t heartbroken. [Laughter] He said he would be sensitive to your President’s political necessities, if you and he were in basic agreement.

DeGuiringaud: My President and I are really concerned about proliferation. But we have certain political necessities.

Kissinger: When I saw him, he had no advisors of his own, so he seemed to be impressed by my arguments. I can’t predict what will happen when the whole machinery is in place.

But I will raise it again.

Sonnenfeldt: You know the people.

DeGuiringaud: Brzezinski, Gardner.

Sonnenfeldt: They don’t all feel the same way.

Kissinger: Some of the people will be the people of eight years ago whose attitude toward France we worked so hard to eradicate.

I think Carter will be substantially sympathetic.

Lord: For what it’s worth, the experts in the administration will be sympathetic.

Kissinger: Yes, the experts they inherit will be sympathetic. Carter will be sympathetic. The question is the ones in between. I have no reason to think they won’t be.

I’ll let Kosciusko know.

DeGuiringaud: You have environmental concerns.

But it is important when a new step is being prepared that we have a chance to be in advance so we do not always appear to be following you.

Kissinger: I smile because occasionally we need to be able to be in advance.

DeLaboulaye: We also are concerned that there be free competition.

Kissinger: If we agree on the basic rules, there should be.

Lord: That’s one of the basic rules in the President’s position, that there be no unfair advantage for us.

DeLaboulaye: There is some organization, some competition. We lean to competition.

Kissinger: You’re against organizing the market.

DeGuiringaud: We want competition in servicing the fuel cycle. But that’s something we should be able to agree on.

Kissinger: I don’t see any problem.

DeGuiringaud: One other point. Because we are deprived of other sources of energy, we are going into nuclear energy for our energy needs. We will not be paralyzed, as you seem to be, in construction of new nuclear facilities. Therefore, we want to be able to construct reprocessing facilities in France for our own needs. So we may appear to your people to be more nuclear-minded than you.

Kissinger: We put into our position some restraint on our own reprocessing, in the kind of excess of Puritanism that seizes us every five years. In my personal opinion it’s ridiculous. You’re a nuclear power anyway. Win?

Lord: I see no problem for a nuclear state.

Kissinger: It’s a sort of superclever idea, to show restraint in our own reprocessing.

Lord: It may be cheaper to do enrichment.

Kissinger: We do not object to your even reprocessing for other countries, as long as it’s with adequate guarantees.

DeGuiringaud: Yes.

Kissinger: Indeed, one of our arrangements with Iran is that we do the reprocessing for him.

DeGuiringaud: The Shah told us he was not interested in reprocessing in his own country.

Kissinger: We had the same discussion with him.

DeGuiringaud: One last thing. The Russian came to Mr. DeLaboulaye one day and expressed concern that we not sell reprocessing to the Shah. Which Mr. DeLaboulaye could assure him we’re not doing. They did not mention the Pakistanis at all.

Kissinger: Very interesting.

DeLaboulaye: They brought a paper.

DeGuiringaud: And they were so rude as to ask for a written answer, a written commitment that we would not sell reprocessing to Iran.

Kissinger: Wait until you sell one to China. [Laughter]

DeLaboulaye: And our Ambassador in Moscow mentioned to Gromyko that this was unusual to raise this.

Kissinger: That is very interesting.

I must see the Luxembourg Prime Minister.

DeGuiringaud: Gaston.

Kissinger: I must see the Luxembourg Cabinet, in the person of Gaston. When I see him, I’m seeing four Ministers at once!

DeLaboulaye: Lucky man, he must find coordinating very easy!

[Secretary Kissinger and Minister DeGuiringaud posed for questions and photographs with the press. Their remarks are attached.]

1. Summary: Kissinger and De Guiringaud discussed Djibouti, a submarine device, and nuclear non-proliferation.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 19, NODIS Memcons, Dec. 1976. Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Ambassador’s Residence. An unknown hand wrote “no—the senior staff.” in the margin beside Kissinger’s statement: “The last time I spoke to Bhutto alone, but the maniacs [the press corps] on my plane asked me about the Symington amendment.” Attached but not published are De Guiringaud’s and Kissinger’s remarks to the press.