Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

90. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹

Washington, October 9, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Possible International Restraints on Environmental Warfare

The concept of environmental warfare envisages advertent modification of the weather, climate, oceans, or terrestrial properties for military or hostile purposes. Deliberate and controlled modifications are today theoretical possibilities only with the exception that operational or near-operational techniques exist for a few types of weather modification (for example, precipitation and fog modification).

As a result of an interagency review and a recent Senior Review Group meeting on this subject, all agencies except the JCS consider that some restraints on environmental warfare are in our interest. The JCS prefer no restraints but consider the restraints recommended by OSD below acceptable.

All agencies also agree that there should be no international restraints either on R&D or on using weather modification techniques solely to protect forces from natural hazards.

President Nixon agreed at the Moscow Summit in June to advocate bringing about the most effective measures possible against the dangers of using environmental modification techniques for military purposes and to begin discussions with the Soviets this year on the subject. This decision was set forth in the U.S./USSR Joint Communiqué and the Joint Statement on Environmental Warfare. The Soviets have moved ahead to seek a UN General Assembly resolution on this subject and their proposal gives us some problems which we will wish to iron out. Before entering into the agreed bilateral discussions, however, agency disagreement on the scope of restraints we should seek needs to be resolved.

OSD believes that we should prohibit “any military use of weather, climate, ocean, or terrestrial modification techniques having long-lasting, widespread, or severe effects.” This would in effect preclude hostile uses of all environmental modification techniques except for tactical fog or precipitation modification. This choice would retain a military option which in certain circumstances could have some utility, while banning the most potentially dangerous activities that would be subject to reasonable verification.

The main drawback of this choice is that it would open us to domestic and international criticism since we would be proposing to rule out only theoretically possible techniques, which would at any rate have limited if any military application should they ever be developed, and not the things we know how to do and have done (like rainmaking in Southeast Asia).

State and ACDA strongly believe that we should prohibit not only those restraints recommended by OSD but also restraints on precipitation and fog modification as weapons of war. This is the only choice which would constitute a “peaceful uses only” policy toward environment modification and meet with more general acceptance as a definition of “environmental warfare.” It may also be the only basis on which we could expect successful negotiations.

The drawbacks of this choice are that it would (1) foreclose military options for fog and precipitation modification which could prove useful in some conflict situations (if natural meteorological conditions permitted); and (2) present some verification problems since tactical employment of weather modification techniques might not be detectable.

My View. The basic difference between the agencies is that OSD and the JCS wish to retain the right to use precipitation and fog modification techniques as weapons of war. The military case, including our operational rainmaking experience in Southeast Asia from 1966–1972, for preserving these options does not appear very strong. On the other hand, the restraints favored by OSD focus on activities which would be subject to reasonable verification if ever developed and undertaken, whereas tactical employment of fog and precipitation modification techniques might not be detectable.

Therefore, I believe our approach to the initial exploratory talks with the Soviets should be consistent with the position supported by OSD and the JCS. This would not preclude discussions and perhaps a later U.S. decision on broader restraints if the Soviets raise them. Indeed, once we begin such discussions, particularly if and when a multilateral agreement were desired, we will in all likelihood have to address the question of a “peaceful uses only” policy or prohibitions along the lines recommended by State and ACDA.

There may well be some criticism by the Soviets or in any public airing of our approach that we are proposing to prohibit everything except the things we know how to do and have done. Our use of rainmaking in Southeast Asia has been controversial. This problem should, however, prove manageable.

The draft NSDM at Tab A would direct that the approach for discussions with the Soviets this October be consistent with the restraints supported by OSD and considered acceptable by the JCS.

Recommendation:

That you approve the NSDM at Tab A.

1. Summary: Kissinger informed President Ford that as a result of the interagency review and a Senior Review Group meeting, all agencies except the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed some restraints on environmental warfare were in the best interest of the United States. He indicated that the U.S. approach should be consistent with the OSD/JCS position and recommended that Ford approve a draft National Security Decision Memorandum that reflected this approach.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—NSDMs, Box 55, NSDM 277—International Restraints on Environmental Warfare (3). Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation at the top of the first page of the memorandum indicates that Ford saw it. Ford initialed his approval of the recommendation. NSDM 277 as approved is Document 94.