Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

57. Paper Prepared by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee¹

Washington, June 21, 1974.

U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY

In response to NSSM 202, this study reviews the present U.S. policy concerning nonproliferation and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in particular, in light of the recent Indian nuclear test.² A recently updated NSSM 156 study is a companion paper that focuses on the specific options and courses that are open to us in our dealings with India.

Fundamentally, we need to consider (a) whether our basic policy in opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons remains a feasible as well as desirable goal; and (b) whether there are any concrete actions the U.S. can undertake at the political and technical levels in an effort to avoid a further increase in the number of nuclear weapons states.

These questions are addressed below. Three detailed analyses of specific nonproliferation issues are attached as Annexes to the report.³

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

U.S. Non-Proliferation Objective.

The nonproliferation of nuclear weapons has been a consistent and important element of U.S. policy for the entire nuclear era. Our strong resolve in support of this objective has been predicated on the belief that an unrestrained spread of nuclear weapons would be detrimental to U.S. security and international stability.

—Risk of War. The risk of nuclear war will tend to be increased if additional states acquire independent nuclear forces. More nuclear weapons states, each relating differently to the U.S. and each other, would have to be deterred, in crisis periods an effective U.S. deterrent posture would be more difficult to achieve, and the maintenance of a stable U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship would be complicated. There would be a greater danger that local conflicts could escalate into nuclear wars and the statistical probability of nuclear war being started by accident, miscalculation, unauthorized use, or an irresponsible leader would increase. “Selective” proliferation to allies could not be relied upon to reduce these or other problems associated with nuclear diffusion.

—Political Dangers. Nuclear weapons could give nations a real or perceived sense of greater power and independence in the foreign policy field, thus complicating international diplomacy. This could result in an even sharper loss of American influence in the world, and, more seriously, could lead to threats to our security or economic interests. Nuclear arms control would become more difficult to achieve, both because present NWS would desire additional strategic options and because a greater number of states would have to agree to arms limitations.

—Theft and Sabotage Problems. Apart from the question of deliberate decisions by governments to mount weapons programs is the possibility of theft of nuclear material by radical organizations, revolutionary groups, or crime syndicates, and the prospect of deliberate sabotage. As the commercial nuclear power industry expands and spreads throughout the world, the opportunities for such actions will increase. These scenarios can pose a serious threat to U.S. security by raising international tensions, endangering American citizens or facilities abroad, and possibly leading to military conflict involving nuclear explosives or radioactive materials.⁴

The main elements of our non-proliferation policy are that: (1) non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) should forswear the acquisition of nuclear explosives; (2) nuclear weapons states (NWS) should not help non-weapons states obtain such explosives; (3) the U.S. will cooperate in the peaceful application of nuclear energy; (4) there should be safeguards as widely applicable as possible to assure that nuclear material from civilian nuclear programs is not diverted by NNWS to any nuclear explosives; and (4) nuclear exports to NNWS must be subject to such safeguards.

To accomplish these goals, we have sought to gain widespread adherence to the NPT by NWS and NNWS alike. At present, there are 83 parties to the NPT and 23 signatories, with several important nations (notably Japan, Italy, and the FRG) reasonably likely to become parties within a year.⁵ While these parties and signatories include nearly all states with an operative nuclear industry and nearly all present suppliers in this field, there are some important exceptions. France (which has declared that it would act as if it were a party) and the PRC (which does not yet make nuclear power reactors and may well refrain from activity contributing to proliferation) are not parties; some significant NNWS (including Israel, Argentina, Brazil, and Pakistan) are not likely to become NPT parties; similarly, a few significant signatories (such as Egypt) are unlikely to ratify in the foreseeable future.

Recognizing that a number of significant NNWS are likely to refuse to join the NPT for an indeterminate period, the U.S. has sought to reduce nuclear weapons incentives and capabilities through other policies encompassing: (1) controls and safeguards over exported nuclear material and equipment; (2) efforts to develop common export policies among the major commercial suppliers of nuclear material and facilities; and (3) policies aimed at reducing the possibility that NNWS will decide to develop nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. Alliances, mutual defense policies, security assurances, and forward deployment of U.S. forces also have an important potential bearing on the willingness of states to forego acquisition of independent nuclear weapons. Although U.S. policy decisions in these areas involve other important considerations beyond the scope of this report, any modifications in our present positions should take into account their nonproliferation implications.

Feasibility of Non-Proliferation Policies.

Technical developments and political trends will increase both the difficulty and the importance of deterring or retarding further nuclear proliferation during the coming decade.

—Nuclear power generation is coming into wider use throughout the world and U.S. dominance as a commercial supplier is diminishing. Since the rudimentary principles of weapons design are well known, it will therefore become less difficult for nations to acquire nuclear weapons.

—We are entering a period when political barriers to non-proliferation appear to be weakening. Movements toward a multipolar world could increase the incentives to acquire independent nuclear capabilities, and reliance on the security guarantees of others seems decreasingly attractive to many nations.

—Finally, as a result of the Indian nuclear test, other NNWS will inevitably consider becoming nuclear weapons states. These countries will be influenced by the reactions of the U.S., other nuclear powers, major NPT proponents, and potential nuclear weapons states. The consequences, particularly in the event of a low-key U.S. response, could be a sequential or “chain reaction” with perhaps as many as ten additional states acquiring some nuclear weapons capability or conducting “peaceful” nuclear explosions.

This picture of proliferation patterns may imply that we have no choice but to resign ourselves to the inevitability of further nuclear weapons spread and to begin to shape the U.S. security policies to a world environment of relatively large numbers of independent nuclear powers. But upon closer examination, a strong case can be made that policies aimed at deterring further proliferation can still be effectively pursued. A number of factors support this judgment:

1. Not all key NNWS have the necessary capabilities needed to produce nuclear explosives.⁶ Indeed, many nations with an incentive to undertake a nuclear weapons program may not be able to acquire in the near-term the necessary capacity to do so. With the exception of Israel, which may already have developed weapons, other likely proliferators appear to be 3–10 years away from an initial test. Countries such as Argentina, the Republic of China (an NPT party), and [apparent omission in the original] would be in the near-term category, while those such as South Africa, Egypt, Pakistan, and Iran (an NPT party) which are just initiating power programs, would be in the latter group. Despite its advanced nuclear power program, Sweden has apparently foreclosed its nuclear option in the near-term due to a recent decision to forego construction of a reprocessing plant needed for extraction of plutonium. Japan and the FRG are in a special category—they have the nuclear capability to build large numbers of weapons, but strong political inhibitions coupled with the U.S. security relationship make them unlikely proliferators in the near-term. In general, for countries whose military needs can be met by only a limited nuclear force, the time scale for proliferation is determined by their nuclear capabilities, whereas for countries with strategic military requirements, delivery systems appear to be the pacing factor.

2. Nuclear materials and equipment essential to the production of nuclear weapons are still available only from a limited number of suppliers who generally oppose proliferation. The nuclear materials that would have to be used by a NNWS to manufacture nuclear explosives are plutonium or U–233 (each of which must be produced in a nuclear reactor and then reprocessed in a chemical separation plant) or highly enriched uranium (HEU) produced in enrichment facilities.⁷ All present manufacturers of nuclear reactors (except France and India, which is several years from completing its first two indigenously built reactors) are NPT parties or signatories apparently moving toward ratification, as are all states (except France) that are currently engaged in supplying uranium enrichment services or in commercial chemical reprocessing for other countries. As noted above, France has publicly declared that it is opposed to proliferation and will behave as if it were a party to the NPT, but has in practice been lax in adhering to this position in its nuclear export policy. While this general situation will deteriorate to some extent in coming years, it provides potential leverage in controlling the availability of weapons grade materials and technologies that are essential to the manufacture of nuclear explosives through export controls and safeguards and physical security requirements—the latter being relevant to protecting material against subnational-level theft or seizure of weapons grade materials in storage or transit.

3. Political and security disincentives for nuclear weapons decisions continue to exist in many important NNWS.⁸ Many nations with advanced nuclear capabilities may not choose to exercise the nuclear option for political and security reasons and many are bound legally by the NPT already or will be once they ratify. In Japan, early NPT ratification has suffered a setback, but political inhibitions and the interest in maintaining close ties with the U.S., as well as the large portion of its electric power industry that is dependent on continued U.S. nuclear fuel supplies, will tend to work against a nuclear weapons decision. In the FRG, bound by the Brussels Treaty and the European security context, there have been no indications of a serious desire to develop a national nuclear weapons capability and here too there is considerable dependence on continued U.S. nuclear fuel supplies. Furthermore, with the exception of the Indian CIRUS reactor (which was an early aberration), virtually all nuclear material and facilities that have been sold to NNWS are safeguarded.⁹ The use of nuclear materials or facilities for military weapons purposes would involve the political and legal costs of abrogating an agreement or risking discovery of a clandestine program. For non-NPT parties, the route taken by India in exploding a “peaceful” device (PNW) is not presently subject to strict legal or meaningful political curbs.¹⁰ Even if many NNWS do not ratify the NPT, however, further test ban restrictions could inhibit decisions by demonstrating restraint on the part of NWS who participate and, in the case of a low threshold ban or a possible total ban, by creating a direct obstacle to nuclear explosives testing. Finally, the greater cost and complexity of advanced delivery systems as compared with nuclear weapons indicate that selective controls in limiting the ease of acquiring these systems might be effective in dissuading certain major powers from embarking on an independent nuclear arms program.

4. U.S. national security interests can be well served even with an imperfect and incomplete non-proliferation strategy. We might only be able to delay further proliferation, however determined our anti-proliferation efforts may be. Nevertheless, it would serve our security interests to defer the disadvantages associated with an expanded number of nuclear powers as long as possible, while seeking to create conditions which might ultimately check further spread and planning an approach for minimizing the instabilities of a more proliferated world. Furthermore, the identity and character of potential additional new nuclear weapons states have important and different implications for the U.S. Whether a 7th or 8th nuclear nation were a friend or adversary and whether it would present a credible global threat, or largely a regional one (as in the case of India) would be crucial in terms of its direct effect on world stability and American interests, apart from its effect in increasing the risk of still further proliferation.

In short, although the Indian test has represented a major setback for the objective of nonproliferation, strong arguments can be made that:

—It is still in the U.S. interest to strive vigorously to abate the further spread of nuclear weapons;

—We still may have time and influence to deter others from following suit; and

—A number of useful techniques and options can still be usefully pursued to help dissuade or delay others from entering the nuclear weapons field.

General Comments on Nonproliferation Strategy.

The success of any nonproliferation strategy recommended below cannot be guaranteed. But it seems certain that major reversal or deemphasis of our policy, especially in the aftermath of the Indian decision, would tend to increase the likelihood of additional decisions to go nuclear.

As elaborated below, a variety of positive and negative approaches are available to the U.S. in support of a nonproliferation policy. The problem is one of reviewing and building upon the many actions already underway and planned—not one of constructing an entirely new policy—and exploring the degree to which these actions should be altered, expanded, or extended.

The recommendations have taken account of the fact that some anti-proliferation approaches could be non-productive and that pressure tactics or excessively discriminatory policies could stimulate the probability of proliferation—by driving recipient nations away from well-safeguarded U.S. assistance into arrangements with suppliers that may have less strict controls or possibly into an all out effort to acquire self-contained nuclear capabilities. They have also considered the possibility of conflicts between our nonproliferation objectives and other U.S. political and security objectives—as well as the conflicts among various nonproliferation strategies themselves.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following discussion approaches the problem of formulating U.S. nonproliferation efforts by:

First, presenting those policy actions judged to be most urgent in supporting nonproliferation without involving any significant costs or risks in their implementation.

Second, identifying other actions which can contribute to an effective non-proliferation approach on a less urgent basis or which deserve further consideration as longer-term policy options.

Finally, proposing certain procedural arrangements and special studies judged to be necessary to the execution of the recommended nonproliferation policies.

I. Urgent Nonproliferation Actions

A. Intensify Efforts in Support of NPT

Rationale

The NPT is the principal tool available for dealing with non-proliferation.¹¹ It provides an opportunity to crystallize and convert into an international legal obligation a national decision to forego the acquisition of nuclear explosives, thus creating political obstacles to changing this decision (despite the legal right to withdraw if supreme interests are jeopardized). It provides a ready mechanism by which antagonistic NNWS can remove the nuclear dimension from their conflicts. It obligates NWS parties not to assist in any way the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosives by others. It requires the NNWS who join it not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosives and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities. It requires all parties to place such safeguards on their nuclear exports to any NNWS, whether or not a party to the Treaty. Thus, it is not only the diplomatic centerpiece of worldwide nonproliferation efforts, but provides a basic legal and political framework for many of the other measures discussed in this paper.

We are clearly at a crossroads where the future efficacy of the NPT may be determined and our commitment to nonproliferation put to the test. Even before the Indian explosion, ratification of the Treaty by certain key signatories before the NPT Review Conference in May, 1975 was judged vital to the Treaty’s success. While these states appeared to be progressing toward that end, in some cases (especially Japan and Italy) the outcome was not fully assured. The Indian explosion has provided an additional argument to the opposition in these countries to NPT controls, and has increased the prospects of a “chain reaction.” Without these ratifications, other potential parties would be less likely to join, even parties to the Treaty and strong supporters such as Canada might lose interest, and the common interest which we have with the Soviets in this field could be damaged.

During recent years, U.S. support for the NPT has been perceived as declining, and our response thus far to the Indian explosion has been muted. Our public posture and actions during the next few months can have an important effect on the credibility and effectiveness of our nonproliferation policy. While the treaty admittedly is only one of our nonproliferation devices, any further major blow that it may suffer should make it much harder for us to continue to deal with nonproliferation through other devices. A policy of relative indifference to the NPT at this juncture can seriously damage our ability to cope with nonproliferation, while reinvigorated efforts on the Treaty’s behalf could help compensate for the setback represented by the Indian explosion and prevent such serious damage.

Recommended Actions

1. Reaffirm at the earliest opportunity high-level U.S. support for the NPT and the urgent need for widest possible adherence. This should be done publicly and privately in order to remove any doubts as to the priority we attach to the Treaty and to set the stage for the NPT Review Conference in May 1975.

2. Intensify efforts to plan a U.S. strategy for the Review Conference aimed at “limiting damage” from the Indian explosion and maintaining the integrity of the NPT.

3.Consult promptly with the Soviet Union on key nonproliferation issues:

a) proliferation implications of Indian explosion;

b) steps relevant to the Review Conference;¹²

c) approaches to PNE problem (see D below);

d) handling of demands for security assurances;

e) Soviet adherence to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

4. Discuss with the West Germans, Dutch, and Belgians whether they could proceed with ratification this year, irrespective of Italian ratification. Approach new Italian Government when formed on ratification.

5. Reaffirm to the Japanese our intense interest in their ratification of the NPT this year. Indications of increasing opposition to ratification makes this more imperative. Demonstrate progress on the U.S. offer to place commercial nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and consult with Japan on the Italian ratification problem.

6. Approach the following countries on NPT ratification: Spain (non-signatory NNWS with largest commercial nuclear power program); South Africa (natural uranium resources and constructing enrichment plant); Switzerland (important commercial nuclear power whose ratification is important and seems attainable).

7. Complete negotiations with IAEA of U.S. safeguards offer before the end of 1974.¹³ This is desirable to demonstrate good faith and to help induce timely ratification by Japan, West Germany, Italy, and possibly others.

B. Limiting the Damage from the Indian Event

Rationale

The Indian nuclear explosion raises a number of new problems for our nonproliferation efforts:

—How to limit further development by India of a nuclear weapons program;

—how to minimize the risk that Pakistan will develop its own nuclear explosives;

—how to minimize the risk that others (such as Israel, Argentina and Brazil) will follow the Indian “PNE” route;

—how to minimize the risk that India will make nuclear explosives or the technology for making them available to other NNWS;

—how to minimize the risk that India, as a potential exporter of nuclear materials and equipment, will undercut international nuclear export control efforts designed to require safeguards and meet other nonproliferation concerns;

—how to minimize the adverse impact of the Indian explosion on efforts to obtain the widest possible adherence to the NPT.

In dealing with India it is recognized that strong measures directed against the Indian nuclear program might create resentment on the part of the Indians which could harm nonproliferation efforts by making more difficult our efforts to deter the Indians from expanding their nuclear explosives program and to induce them to adopt a safeguarded nuclear export position. On the other hand, acceptance of the Indian decision or condoning its “peaceful uses” rationale could have the effect of encouraging other nations to follow the Indian route.

Recommended Actions

1. Persuade other nuclear suppliers to obtain from India the type of assurance with respect to non-use of their nuclear exports in any nuclear explosive that we have requested India to furnish before our next shipment of enriched uranium for the Tarapur reactors (this is arguably an obligation for NPT parties) and have the Zangger (nuclear exporters’) Committee consider this question further.

2. Consult with Canada on following urgent matters:

a) Our respective approaches to future nuclear cooperation with India;

b) need to tighten legal and technical safeguards on Canadian-supplied Rajasthan reactors;

c) handling of Argentine purchase of CANDU reactor, (including safeguards effectiveness), and how to deal with PNE issue and possible concerns over U.S.-Canadian reactor sales competition.

3. Head off Pakistani acquisition of chemical reprocessing plant, which they are now actively seeking and which is crucial to their obtaining an independent ability to make nuclear explosives.

a) Consult with Japan, Belgium, FRG, France and other potential suppliers.

b) Seek Zangger (nuclear exporters’) Committee consensus on avoiding assistance and seek to arrange reprocessing Pakistani fuel abroad.

4. Develop recommendations for discussions with India and Pakistan for use by Secretary of State during planned late summer visit with view towards:

a) securing more binding assurances from India on indigenous nuclear program;

b) securing Indian agreement to safeguard nuclear exports and to adopt appropriate PNE assistance policy (see D below);

c) obtaining Pakistani assurance not to use supplied or derived nuclear material for any nuclear explosive.

5. Discuss with Soviets the undesirability of either supplying India with long-range bombers (of which we are the only two sources of supply).¹⁴

6. Consider specific security assurances for Pakistan, either unilaterally or, if possible, in conjunction with one or more NWS. To reduce the complexity of obtaining wide consensus and approval, such assurances might best take a declaratory, non-treaty form. Some declaration along these lines could be considered independently of a wider study of possible security incentives to join the NPT.

7. Develop Administration position on possible congressional actions that would establish prospective sanctions against actions by India or others that would undercut international safeguard efforts and other non-proliferation policies.

C. Strengthen Nuclear Export Controls and Safeguarded Cooperation

Rationale

We need to assure the continued viability of the IAEA safeguards system, recognizing that the Indian case dramatizes the risks of having unsafeguarded indigenous facilities. With wider NPT adherence by suppliers and recipients, the number of unsafeguarded facilities can be held to a minimum. But efforts must continue to be made outside the NPT framework to diminish the ability of key NNWS to acquire nuclear materials or facilities relevant to a weapons or explosive program without rigorous, thorough and positive safeguards. A vigorous cooperative program with other nations in the nuclear field can (unless our failure to enforce our agreements gives a contrary signal) help ensure that we will exert influence over foreign programs, not only through proper safeguards but also through leverage derived from dependence on U.S. supply and the confidence of a constructive association in peaceful programs. It is in this area that we might encounter contradictory pulls—notably in the inherent conflict between the desire to be more forthcoming toward certain countries with regard to peaceful uses of atomic energy and the need to tighten controls on the export of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology.

Recommended Actions

1. Aggressively seek to implement the recently approved NSDM 235 Action Program reflected in NSDM 255 which predated the Indian test but which now appears even more urgent.¹⁵ There is an urgent need to expand and concert our control policies with other nuclear suppliers. Arriving at common export guidelines with other suppliers will be difficult due to countervailing commercial pressures and may have limited value due to the wide availability of much nuclear technology. Nevertheless, the costs of implementing NSDM 255 are minimal and a relaxation of export control efforts would make further proliferation more likely.

2. Approach the new French Government at a high level on a top priority basis with the goal of reviewing our respective export policies and exploring whether France, which has not systematically applied safeguards to its exports, could be induced to join a common effort to safeguard nuclear exports and exports that would help India or others develop an advanced nuclear delivery capability. Of particular importance is the need to ensure that France will not undercut efforts to contain the Indian program and deal with the potential Pakistani and Argentine-Brazil proliferation problems.

3. Press for Zangger Committee guidelines on exports that would “trigger” safeguards to be put into effect this summer. The IAEA would publish the list transmitted by the Committee, which could subsequently add to the list.

4. Develop a more stringent approach to civilian agreements with nations in troubled areas. Our proposed nuclear power agreements with Israel and Egypt include special control conditions beyond the standard requirement for IAEA safeguards.¹⁶ It is suggested that similar constraints not only be applied to requests from other Middle East states (as suggested in the proposed policy) but also to countries in other troubled or unstable areas of the world to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The risk of losing U.S. sales to such states (which could lead to a total loss of safeguarded control by driving recipients to some other suppliers or to indigenous efforts) can be minimized by maintaining a competitive U.S. fuel and reactor export policy and consulting with other suppliers to develop common export guidelines. On the other hand, we need the cooperation of other suppliers in export control, to prevent loose controls from becoming a competitive factor.¹⁷

5. Factor nonproliferation considerations into AEC’s continuing review of U.S. policy with respect to future availability and supply of uranium enrichment services, or decisions on any major changes in such policy.

This review should take into consideration the desirability, from a nonproliferation standpoint, of maintaining the U.S. role as a major supplier. The U.S. should continue Energy Coordinating Group consultations with other countries on enrichment supply policies, with a view to ensuring that they serve non-proliferation objectives.

Our role as the dominant supplier of enriched uranium for foreign power reactors is diminishing with the advent of new enriching plants overseas, together with the exhaustion of excess capacity at our existing plants. U.S. private industry is now seriously considering construction of an additional enrichment plant with 9,000,000 SWU capacity and a decision is expected in the near future. (A review of the U.S. enrichment services situation has been requested by the House Appropriations Committee.)

Our position as a commercially attractive supplier of enrichment services gives us leverage to obtain appropriate safeguards and guarantees on our exports, and to make dependence on us for periodic refueling of the nuclear power plants a factor that helps enforce such undertakings. Loss of this position could drive customers to deal with other suppliers who impose less rigorous conditions, or who sell CANDU type reactors, which are more difficult to safeguard, and, by eliminating dependence on enriched uranium supply, provide less leverage to prevent the acquisition of unregulated weapons grade material.

D. Develop Internationally Acceptable Approach to PNE That Serves Our Nonproliferation Interests

Rationale

It is inherently impossible to develop a PNE that does not at the same time contribute to the developer’s nuclear weapons technology. Accordingly, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are bound by the NPT not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any NNWS to manufacture any nuclear explosive device, and NNWS who join the NPT give up their option to do so. Thus, any action that tends to encourage or give international blessing to a NNWS in developing its own PNEs discriminates against NNWS who have joined the NPT. Moreover, in order to fulfill our obligations under the NPT not to give such assistance, it is essential that, in the case of non-NPT parties, we reinforce restrictions against the use of our nuclear exports in PNEs. To obtain such assurances we should be prepared to cancel further nuclear shipments to the country involved if it refuses our request.

Neither the U.S. nor the USSR has fulfilled the expectations of NPT parties that we would make nuclear explosives services available to them for peaceful purposes as contemplated in Article V of the NPT. Most of the foreign interest to date, which has been preliminary in nature, appears to have been in excavation projects (canals and harbors) which probably present problems under the LTBT. But regardless of the project, lengthy and detailed feasibility and engineering studies would have to be conducted before any actual explosion services could take place.

As noted above, nuclear excavation presents problems of compliance with LTBT and may well be precluded by a TTB in the absence of a special provision that would constitute a major loophole without comprehensive constraints that would be difficult to negotiate. While we have no plans for nuclear excavation, the Soviets appear to be preparing for a follow-on to their 1971 experiment in preparation for excavation of a Kama-Pechora canal. Their PNE advocates would like to see special exceptions for PNEs worked out under either a CTB or a TTB.

Complicating factors in dealing with the nonproliferation aspects of PNEs are the apparent strength of the Soviet interest in PNEs (which has become evident in the TTB negotiations), the apparent interest of the French in providing PNE services (even though their technical readiness to do so is doubtful), and the impetus that the Indian explosion may give to other NPT holdouts who may wish to keep open the option to develop their own PNEs. It must be recognized that an offer of PNE services to such NPT holdouts would not be likely to induce them to forswear this option or join the Treaty, and that few NPT parties appear to be urgently interested in PNE services. However, it would make it harder for them to justify their own indigenous PNE effort.

Recommendations

1. Obtain, and urge other NPT parties to obtain, assurances from any non-NPT countries supplied by NPT parties that they will not use nuclear exports from such NPT parties for any nuclear explosive development, and ensure that safeguards apply to this commitment. We should be prepared to cancel further nuclear shipments to the country involved if it refuses to give such assurances.

2. Consult with Soviets on how we both expect to handle the NPT Article V problem in the coming year, including possibilities of:

a) developing a mechanism for supplying PNE services pursuant to that article;

b) openly discussing in an appropriate international forum the radiation and LTBT problems associated with nuclear excavation explosions, and the limitations and problems of other PNE applications;

c) deferring further excavation experiments pending outcome of TTB negotiations and proposed discussion in November of LTBT problems;

d) arranging, either jointly or separately, to participate in the coming year in a feasibility study of a PNE project (preferably not an excavation project) in an NPT state to demonstrate our good faith under Article V.

3. Examine on an urgent basis the question of whether special “safeguards” can be devised to help give assurance that any PNE devices made by a NNWS are accounted for and will continue to be channeled to peaceful uses, while not encouraging others to follow the Indian route. (A preliminary examination of this possibility is made in Annex III of the report.)

4. Consider extending PNE services offer (as we did in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America) to states which forswear indigenous development of nuclear explosives.

[Omitted here are Section II. Longer-Term Policy Considerations; Section III. Procedures and Special Studies; Annex I: Affecting Technical Capabilities; Annex II: Decreasing Motivations for Nuclear Weapons Decisions; and Annex III: Limiting the Damage From the Indian Development and Containing the PNE Problem.]

1. Summary: The report, required by NSSM 202, summarized the NSC Under Secretaries Committee’s study of U.S. policy concerning nonproliferation and the Non-Proliferation Treaty specifically, in light of the Indian nuclear test.

   Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Institutional Files (H–Files), National Security Study Memoranda, Box H–205, NSSM 202. Secret. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors or omissions and footnotes in the original. NSSM 202 is Document 50.

2. NSSM 202 (May 23, 1974) is attached. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. Technical Capabilities (Annex I); Motivations for Nuclear Weapons Decisions (Annex II); Limiting Damage From the Indian Development and Containing the PNE Problem (Annex III). [Footnote is in the original.]
4. However, because they involve substantial level activities they are addressed only in a peripheral way in this study. [Footnote is in the original.]
5. Italian ratification is delayed due to domestic politics; the FRG Parliament has approved the Treaty. Early Japanese ratification has become less certain as a result of the Indian test. [Footnote is in the original.]
6. See Annex I for a more extensive discussion. [Footnote is in the original.]
7. U–233 presents a number of difficult problems and is very unlikely to be selected by a NNWS for explosive use. Countries with thorium reserves and, for some reason, unable to obtain Pu might consider this alternative. [Footnote is in the original.]
8. See Annex I for information on the NPT and for analyses of incentives affecting nuclear weapons decisions. [Footnote is in the original.]
9. Other notable exceptions are the French supplied 25 MW+ Dimona research reactor in Israel and a 480 MWe power reactor in Spain built jointly with France. Within a few years, two unsafeguarded (Madras) power reactors will be operational in India. See Annex II. [Footnote is in the original.]
10. See Annex III and the recommendations on PNEs discussed below for possible solutions to this outstanding problem. [Footnote is in the original.]
11. Annex II discusses the treaty in more detail. [Footnote is in the original.]
12. See D below. [Footnote is in the original.]
13. This would call for IAEA safeguards on selected U.S. commercial nuclear facilities to diminish concerns over “discrimination” and “intrusion.” [Footnote is in the original.]
14. Our present arms policy precludes supply by the U.S. [Footnote is in the original.]
15. The plan contemplates the inauguration of U.S. consultations with other suppliers designed to forge common policies governing exports of highly enriched uranium and plutonium as well as standards to govern the export of unclassified as well as classified technologies, the encouragement where feasible of multilateral fabrication and reprocessing plants, and the inauguration of a major U.S. initiative to upgrade nuclear physical protection measures worldwide. [Footnote is in the original.]
16. The conditions include: omission of commitment to consider transfer of highly enriched uranium; U.S. rights to influence the location of fabrication and reprocessing facilities for, and storage of plutonium (e.g., insist on external storage); commitments and consultations regarding adequate physical security; and confirmation of no PNE use of U.S. derived matériel. [Footnote is in the original.]
17. It has been suggested by some that consideration be given to the possibility of a broader policy of applying special conditions to all future nuclear arrangements. [Footnote is in the original.]