Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

77. Memorandum From David Elliott of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, September 5, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Amendment of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)

We have been carrying on technical talks for some years with the Soviets and others regarding the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) for excavation purposes and the possibilities for limiting the radioactive fallout to acceptably low levels. Such excavation shots are almost all prohibited by the LTBT. The outcome of these talks would supply the technical background for a possible future initiative to open the LTBT to amendment to allow de minimus radioactivity levels to cross borders for legitimate PNE applications as long as no health risk exists. Our own PNE program is practically nonexistent and not constrained by the LTBT prohibition, but the Soviets have many excavation shots planned and are most interested in amending the LTBT.

The political aspects of seeking to amend the LTBT have not been the subject of any explicit interagency study, and no administration policy exists.

Our preparatory work for the negotiation of the PNE agreement collateral to the TTB and for the NPT review conference could be more comprehensive and useful, if some policy understanding could be reached on the LTBT matter. In particular, the handling of excavation PNE above the threshold will be one of the major focuses of the October Moscow talks, and Soviet willingness to be forthcoming on verification procedures (including establishing the precedent of on-site inspection) may well depend in part on our position on the LTBT amendment question. It is even conceivable that some indication of U.S. support for LTBT amendment will be necessary to the successful conclusion of the PNE agreement. However, there are several disadvantages to seeking to amend the LTBT, the most important being that the majority of the LTBT Parties may well demand a CTB as a quid pro quo for amending the treaty to allow excavation PNEs, and we may, in any event, fail to gain international approval for the amendment by raising it at this time. Further, Congress may defeat ratification of both an LTBT amendment and the TTBT if the two issues are coupled directly or implicitly. (Further analysis of the LTBT issues and the pros and cons are at Tab B).

It would be useful to conduct a quick interagency assessment of the non-technical issues associated with amendment of the LTBT. Based on this study, the President would have the background for deciding whether the amendment liabilities appear too great to indicate any U.S. movement at this time or, conversely, that we can use some indication of U.S. support to gain important concessions from the Soviets in the PNE talks. (Any action to seek amendment of the LTBT would, of course, be predicated on technical agreement on reducing radioactive release and standards of acceptable dose so that risk to health would not be an issue.)

A memorandum to the Under Secretaries Committee (Tab A) requests a study of the non-technical issues associated with seeking to amend the LTBT. The study would be completed in time for the VP and NSC on PNEs later this month.

Dick Kennedy, Jan Lodal, and Denis Clift concur.

Recommendation:

That you sign the memorandum to the USC at Tab A.

1. Summary: Elliott reviewed the current status of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and recommended that Kissinger approve a request for an interagency assessment of non-technical issues associated with amendment of the treaty.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 45, Nuclear Testing (1). Secret. Sent for urgent action. Elliot sent the memorandum to Scowcroft under a September 5 covering memorandum, noting: “Consideration of our position on the LTBT will be a background theme in the VP and NSC meetings on PNEs. It therefore seems highly desirable to get a quick fix on the problems, options, and pros and cons in this area as part of the preparation for these meetings and the Moscow talks.” Scowcroft added the following at the bottom of the covering memorandum: “Went out Saturday [September 7]. B.” Tab A, an undated draft memorandum to the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, is attached but not published. Tab B, the analysis, is Document 78. The Interagency Study Group’s report is Document 82.