Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

73. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, August 27, 1974.

SUBJECT

• Possible International Restraints on Environmental Warfare

A Senior Review Group meeting on this subject is scheduled for August 28.

Following on the interagency review in May of options regarding restraints on environmental warfare, President Nixon agreed at the summit in Moscow to advocate the most effective possible restraints against using environmental modification techniques for military purposes and to begin discussions with the Soviets on the subject this year (see marked tab).²

As a result of the interagency review, all agencies except the JCS consider that some restraints on environmental warfare are in our interest. The JCS prefer no restraints but consider the restraints recommended by OSD below acceptable. There is interagency disagreement on the scope of restraints we should accept.

Therefore, in the likely event that no interagency consensus on an option emerges at the meeting, your purpose is to confirm agency views and to reach agreement that the differences should be forwarded to the President for decision.

DOD’s summary of the military aspects, the Under Secretaries Committee study of possible international restraints (including verification aspects), agency views, and my analytical summary are at marked tabs.

To facilitate the near term decision on whether to give favorable consideration to the Soviet suggestion that the July summit communiqué include agreement to enter into discussions on prohibiting the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes, the interagency report examined three options:

1. Accept no international restraints on military use of environmental warfare, including weather, climate, ocean, and terrestrial modification techniques. [Of these, there presently exists an operational or near operational capability for only a few types of weather modification (for example, fog and precipitation modification).]

2. Accept prohibitions on any military use of the above environmental modification techniques having long-term, widespread, or especially severe effects (essentially preserving tactical uses of fog and precipitation modification for hostile purposes).

3. Accept prohibitions on all military use of such techniques for hostile purposes.

None of the options would prohibit and no agency supports prohibiting weather modification techniques solely to protect forces from natural hazards or fog modification to aid in search and rescue missions.

OSD recommends Option 2. Although preferring no restraints, the JCS consider Option 2 acceptable and note that its adoption would do no serious damage to our military posture.

This choice would (1) rule out the most dangerous and destructive possibilities (most of which would have limited if any military application should they ever come to be developed); (2) allay some of the domestic and international concerns; (3) limit an area of possible arms competition; and (4) be verifiable within reasonable limits of error.

On the other hand, this choice would (1) be criticized internationally and domestically as proposing to rule out everything except the things we know how to do and have done (rainmaking in SEA); (2) be far more difficult politically to negotiate on a multilateral basis; and (3) possibly hamper future development of international guidelines for civil environmental modification efforts having cross-border effects since these would probably proceed on a “peaceful purposes only” premise.

State and ACDA strongly recommend Option 3 as the basis for discussions with the Soviets and subsequent multilateral effort.

This choice would (1) meet with more general acceptance as a definition of “environmental warfare” since all clearly hostile uses would be prohibited; (2) be less ambiguous and perhaps the only basis on which we could expect successful negotiations; and (3) enhance the development of international guidelines for civil applications having cross-border effects since it would constitute a “peaceful uses only pledge.”

On the other hand, this choice would (1) foreclose existing and prospective weather modification options (fog and precipitation) which might be employed to gain tactical advantage in some conflict situations (if natural meteorological conditions permitted); and (2) present some verification problems since tactical employment of weather modification techniques might not be detectable.

In addition to recommending Option 3, ACDA has favored a broad initiative covering peaceful and hostile uses which would provide for (1) a continuing program of studies under UN auspices on the feasibility of environmental modification for the benefit of mankind; (2) a commitment to study and work out international regulations or guidelines to avoid unintended harmful effects of civil environmental modification activities; and (3) a commitment not to use environmental modification techniques for hostile purposes (see Ikle memoranda at ACDA tab). (We believe that the desirability of working out international guidelines for civil applications deserves further study with Commerce’s participation, but that this aspect need not delay decision on the arms control question before us.)

The fundamental difference between the agencies is not likely to change at this meeting. OSD and the JCS will wish to retain the right to use precipitation and fog modification techniques for hostile purposes.

Therefore, your purpose in the meeting is to confirm agency views and to reach agreement that the differences should be forwarded to the President for decision. Your talking points at marked tab are structured accordingly.

Our View. We believe that the military case, including our operational rainmaking experience in SEA, for preserving the option for hostile uses of fog and precipitation modification techniques is not very strong. However, OSD’s position does focus on restraining those activities which could be subject to reasonable verification, whereas tactical employment of fog and precipitation modification might not be detectable.

Therefore, we recommend that the U.S. should structure its exploratory talks with the Soviets on the basis of a preferred approach consistent with the position supported by OSD and the JCS. The draft memorandum for the President (Tab 1) and draft NSDM (Tab A) reflect this recommendation.

The draft NSDM requests the NSC Under Secretaries Committee to prepare an appropriate scenario and approach for discussions with the Soviets and an approach for dealing with the Soviet UNGA proposal.

This would not preclude exploratory discussions and perhaps a later U.S. decision on broader restraints if the Soviets raise them. Indeed, once we begin such discussions, particularly if and when a multilateral agreement were desired, we will in all likelihood have to address the question of a “peaceful uses only” policy or prohibitions along the lines recommended by State and ACDA.

There may well be some criticism by the Soviets or in any public airing of our approach that we are not including in these discussions the only things we know how to do and have done. Our use of rainmaking in SEA has been controversial. This problem should, however, prove manageable.

Kennedy, Lodal, and Clift have concurred.

Recommendations:

1. That you note your talking points at marked tab.

2. If there is no consensus at the meeting on an option, that you forward the memorandum for the President at Tab 1;

3. If he approves, that you issue the NSDM at Tab A (which reflects the decision that the U.S. approach to exploratory discussions with the Soviets will be consistent with the OSD/JCS position).

1. Summary: Guhin summarized agency views concerning restraints on environmental warfare, stating that all agencies except the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered some restraints to be in the U.S. interest. Noting it was unlikely that interagency consensus on an option would emerge at the scheduled August 28 Senior Review Group meeting, Guhin commented that Kissinger would need to “confirm agency views and to reach agreement” that differences would be forwarded to President Ford for decision. Guhin also recommended that Kissinger send a draft National Security Decision Memorandum to Ford, which would require the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee to prepare an approach for upcoming discussions with Soviet officials and for dealing with the Soviet UN General Assembly proposal.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—Meetings, Box 13, Senior Review Group Meeting, 8/28/74—Environmental Warfare (2). Secret. Sent for action. Sent through Elliott. All brackets are in the original. Attached but not published are talking points on environmental warfare for use at the SRG meeting; Tab 1, a draft memorandum from Kissinger to Ford that summarized agency positions on international restraints on environmental warfare; and Tab A, a draft NSDM, that reflected the decision that the U.S. approach to explanatory discussions with the Soviets would be consistent with the OSD/JCS position. The DOD summary of military aspects is Document 42. Guhin’s analytical summary, “Possible International Restraints on Environmental Warfare,” is Document 74. The talking points and agency views, which Guhin indicated were attached at marked tabs, were not found. The minutes of the August 28 SRG meeting are Document 75. The final version of draft memorandum attached at Tab 1 is Document 90. The final version of NSDM 277, as signed by Kissinger, is Document 94.

2. The Soviets have not waited for the bilateral discussions but have moved to seek a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution this fall which would approve “the idea of concluding a broad agreement on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health” (see marked tab). This “broad-brush Soviet initiative” gives us problems. Regardless of the decision on the issue discussed herein, we will wish to ensure that any UNGA resolution in effect refers the subject to an appropriate body for further examination and is consistent with the language agreed at the summit. Simply opposing the resolution would appear contrary to our expressed interest in restraints as affirmed at the summit and give the Soviets the lead in this area. [Footnote is in the original.] Gromyko’s letter to Waldheim proposing an agenda item from the UN General Assembly on the prohibition of environmental modification for warfare is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 380–382.