Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

138. Minutes of a Verification Panel Meeting¹

Washington, April 19, 1975, 10:21–10:50 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Nuclear Non-Proliferation

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman

  • Henry A. Kissinger

• State

  • Robert Ingersoll
  • Helmut Sonnenfeldt
  • William Hyland
  • George Vest

• DOD

  • Robert Ellsworth
  • Amos Jordan
  • Dr. James P. Wade

• JCS

  • Gen. John W. Pauly

• CIA

  • Edward Proctor
  • [2 names not declassified]

• ACDA

  • Dr. Fred Iklé
  • John Boright
  • Charles Van Dorn

• ERDA

  • Dr. Robert Seamans
  • Dr. Edward Giller

• NSC Staff

  • Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
  • Jan Lodal
  • Dr. David Elliott
  • Stephen Hadley
  • James Barnum

Secretary Kissinger: We have to have a WSAG right after this meeting, so we had better get moving. Fred (Dr. Iklé) would you give us a run-down on how you view the upcoming Review Conference?

Dr. Iklé: We view the Review Conference as an opportunity to reaffirm our committment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to promote accession to the Treaty by non-party states. We do not plan to address any new problems. We hope to keep it strictly to a reaffirmation of the Treaty. We believe we will come under attack on two things: (1) that we have not done enough to guarantee adequately the security of non-nuclear states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons; and (2) that we have not been forthcoming enough on technical assistance.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me make one point. We are going to stand on our record at this Conference and at any other conferences. The United States is not going to any international conference with a defeatist attitude. We’re going there as a world power. We’ll negotiate in good faith, but I want to make it clear to everybody that the United States is too tough to be pushed around. I don’t want any of this masochistic self-criticism in which we so often specialize.

Dr. Iklé: You’re stealing my thunder.

Secretary Kissinger: Thunder away!

Dr. Iklé: I think I can dispense with the technical issues very quickly. We expect the less developed countries to attack us on our record of assistance to them in the nuclear field. They will argue that considerably more assistance has gone to non-parties to the NPT than to parties to the NPT.

Secretary Kissinger: Who will attack us, India?

Dr. Iklé: India won’t be there. I’m thinking of Mexico and some of the other Latin American countries.

We think that there are two difficult issues we will face. The first is negative security assurances (or non-use assurances). This is the question of whether nuclear weapons states will give assurances that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

Secretary Kissinger: What is the negative security issue?

Dr. Iklé: Well, it boils down to whether nuclear weapons states are prepared to say that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states (NNWS). We think that a flat “no” would be awkward. We have looked at various options in the working group.

Secretary Kissinger: Are you saying that the nuclear weapons states are prepared to renounce use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states?

Dr. Iklé: We are saying that we will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states. There are contingencies to that. The Defense Department prefers not to get into this issue right now and to avoid any change in present policy.

Secretary Kissinger: What does the State Department prefer?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Absolutely no change. We support DOD in that.

Dr. Iklé: Well, there is an implied difference. There are at least two choices of how to make a non-use assurance.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you mean, two choices? We either will use nuclear weapons or refuse to use nuclear weapons.

Dr. Iklé: The first choice is that we refuse—that we agree not to use nuclear weapons against non-weapons states. The second choice is to make this assurance with an exception for non-nuclear states in alliance with the nuclear powers.

Secretary Kissinger: And DOD is against this?

Mr. Ellsworth: We don’t think that this is a good time to change our position.

Secretary Kissinger: And State is against this?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Your understanding is that we will have to handle criticism on this point.

Dr. Iklé: We will be having further discussions with the allies on this. We could publish a statement. I think that our best ploy is to leave it open in NATO. We could use part of the Japanese text that talks about avoiding the use of force generally in relations between states.

Secretary Kissinger: What’s that?

Dr. Iklé: That the Japanese have our support for this text. (Hands the Secretary a copy of the Japanese text).

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I can’t say that this moves the thing very far.

Secretary Kissinger: What other issues are there?

Dr. Iklé: Technical assistance, we think, will probably be brought up. We think that something can be done in that field. One thing we could do, for example, is give preferential treatment in terms of credits to parties to the NPT. One percentage point, for example. Congress will probably want some type of legislation to back that up, however. We could say at the Review Conference that we will seek congressional agreement for preferential treatment toward NPT parties.

Secretary Kissinger: Will reprocessing come up or be handled only in the suppliers context?

Dr. Iklé: Reprocessing (where, weapons-usable plutonium is extracted from the spent fuel rods used in power reactors) may come up. We think that our best tack would be to be supportive of that (the approach in the suppliers’ context).

Secretary Kissinger: On the point of assurances. I have not raised that subject with the President. The President, however, is not about to change any commitment of any kind at this time. There will be no redeployment of weapons without his specific approval. I do not want any discussion of this issue. The President asked me to make this clear at the first opportunity in an interagency forum, so don’t get case-by-case on this. This position suggests that we cannot give non-use assurances.

Dr. Iklé: Maybe we can go along with the Japanese text.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: No. I think it focuses too much on nuclear weapon states.

Mr. Hyland: This is a left-handed blow to the NPT Conference. The implication is that we are trying to do away with special treatment for NPT parties.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: This is crazy.

Secretary Kissinger: It says here (reads from Japanese text). The implication is that it must be nuclear weapons.

Mr. Ellsworth: The Japanese text might be modified.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let’s all analyze it. Our basic policy is not to give that type of assurance. In the wake of Indochina, we do not want to give the impression of backing down anywhere.

Dr. Iklé: Our allies want to make a general offer of our assurance to countries not tied to alliances.

Secretary Kissinger: Is India going to be there?

Dr. Iklé: No, India will not be there.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Swedes, for one, want us to do that.

Dr. Iklé: And the African countries.

Secretary Kissinger: So, we’re clear on the security assurances.

Dr. Iklé: Right.

Secretary Kissinger: We’ll let Brent (Gen. Scowcroft) work it out with Defense and let you know whether we can accept the Japanese language. We’ll do it in the working group. There is still time. On Monday you can discuss it in the working group.

Dr. Iklé: I would like to pursue the question of giving credit rate preference to favorable countries through the Export-Import Bank, if I could. (Export-Import Bank President) Casey is in favor of it.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: How much money are you talking about, $100,000?

Dr. Iklé: No, it would be much more than that.

Mr. Ellsworth: Yes, but that would involve going to Congress.

Dr. Iklé: Yes, I know, but I believe we could win this one.

Secretary Kissinger: Requiring congressional approval is the best negative assurance I know of!

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Another angle would be that whichever country is authorized Ex-Im bank credits they not be discriminatory and not be used against an ally who is not a party to the NPT versus a non-ally and a member of the NPT.

Dr. Iklé: Spain is one, for example.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: That’s one that I had in mind.

Dr. Iklé: I think we can be flexible enough to handle that problem.

Secretary Kissinger: I see no problem with that. Are there any others?

Dr. Iklé: Those are the essential ones.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay. There are a number of other issues. PNE? Are we all agreed on the PNE issue?

Dr. Iklé: No, ERDA has some problems. They would like to use the Review Conference to gain some leverage on the PNE issue in the Threshhold Test Ban Treaty (TTB) talks and in the CCD.

Dr. Seamans: Well, we are in general agreement with everybody on the PNE issue. We do think, however, that we ought to have a stand-by position at the Review Conference and see if we can exploit it.

Secretary Kissinger: I have no disagreement with that. The Nuclear Proliferation Treaty obligates us to share our nuclear conclusions with member states. As I understand it, the NPT says that only the level of programs must be shared with the other countries. It doesn’t obligate us to give more than we know.

Dr. Seamans: All it says is that it must be at some modest level.

Secretary Kissinger: I’m in favor of saying at the NPT that we will stick to our modest program.

Dr. Iklé: Yeah, we’ll just repeat our long-standing language. In the TTB, we’re already working with the Soviets on an agreement governing PNEs.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, are there any other problems?

Mr. Ellsworth: No, not really.

Dr. Iklé: There are some other problems that might come up outside the Review Conference—like the Iranian nuclear deal.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay, who will be doing the talking at the Suppliers Conference?

Mr. Vest: You have already talked to the French about that. The French expect to hear from them, so everyone will be there—seven in all. I think it will be strictly experimental and that it will not go far in substance. The Japanese and the Germans are cautious. We expect to get a common level of understanding by June or July.

Secretary Kissinger: Will the Soviets be there?

Mr. Vest: Yes. The British have taken on the task of running the show.

Secretary Kissinger: Are you going to go? (to Dr. Iklé)

Dr. Iklé: No, I won’t be there. We are sending only a very small team. There are two things, however, we think will come up: the German deal with Brazil, and our deal with Iran. The Germans are insistent upon setting up some sort of deal with Brazil. It is likely that Iran will also come up.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We have a fairly tough policy point with respect to the Iranians. Our priorities are about to clash. The Iranians will argue their principal economic concern—benefits from access to nuclear power—against whatever it does to nonproliferation.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, if we don’t sell it to them, the French will.

Dr. Iklé: What if the Shah decides to get it from Europe?

Mr. Ellsworth: There is 100% support in Congress for an agreement with controls.

Secretary Kissinger: Suppose the agreement says never to have national reprocessing?

Mr. Ellsworth: That’s a subject of further study.

Secretary Kissinger: What is the ideal position?

Dr. Iklé: Multilateral reprocessing.

Secretary Kissinger: But that’s pure ideology.

Dr. Iklé: What do you think about the chance of bilateral processing?

Secretary Kissinger: I think a 50–50 chance would be realistic.

Dr. Iklé: Then there is not much left in the Suppliers Conference. Also, Congress will object.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: That’s the question we need to decide.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we might just as well stand for what we believe is right and let Congress take the blame.

Mr. Ellsworth: The Defense Department feels that we should try the multilateral approach to reprocessing.

Dr. Iklé: And the French . . .

Secretary Kissinger: If we get every one of the suppliers to agree, I see no problem. I don’t expect that will be possible, however. If not, maybe then we let the Iranian deal go forward. We can stall the Iranians until we find out if we can get a multilateral agreement. On the whole, I would prefer not to have national reprocessing plants. I feel that the question is if we cannot get an agreement to that, should the U.S. then refuse to sell nuclear reactors to countries with reprocessing plants?

Mr. Ellsworth: I hope that we are not at that point yet.

Secretary Kissinger: I know.

Dr. Iklé: Another point regarding reprocessing is not to urge a 10 year duration.

Secretary Kissinger: The Iran negotiations should be confined to what we need to decide now. It ought to be handled first at the Suppliers Conference—get a full picture of the prospects for multilateral reprocessing.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The NSDM involves instructions on how to deal with this problem.

Secretary Kissinger: Okay.

1. Summary: The participants discussed the U.S. commitment to the Nonproliferation Treaty and raised potential issues that could come under scrutiny at the upcoming Review Conference.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—Meetings, Box 23, Meeting Minutes, Verification Panel (Originals), April-May 1975. Top Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text that remains classified. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information appears on the minutes.