Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

137. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and Jan Lodal and David Elliott of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, April 18, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Verification Panel Meeting on Non-Proliferation
• Saturday, April 19, 1975—10:00 a.m.

This Verification Panel meeting has been scheduled to:

—Review our preparations for the May 5 NPT Review Conference and next week’s U.S./UK/USSR preparatory trilaterals.

—Examine the alternative U.S. PNE policies analyzed in the PNE policy paper you requested at the last Verification Panel meeting on Non-Proliferation.

—Review progress toward a Nuclear Suppliers Conference and get interagency agreement on next week’s exploratory meeting in London.

What You Want Out of the Meeting

—On the NPT Review Conference, you need to make it clear that the Conference is merely one of several forums for our nonproliferation activities, and that it is probably not the best place for major U.S. initiatives. While we will want to affirm our support for the treaty, the Conference will be primarily a damage-limiting exercise—handling inevitable criticisms in a way that avoids undercutting the NPT framework. Specifically, you should:

• Dispose of proposals within the USG to offer a pledge to non-nuclear NPT parties not to use nuclear weapons against them.

• Direct that U.S. initiatives regarding limits on chemical reprocessing plants (plants used to extract the plutonium needed to make bombs from spent reactor fuel) be introduced at the Suppliers Conference meeting rather than at the Review Conference.

• Emphasize that no additional assurances regarding reductions in strategic force levels will be made at the Conference.

—On the PNE issue, you should disabuse Iklé of his idea that a strong anti-PNE stance by the U.S. will facilitate our non-proliferation effort.

—On the Suppliers Conference, you will want to make clear that the April 23 meeting is both preliminary and procedural, and that pressing too hard on substantive issues could threaten the whole enterprise.

NPT Review Conference

The NPT Review Conference comes five years after the Treaty entered into force, and is required by Article VIII of the Treaty itself. Our objective is to be as supportive of the NPT regime as possible and to promote accession to the Treaty by non-party states. But there is little we are prepared to do to make adherence to the Treaty any more attractive, and we should especially resist attempts to amend the Treaty itself.

Our approach to the Conference will be largely defensive, meeting charges by the non-nuclear weapon states that the nuclear powers have undermined the Treaty by failing to live up to their obligations. We can expect charges that the nuclear powers have not done enough to:

—guarantee adequately the security of non-nuclear states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons;

—ensure that international safeguards are not more onerous for NPT parties than for non-parties;

—provide incentives for NPT membership through preferential treatment to NPT parties in the development of peaceful uses for nuclear energy;

—obtain adequate progress in nuclear disarmament; and

—make available the “potential benefits” of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Rhetorically, we will meet these objections by emphasizing the progress that has been made since the Treaty went into effect. However, the following specific issues, discussed in more detail in the interagency paper at Tab B, need policy decision in order to determine our position at the Conference.

1. Security Assurances. Several non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) have already indicated that they will press for assurances by the nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. The Verification Panel working group, in its paper at Tab D, developed several options, focusing on two alternatives to our present policy of opposing general non-use commitments. The first of these, non-use assurances for parties to nuclear-free-zone arrangements, does not benefit states because of their NPT status, and thus would not help us in responding to pressures at the Review Conference. While we might consider this policy at some point, there is no sense in considering this as an initiative at the Review Conference.

The second alternative, non-use assurances to NNWS party to the NPT except in response to an armed attack assisted by a nuclear weapons state, is modeled after Protocol II of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. This option was suggested as a useful way to head off more extreme initiatives at the Review Conference. Supporters argue that it merely rules out something we would never do anyway—namely, the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation to a purely conventional attack by an NNWS acting alone. Thus, it is said to cost nothing in terms of deterrence, while providing an incentive for NPT adherence.

In our view, the value of such an assurance is subject to some doubt. It would not be a major influence on the key NPT holdouts, such as Israel, Egypt, and Pakistan. Furthermore, while the assurance would not rule out nuclear strikes against Pact countries in a Soviet-supported attack on NATO (or a North Korea attack supported by China), the declaration can nevertheless be expected to inject some uncertainty in the minds of our allies—at a time when we want to make the strongest reaffirmation of our support. Thus, we believe you should move the Verification Panel principals toward a consensus that at this time, we should make no change in our present position of unwillingness to give general non-use commitments.

In order to appear somewhat forthcoming at the Conference, we should be able to work with our allies to develop a negative assurance formulation that does not go beyond existing obligations, such as those already assumed under the UN Charter.

2. International Safeguards. We can expect complaints by NPT parties that the safeguards they assume under the Treaty are more onerous than those imposed on non-parties by supplier countries as a condition of export. To match the obligation assumed by NPT parties, we would have to require as a condition of supply that non-parties put all of their peaceful nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. The French at least will not go along with this. But a consensus is emerging among suppliers that an agreed list of items should be put under IAEA safeguards of common duration and scope. It would be fully consistent with this consensus to announce at the Review Conference, either singly or with other suppliers, that we will give major weight in future nuclear export decision to the comprehensiveness of the safeguards on the recipient’s peaceful nuclear activities.

3. Incentives for NPT Membership. ACDA has proposed two Conference initiatives involving preferential treatment for NPT parties.

• We have stated in the past that LDCs who are NPT parties would get preference in the allocation of our contributions-in-kind to the IAEA technical assistance program. We would now expand this statement to include similar U.S. bilateral assistance programs.

• We would announce at the Conference that NPT adherence will be one of several factors given favorable consideration in future U.S. decisions on the rates charged by the Export-Import Bank for financing nuclear exports.

Giving preferences to NPT parties without similar commitments by other suppliers can place the U.S. at a disadvantage in competing for business from non-party states and might stimulate independent development by non-parties that would increase the risk of proliferation. These two ACDA proposals probably avoid these difficulties. They allow the U.S. to improve its treatment of NPT parties without imposing any new restrictions in its dealings with non-parties.

Nevertheless, neither proposal is particularly well thought out. Giving NPT parties preference in our bilateral technical assistance programs would have no practical impact because virtually all U.S. technical assistance is funnelled through the IAEA. Implementation of the credit rate preference would require further consultations with the Export/Import Bank and could involve special Congressional legislation. Thus, we believe your best approach would be to point out at the meeting that these initiatives would have to be further developed before they could be aired at the Review Conference.

ACDA has also proposed that these two initiatives be used to discourage nations from acquiring their own chemical reprocessing facilities by giving preference in allocating technical assistance and by giving favorable export credit rates to those states willing to forego reprocessing plants.

Reprocessing is undoubtedly a major proliferation problem. Through this process, weapons-usable plutonium is extracted from the spent fuel rods used in power reactors. The process is so expensive that none of the countries trying to obtain a national facility (including Pakistan, Korea, the Republic of China, and Brazil) can justify it on strictly economic grounds—raising some question about their real intentions. Finally, although some safeguards are possible on reprocessing plants, they are very difficult technically; it would not be difficult to divert enough material to make several bombs per year even if a plant were under international safeguards. For these reasons, we have tried to discourage acquisition of national facilities in our bilateral discussions with these countries and have made a major effort among the nuclear suppliers to get agreement on a multinational approach to reprocessing plants.

Nonetheless, it probably does not make sense to discuss reprocessing at the Review Conference. The suppliers meeting is a better forum for dealing with the issue. The NPT does not discuss specific processes such as reprocessing, and we really have no handle on the issue through the NPT. In fact, it probably would appear to most participants that the U.S. was looking to avoid its Article IV obligation to share nuclear technology.

At the Review Conference we should probably content ourselves with seeking support for an expedited international study of this subject, urging states contemplating the purchase of these facilities to hold off on their decisions until the results of the study are available. This will give us time to pursue our efforts among the suppliers.

4. Progress in Nuclear Disarmament. The U.S. and the Soviets will be under great pressure to defend their record under Article VI of the NPT in negotiating measures relating to nuclear disarmament—and will be asked to give some assurances on reductions as well as limitations on strategic nuclear arms.

The guidance on this point is well established; we must successfully complete the negotiations implementing the Vladivostok Agreement, and then commence follow-on negotiations aimed at reductions. You will want to emphasize at the Verification Panel meeting that this is the extent of the commitment we are willing to make at the Review Conference.

5. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. Critics at the Conference will assert that the nuclear weapon states have not done enough to make available the “potential benefits” of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) to NNWS. How we handle this issue is affected by the TTB/PNE negotiations with the Soviets, and the decision made concerning our domestic PNE policy. For this reason, you should first review our overall PNE policy before dealing with the tactics for handling this issue at the Conference.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

The Verification Panel working group considered three approaches to our overall policy on PNEs. (An analysis is at Tab E.)

—Maintain our present low-profile position on PNE benefits in international forums and our token domestic PNE development program (FY 76—$1 million).

—Downplay PNEs in international circles and forego any U.S. domestic program.

—Promote PNEs internationally and seek a bigger domestic budget ($15 million and up).

The Soviets have conducted an active PNE program. Because of this we are now negotiating an agreement governing PNEs in the TTBT context. This agreement will in effect legitimize PNEs for the short term, although over time the substantial budgetary outlays required for an extensive PNE program may curb the Soviet appetite. For our part, we have found no attractive industrial applications for PNEs. Business has been indifferent and has faced a public concerned about the environmental impact.

Both ERDA and ACDA are trying to use the NPT Review Conference to gain some leverage on the PNE issue. Article V of the NPT commits us to provide the “potential benefits” from PNEs to NNWS. ERDA argues (falsely) that this obligates us to have an active PNE development program. ACDA rightly points out that we are only required by Article V to make any benefits we actually realize from PNEs available to NNWS on a non-discriminatory basis. But ACDA goes on to argue that since we have found no such benefits, we should downplay PNEs and terminate our domestic program as an aid to curbing the proliferation of nuclear devices.

In fact, proliferation is not at issue here. Neither promotion of PNEs nor their denunciation is likely to be a factor in an Indian, Korean, or any other nation’s decision to develop the capacity to explode a nuclear device. Basic perceptions of national interest and power will govern.

Were the U.S. to forego its own program and declare itself against PNEs, we would forfeit a role which we may wish to play 5 to 10 years from now. Legitimate requests for PNE applications may come from NNWS, which we may wish to respond to on the merits or to preclude a Soviet role as the primary PNE supplier. To retain this option, however, we do not need much of a domestic PNE program. Nuclear weapons technology is largely transferable to the area of PNEs, and it should not be too costly to modify a weapons device to fit most PNE applications. A PNE program now of any significance would run into Congressional resistance and criticism from environmentalists. Should concrete uses appear, these pressures would probably decline. Whatever future program might be required, it would probably fall well within the limits on PNEs that are likely to come out of the TTB/PNE negotiations.

We should stick with our present approach to PNEs and fund a domestic program at current levels. At the NPT Review Conference, we should emphasize that Article V was designed to ensure the NNWS party to the Treaty not be deprived of the potential benefits of PNEs realized by nuclear weapon states. When (and if) we realize such benefits, we are prepared to make these benefits available as provided in Article V. In the interim, we will continue to participate in discussions regarding the institutional and procedural problems involved in setting up the international PNE framework envisioned in Article V. Thus, at the meeting, you should disabuse both ACDA and ERDA of their hobbyhorses—telling ERDA that the NPT does not “require” us to expand our PNE program, and telling ACDA that no good non-proliferation purpose is served by U.S. denunciation of PNEs.

Nuclear Suppliers Conference

As a result of your exchange of letters with Sauvagnargues, it now appears that the French will join us April 23 in London for an exploratory suppliers meeting. The Soviets, FRG, Canadians, and Japanese have all indicated that they will attend.

In preparing for this meeting, we have discussed in a series of bilaterals our views in five areas of nuclear control:

—Prohibition of using material acquired through exports to produce “PNEs.”

—Safeguarding all exports of facilities and materials and greater control of technology transfer.

—Multinational ownership of chemical reprocessing and enrichment facilities.

—Enhanced physical security.

—Special consideration of exports to sensitive countries and regions.

We have supplied to the UK the paper at Tab I which summarizes our views on the above points and, without attribution, gives the views of other suppliers. It is our expectation that this summary will be the basis for substantive discussions at the exploratory meeting, and the starting point for the other countries in developing positions for the Conference itself. The rest of the discussions in London will center on procedural questions, and our delegation will be guided by the instructions at Tab H.

Our main purpose at the London meeting will be to edge the suppliers closer to a full-fledged conference in June and July, at which we hope to reach common understandings on supply policies. At next week’s meeting we want to review the assorted national positions, but without seeking any commitments, so as not to scare anyone away. This point needs to be emphasized at the Verification Panel meeting.

The most sensitive issue involves provision of chemical reprocessing facilities to NNWS. France and the FRG are about to conclude deals to provide reprocessing facilities to South Korea and Brazil respectively. Because such plants produce quantities of weapon-usable material and are difficult to safeguard effectively, there is risk of diversion of bomb material. These plants—though they will have IAEA safeguards—have generated considerable controversy. ACDA and some bureaus in State want us to intervene strongly to halt the sales. Neither France nor the FRG is likely to reverse itself, but we may be able to obtain a concession of multinational ownership which would be added deterrence against diversion.

Our policy has been to seek multinational reprocessing plants as a hedge against diversion. To badger others on the basic issue of selling reprocessing facilities runs the risk of jeopardizing common understandings. The Verification Panel principals need to understand this.

One other argument against reprocessing facilities in NNWS is that they are not economical. The other suppliers may see that argument as an attempt to preempt their commercial opportunities. In discussing the reprocessing issue, it should be predominantly on proliferation grounds, not economic. We can, however, support and even accelerate the international study of the need for and economic aspects of reprocessing now underway in the IAEA.

Conduct of the Meeting

—Ask Iklé to give a rundown on our preparations for the NPT Review Conference.

—Set out our general approach to the Conference as primarily a damage-limiting exercise.

—Discuss the specific issues requiring decision prior to the Conference.

—Indicate the positions that should be taken on these issues at the trilateral meeting on April 21.

—Review our overall PNE policy, and provide guidance on how to handle the PNE issue at the Review Conference.

—Turn to the Suppliers Conference and bring the group up to date on our recent progress.

—Emphasize the exploratory nature of the April 23 talks and the need to avoid confrontation.

—Provide further guidance for the April 23 meeting as necessary.

Your Meeting Book

In addition to your talking points, your meeting book contains the following:

—An issues paper on the NPT Review Conference (Tab B)

—The text of the NPT (Tab C)

—An options paper on Non-Use Assurances (Tab D)

—An options paper on US PNE policy (Tab E)

—The Aide Mémoire initiating the Suppliers Conference and some of your earlier guidance (Tabs F and G)

—Proposed guidance for the April 23 suppliers meeting and a suggested discussion paper (Tabs H and I)

—A U.S. position paper on the substantive issues involved in the suppliers discussions (Tab J)

—The correspondence with the French (Tab K)

1. Summary: In preparation for the April 19 Verification Panel meeting, Sonnenfeldt, Lodal, and Elliott summarized for Kissinger the current issues and strategy options concerning the upcoming NPT Review Conference and trilateral preparatory talks, U.S. PNE policy, and the Nuclear Suppliers Conference.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 9, Verification Panel (NPT), April 19, 1975 (1) (Lodal’s BK). Secret; Completely Outside the System. Tabs A, B, D, and F–J are attached but not published. Tabs C and K are not attached. Tab E is Document 136. Minutes of the April 19 Verification Panel meeting on nonproliferation are Document 138.