Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

72. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Iklé) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, August 26, 1974.

U.S. Policy on Nuclear Proliferation

Following our last Analytical Staff Meeting, we have drafted the attached Memorandum for the President on U.S. policy regarding nuclear proliferation and its relationship to multilateral efforts.

The memorandum (Tab A) outlines U.S. policy moves in a multilateral context for controlling nuclear materials and inhibiting national decisions to acquire nuclear explosives. The proposed U.S. approach ties in with three ongoing international efforts: (1) measures to strengthen safeguards and export controls; (2) discussions with India related to minimizing the adverse consequences of her test; and (3) encouraging important NPT signatories and other key non-nuclear weapon states to ratify the treaty soon. In addition to these efforts, a successful nonproliferation strategy will be affected by perceptions of non-nuclear weapon states regarding progress in U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms limitations as well as the confidence of these states that their security and political needs can continue to be met without recourse to independent nuclear forces.

As a device that might help to strengthen export controls and to coordinate other multilateral nonproliferation efforts, the memorandum calls for an international conference of key nuclear industrial states, provided constructive French participation can be expected. To prepare such a conference, we would use further bilateral consultations with the UK and Canada, and consultations with France and other key states (USSR, FRG, Japan).

Consultations with other interested governments have shown that the U.S. is not the only nation concerned with the problem of preventing further nuclear proliferation. We have already consulted with Canada and the UK in response to their initiatives. Representatives from the FRG wish to discuss NPT issues during their visit to Washington later this month, and we have made plans for talks with the USSR on PNEs and a number of broader nonproliferation matters of common concern.²

A conference of nuclear industrial states offers an opportunity for realizing a coordinated approach in placing effective controls, including safeguards and security measures, over transfers of commercial nuclear equipment and materials. In the context of both the conference and prior consultation, countries such as Canada, the USSR, and the U.S., which strongly support controls, may convince other suppliers, notably France, to do the same. The advance consultations, the conference itself, and any follow-up policies and procedures that might be devised could also contribute to dealing with India on non-proliferation questions.

To prepare the conference, we would approach the French and the Soviets to ensure their support; it would be important to consult other key participants following a positive reaction from France and the USSR. If the French indicate clear opposition, it will be necessary to reformulate the proposed approach and come back to you with further recommendations. Realistically, given the need to complete interagency review as well as the necessary preparations and prior consultations, it is unlikely that the conference could be held before mid-November.

The major conference issue to be resolved is that of participation. Related problems of polarization, the specific agenda and feasibility of substantive results, and publicity tend to be tied to this question. (See Tab B for further discussion.) Although many options could be constructed using a variety of criteria, there are basically two approaches to participation:

—a restricted conference attended by the major current nuclear suppliers, namely the U.S., France, the USSR, Japan, the FRG, the UK, and Canada;

—a broader conference expanded to include other nuclear industrial states, notably the Netherlands, Sweden, South Africa, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Australia, and India.³

The more restrictive approach would enhance both the manageability of the conference and the prospects for reaching consensus among the current major suppliers on an effective nuclear safeguards strategy. The only country likely to present serious problems would be France, although that nation would probably react more positively to a proposal for a restricted conference than for an expanded one. Japan, on the other hand, might not look with favor at participating in a small cartel-like meeting. In such a conference we would have more flexibility in terms of publicity; while the option of high-visibility could be chosen, a smaller conference could be handled in a more low-profile manner, perhaps at the Under Secretary level with strong technical participation by the various delegations. If a restricted conference is held, we will need to deal with potentially adverse reactions on the part of uninvited nuclear industrial states as well as nuclear have-nots. A low profile could help alleviate the polarization problem. Moreover, by excluding other nuclear industrial states whose present export capabilities are limited, we could avoid the appearance of isolating India, who would pose as a defender of the rights of the nuclear have-nots and tend to take an unconstructive stance. The non-participation of India would also facilitate agreement among the major suppliers on dealing with India regarding PNEs and export controls.⁴ Some of the political disadvantages of a restricted conference could be lessened if the original members took the position that they viewed themselves as a nucleus which might subsequently be enlarged. It might be understood that an item on the agenda of the restricted conference would be “possible enlargement of the consultations.”

The broader approach would include from the start other interested nuclear industrial states, and eliminate their concerns at being excluded. The inclusion of Sweden, the Netherlands, and Australia would provide the conference the benefit of three of the strongest supporters of non-proliferation. At the same time, the broader approach would diminish the appearance of a suppliers’ cartel. On the other hand, with a large conference, presumably at a Foreign Minister level, adopting a low profile would become extremely difficult. Some potential participants are less likely to publicly agree to nuclear export restraint in such a conference than they are to actually apply such measures in practice. Furthermore, many of the additional nations are primarily nuclear importers in the near term (although all are potential suppliers)⁵ and obtaining unanimity on substantive issues would be difficult. In addition, it would be difficult to draw the line for selection of participants once the conference were expanded; for example, Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil would almost certainly wish to attend, and the possibility of a twenty-odd nation conference could not be dismissed. The inclusion of India would seem necessary in the widened context; its exclusion in such circumstances might well provoke strong GOI opposition to the proposed strategy. India would probably play a spoiling role and its presence would seem to make export restraint agreements an unrealistic goal, and could reduce prospects for gaining Indian cooperation in placing controls over its nuclear exports.

With respect to participation:

ACDA, SCI, and INR strongly favor a restricted approach.

S/P sees valid arguments on both sides, but, on balance, prefers a restricted conference as a first step, with the option to convene an expanded conference later if judged to be useful.

NEA has a strong preference for a restricted conference of major suppliers (not including India) which would avoid the problem of Indian participation.

PM believes that participation at the conference can best be decided after consultations with France and the USSR, but, subject to the concurrence of these countries, would prefer a restricted approach.

C has a slight preference for a smaller conference.

EUR would also marginally prefer a restricted conference, on the grounds that the French would probably be more likely to agree to attend.

IO, without passing judgment on the policy issue of whether a more restricted or broader group should be sought, considers that, from the standpoint of coordination and management, there would be significant advantage in at least starting the conference with a restricted number of participants.

EA prefers the option for a larger conference to allow the inclusion of Australia and to make participation less exclusive, and thereby more attractive, to Japan.

AF prefers an expanded conference to assure South African participation, but indicates that South African concerns could be accommodated through consultations if a restricted conference were selected.

ARA does not wish to judge the policy merits of a small versus a large conference, but strongly favors the inclusion of Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil if a broader approach is chosen and advance consultations with these countries in the event a restricted approach is followed.

Recommendations

1. That the draft Memorandum to the President be circulated to interested agencies by the Under Secretaries Committee for rapid review. They would be informed that the memo is based upon comments on the NSSM 202 draft Report of June 21 as well as events since the original NSSM effort. Their further comments and concurrence would be solicited within a week, prior to forwarding the memorandum to the White House. (This would not prejudice decisions as to extent of participation and publicity for the proposed conference.)

2. That the Department and ACDA prepare a detailed operational plan for the conference of nuclear industrial states, either

—restricted in the first instance to a low-visibility meeting among the most advanced nuclear industrial states;

—or a more highly publicized conference expanded to include other nuclear industrial states, with Indian participation.

1. Summary: Iklé and Lord sent Kissinger a memorandum for the President on U.S. policy regarding nuclear proliferation and its relationship to multilateral efforts. They offered several recommendations regarding a conference of nuclear industrial states.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy Planning Council (S/PC), Policy Planning Staff (S/P) Director’s Files (Winston Lord) 1969–77: Lot 77D112, Box 349, AUG 1974. Secret. Drafted by Kalicki, Kahan, Van Doren, and Boright; concurred in by Sonnenfeldt, Buffum, Easum, Hyland, Goodby, Lowenstein, Lanigen, Bloomfield, Martens, and Sievering. Kahan initialed for the drafters and the concurrences. On September 7, Kissinger approved the first option of the second recommendation. Tab A, an undated draft memorandum to Ford, and Tab B, an undated paper entitled “Conference of Nuclear Industrial States,” are attached but not published. NSDM 255 is Document 53. The June 21 NSSM 202 draft report is Document 57. For the minutes of the July 12 Analytical Staff Meeting, see Document 65.

2. In part, these talks serve to carry out the recently approved NSDM 255 which calls for U.S. consultations with other suppliers designed to forge common policies to control exports of special nuclear material, encourage multilateral reprocessing plants, and upgrade worldwide physical security standards. In addition, the Energy Coordinating Group is working to develop multilateral policy guidelines and procedures affecting uranium enrichment. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. Criteria for participation in the restricted conference seem relatively clear, since the seven nations designated are the most significant potential nuclear suppliers. Selection in the case of a broader conference is arbitrary. The above expanded list consists of the ten nations judged to be next in potential as nuclear suppliers. Particularly in the case of a larger conference, it should be recognized that the Soviets may insist on greater representation of their allies, thus creating pressure to further expand its size. We would inform the PRC in advance of a conference and welcome their attendance; they would be unlikely to accept an invitation. The Memorandum to the President leaves open the question of participation and can be forwarded for interagency review while these alternative approaches and other conference issues are being considered in greater depth by State and ACDA. [Footnote is in the original.]
4. Your scheduled trip to India will probably take place before the conference. This offers the opportunity for private talks with the Indians on non-proliferation, in the context of a coordinated approach on the part of Canada, the UK, and possibly the USSR flowing from pre-conference consultations. [Footnote is in the original.]
5. The situation here, of course, is different from the Energy Conference (when we wanted to increase our leverage versus the producers) because suppliers and many recipients share a consensus on the problem. [Footnote is in the original.]