136. Paper Prepared by the Verification Panel Working Group1
INTERNATIONAL POLICY ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
SUMMARY
Developments over the past year, in particular the Indian nuclear explosion and the Soviet position that some accommodation be made for PNEs in the TTBT have brought a degree of urgency to the consideration of peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) issues. In addition to the issues arising in the preparation of the U.S. position for Round III of the TTBT III negotiations, several other principal areas at issue concern our PNE services posture, in particular:
(1) What future public posture should the U.S. take as to the potential technical and economic benefits and social acceptability of PNEs [Page 451] and what is the relationship of this posture to the actual status of, and prospects for, the U.S. PNE R&D program?
(2) To what extent should the U.S. assist other countries in studies of contained and excavation PNE applications?
(3) To what extent should the U.S. be prepared to furnish PNE detonation services to other countries?
(4) How far should the U.S. go in developing the international agreements for PNE services called for in Article V of the NPT?
These issues will arise in the near future during several international activities, particularly at the May NPT Review Conference and at the CCD and the IAEA. Consideration should be given to approaches for handling PNE issues both in these near-term activities as well as over the longer term. Present U.S. international policy on PNEs consists of:
—strong opposition to development of any nuclear explosive devices by non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS).
—limited assistance to other countries on PNE studies.
—a cautious attitude on PNE services.
—a cautious approach on procedural arrangements for PNE services.
—insistence in the TTBT Article III negotiations that PNEs must not provide weapon-related benefits otherwise precluded or limited by the TTBT.
—refusal to support or encourage any changes in the LTBT to allow accommodation of excavation applications.
As a party to the NPT, the U.S. has an obligation under Article V to ensure that any benefits realized by the U.S. from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to NNWS party to the NPT on a non-discriminatory basis. The U.S., however, has no obligation under the NPT to develop PNE technology. The U.S. has repeatedly stated its preparedness to meet its NPT Article V obligations. The U.S. has taken a low-key approach on supply of PNE services, stressing that the feasibility and economic advantages of PNE applications have not yet been determined or demonstrated by the U.S. It is desirable to review both our international posture on PNEs and the U.S. domestic PNE program level, which has declined substantially recently, to ensure that they are in reasonable harmony.
Contained PNE applications of potential interest in the U.S. are natural gas stimulation, recovery of oil from oil shale, several storage applications, mining, and electric power production. ERDA is now considering proposing future work on at least some of these applications. The U.S. has no current excavation interest.
The Soviet Union has a continuing program in both contained and excavation PNE applications. They have stated an interest in eleven [Page 452] contained PNE applications and have claimed that three contained and one excavation application have been reduced to practice. One of these, (gas condensate storage) has been described fully in public. Further, they have requested that the IAEA develop health and safety guidelines for PNEs, including excavation projects.
France and the UK are studying oil storage, and the FRG is financing an Egyptian study for a major hydroelectric project, including nuclear excavation as an option. A number of technical, political and legal (e.g., LTBT) problems remain to be resolved before nuclear excavation projects could be carried out.
While PNEs and competing advanced technologies are projected in the U.S. to have generally similar costs, these estimates are very uncertain. Contained applications, except hydrocarbon storage, would require at least 5–10 years of successful development in the U.S. to establish technical suitability for commercial use, with additional time for resolving regulatory issues.
The Soviets may be planning to indicate at the NPT Review Conference or in other fora that they have reduced certain PNE applications to practice and are ready and willing to provide PNE service to NNWS parties. If this happened the U.S. could be asked whether it is also willing to provide such services.
Strategy Options
Assuming that a decision is made to adopt an overall strategy, the basic US strategy options would be to continue the present approach or adopt either a more positive or more cautious attitude toward: (i) the prospects for PNEs, (ii) assistance to other countries in PNE studies, and (iii) development of international agreements for PNE services. These strategies interrelate with our non-proliferation policy, and, to a considerably lesser extent, with the TTBT Article III negotiations and U.S.-Soviet competition internationally. Another factor is the level of effort in the domestic PNE program that would be a precondition for each strategy.
Pros and Cons
1. Present Approach
Pros:
a. Gives U.S. flexibility in international discussions pending further consideration of the future of U.S. domestic PNE program.
b. Is consistent with present USG position on maintaining integrity of LTBT.
Cons:
a. Requires moderate increase in funding to implement effectively; otherwise approach may lose its international credibility.
[Page 453]b. May eventually result in requests for PNE assistance in studies or services which the U.S. would be unwilling or unable to meet.
c. Fails to stop politically motivated criticism of U.S. for not implementing Article V promptly.
2. More Cautious Approach
Pros:
a. Could result in decreased interest in NNWS in use of PNEs and thereby make requests for PNE services, which we may not be able to fulfill, less likely.
b. Could tend to weaken NNWS rationale for indigenous “PNE” programs.
c. Would be approach most consistent with the present low-level of funding in the domestic U.S. PNE program.
d. Would reinforce U.S. LTBT position.
Cons:
a. Might result in increased criticism that the U.S. was not meeting its Article V commitment.
b. Without similar Soviet stance, effectiveness would be reduced and there might be some gain in Soviet influence should they be the only provider of PNE services.
c. Could provide more excuse for weapon development under the guise of PNEs.
3. More Positive Approach
Pros:
a. If the U.S. were both willing and able to meet any requests for PNE services, criticism that we were not fulfilling our NPT Article V obligations would be minimized and the NPT might thereby be strengthened to some extent.
b. Would tend to minimize any advantages to the Soviets that might result from their provision of PNE services to other countries.
c. Could increase likelihood of obtaining any domestic benefits that might accrue from PNEs.
Cons:
a. To some degree it could strengthen those factions in some NNWS who favor indigenous development of nuclear devices, because the perception of utility will be greater.
b. If the U.S. were unable or unwilling to supply services, resentment on the part of some NNWS might be increased.
c. If the more positive approach were applied to excavation applications, the question of changing the U.S. position regarding the LTBT would have to be dealt with.
[Page 454]d. This approach would be feasible only if the U.S. were to decide to expand its PNE program significantly to meet domestic needs.
[Omitted here is the body of the report.]
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Summary: The paper summarized U.S. international policy on peaceful nuclear explosions and strategy options in advance of the May 5 NPT Review Conference and preparatory trilateral meetings.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Program Analysis Staff Files, Convenience Files, Box 9, Verification Panel (NPT), April 19, 1975 (1) (Lodal’s BK). Secret. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. Attached as Tab E to Document 137.
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