Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

91. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹

Washington, October 9, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Returning Depleted Uranium from the USSR

Companies in several countries (now including the U.S.) obtain uranium enrichment services from the USSR. There is disagreement in COCOM whether the partially depleted uranium remaining after enrichment (tails) should be left in the Soviet Union or returned to the West. The Soviets are willing to do either and leave it to the discretion of the purchaser. The FRG, UK, and France consider tails as waste and resent the cost of having to ship and store them.

The NSC Under Secretaries Committee has examined the issues involved and concluded that the potential strategic significance of depleted uranium depends on how limited the Soviets indigenous supply of raw uranium might be. Unfortunately, we do not have full enough information on Soviet uranium resources to resolve the issue. (Tab B)

DOD and the AEC recommend that we continue our policy of requiring the return of tails. DOD is concerned that in addition to potential strategic value of the depleted uranium, we may erode our resolve toward the embargo of nuclear materials more generally if we allow our position on tails to weaken.

The Federal Energy Administration, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Council on International Economic Policy recommend that if transaction tails are 0.2% or less, they can be left since the cost of additional stripping is so uneconomic that the strategic value is negligible for the foreseeable future.

State believes we ought to try to maintain our position in COCOM requiring the return of tails, but if significant opposition develops we should be prepared to reexamine our position with a view to finding an acceptable compromise, probably along the line suggested above of setting a minimum tail content requiring return.

I support State’s suggestion for two reasons:

(1) We are engaged in an extensive COCOM review with our allies in which we are trying to hold the line in a number of important areas, such as computers. Our allies (particularly the British) are not very sympathetic with our restrictive views, and we may find our overall objectives regarding export control will be furthered if we are prepared to compromise on the comparatively less important matter of tails.

(2) Our evolving nonproliferation strategy will center on a system of controls exercised by the nuclear suppliers, requiring a high degree of collaboration among those nations. We will have to establish a cooperative atmosphere in nuclear affairs generally if we are to be successful in achieving our ends. This means not overriding our allies’ interests in COCOM unless our security concerns warrant it, which is not the case in the question of the return of tails.

The Joint committee on Atomic Energy and other interested congressional committees should be kept informed of our COCOM negotiations.

If you approve, I will issue the decision memorandum at Tab A which directs that we seek to maintain our position in COCOM requiring the return of tails; that we reexamine our position if significant opposition develops, with a view to finding an acceptable compromise; and that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and other interested congressional committees be informed in advance of the approach being taken in COCOM and any changes that may prove necessary.

1. Summary: Following review of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee report on uranium tails disposition, Kissinger recommended to Ford that the United States require the return of depleted uranium from the Soviet Union.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—NSDMs, Box 55, NSDM 275—COCOM Position on the Return of Depleted Uranium (Tails) from the USSR. Secret. Sent for action. Ford initialed his approval of the recommendation. Tab A, NSDM 275, is Document 92. Tab B, the August 7 National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee report, is not attached but a copy is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Files of NSC Logged Documents, IF/NS File for the President, Box 2.