Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

123. Statement by the U.S. Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (Martin)¹

Geneva, March 4, 1975.

U.S. Outlines Issues Before Resumed Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

The President of the United States has directed me to convey to the CCD the following message, which I request be made a conference document:

As the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament begins its 1975 deliberations, I would like to extend my best wishes and express my fervent hope that its work this year will add new achievements to the Committee’s substantial record.

The accomplishments of previous sessions have earned the respect of nations throughout the world. The General Assembly of the United Nations has entrusted to the Committee some of the most important and complex problems of our time. The dedication and seriousness of purpose that have characterized the work of the CCD have made it a most effective multilateral forum for dealing with arms control and disarmament questions.

The Committee’s work resumes this year at a significant moment. One of its accomplishments, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, is about to enter into force. The Convention is a positive measure of the progress that can be made through responsible and constructive international negotiation.

A great many tasks—some continuing, some new—face the CCD. Few have simple solutions. No one can guarantee that agreed solutions can be achieved for every issue. For its part, the United States will do all in its power to promote agreement wherever and whenever possible.

I am confident that this Committee, through the constructive dialogue that is its hallmark, will continue to make its valuable contribution to the promotion of peace and security through effective arms-control measures.

Gerald R. Ford

We are resuming our work at a time when disarmament efforts are receiving increasing attention in the search for a more stable and secure world. Convincing evidence of the growing interest in arms control solutions to national and international security problems can be found in the extensive treatment of disarmament questions at the 29th U.N. General Assembly. It is also reflected in the unprecedented number of international meetings which are currently dealing with the subject.

Here in Geneva, Soviet and American negotiators are working out the specific provisions of a second-stage SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement, the broad outlines of which were agreed at the Vladivostok summit. In Moscow, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in discussions aimed at reaching the agreement governing peaceful nuclear explosions that is called for in article III of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. In Washington, representatives of the two countries have been considering the question of effective measures of restraint on environmental modification techniques. In Vienna, members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are continuing their efforts to reach agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency is the focal point for international examination of safeguards on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and of various aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. Finally, two months from now the conference to review the operation of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will begin in Geneva.

The CCD occupies a unique and important position in this overall effort. In 1975 our newly enlarged Committee can expect a heavier workload than it has had in several years. The 29th General Assembly of the United Nations, in addition to urging the CCD to continue its work on a comprehensive test ban and chemical weapons limitations, called on the Committee to examine questions that have so far received relatively little attention in this forum; namely, environmental modification for military purposes, nuclear-free zones, and the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). My delegation welcomes these new responsibilities and is confident that the CCD can make a valuable contribution in each of these fields.

Among the large number of items on the international disarmament agenda, the most pressing, in our view, concern nonproliferation and related nuclear issues. My government was gratified that at the 29th U.N. General Assembly many nations recognized that there is serious cause for concern in the prospect of the further spread of independent nuclear explosive capabilities. The United States feels that the wide support given to the Nonproliferation Treaty and the many calls for broader adherence to that treaty were constructive developments.

At the same time, a large number of delegations recognized that the prevention of the further spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities cannot be taken for granted and that a broad and determined international effort is needed to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

My government is urgently considering what courses of action would contribute most effectively to achieving a more universal, reliable system of safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials and technology to military purposes. It is also considering what would be the most promising steps to increase the political and economic incentives which could lead a country to forgo the nuclear explosive option. My government looks to the NPT Review Conference to assess how well the treaty has functioned in the first five years of its existence, to consider how the treaty can be more effectively implemented, and to provide an impetus for the broadly based effort that will be essential if we are to avoid a proliferation of nuclear powers.

U.S.–USSR Steps To Curb Nuclear Arms Race

The Review Conference will be concerned not only with the operation of those provisions of the NPT that deal directly with the spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities but also with the implementation of those provisions that were designed to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race, notably article VI. In this connection I am pleased to note that, since the CCD last met, the United States and the Soviet Union have taken another major step to curb their competition in nuclear arms. At Vladivostok President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev set firm and equal numerical limits on the strategic forces of both sides. Specifically, they agreed to put a ceiling of 2,400 on the total number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers for each country. They also agreed on a maximum number of 1,320 launchers for missiles that could be armed with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). With the agreement to place all these strategic delivery vehicles under the ceiling and to set an additional limit on MIRVs, this general framework for a new SALT accord goes well beyond the scope of the interim agreement concluded in 1972.

Because of this breakthrough at Vladivostok, for the first time in the nuclear age each side’s strategic calculations and force planning will not be motivated by fear and uncertainty about a possible open-ended strategic buildup by the other side. Instead, they can be based with confidence on firm, established parameters. This can be expected to make a valuable contribution to the stability of the strategic relationship.

Of perhaps greater long-range importance, the ceilings worked out by the leaders of the two countries will provide a solid foundation for negotiating future arms reductions. While many details remain to be settled before this general framework can be transformed into a new agreement, the United States is confident that such an agreement can be concluded this year and that further negotiations on reducing the force ceilings can follow soon thereafter.

My government is aware of the importance attached internationally to a comprehensive test ban as a means of curbing the nuclear arms race. The United States remains firmly committed to seeking an adequately verified comprehensive test ban. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, negotiated in Moscow last summer, is not only a step toward that objective but will be in itself a significant constraint on the nuclear arms competition between the United States and the USSR.

Question of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

The question of peaceful nuclear explosions has recently become a major topic in international disarmament discussions. We must start from the facts that a number of uncertainties about the feasibility and practicability of PNEs have yet to be resolved and that the use of PNEs is a highly complicated matter both politically and legally. Recognizing these facts, the U.S. delegation at the recent General Assembly called for thorough international consideration of the PNE question. We accordingly supported the Assembly’s request in resolution 3261D that the CCD consider the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Those implications have two aspects: implications for the development and testing of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states and implications for the spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities among non-nuclear-weapon states.

With respect to the first of these categories, it is clearly important to insure that nuclear explosions carried out ostensibly for peaceful purposes are not used to gain weapons-related information in circumvention of agreed limitations on weapons testing. This is the central task of the bilateral negotiations now underway in Moscow, where the two sides are discussing criteria to insure that PNEs are consistent with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. An analogous question arises with respect to any form of international test ban agreement. Indeed, this question would be particularly crucial with a comprehensive test ban, since in the absence of any authorized weapons testing, there would be a greater incentive to seek weapons information in the course of a PNE program.

With respect to PNE implications for the spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities, my government’s firm conviction remains that it would be impossible for a non-nuclear-weapon state to develop a nuclear explosive device for peaceful purposes without in the process acquiring a device that could be used as a nuclear weapon. It has been argued that the critical factor is not the capability to produce nuclear devices but the intention of the country producing the device. However, this is not the issue. The critical question is not whether we can accept the stated intentions of any country, but whether a world in which many states have the capability to carry out nuclear explosions—and in which all therefore fear the nuclear-weapons capability of others—would not be vastly less secure than a world that has successfully contained the spread of nuclear explosive technology.

Study of Nuclear-Free Zones

A notable development at the last General Assembly was the heightened interest in nuclear-free zones. Resolutions were adopted dealing with nuclear-free-zone proposals for South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa and with the Latin American Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty. Reflecting this renewed interest, and motivated in part by the diversity of the regional initiatives and the complexity of some of the issues involved, the General Assembly requested that an ad hoe group of governmental experts, under CCD auspices, undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-free zones in all its aspects.

My delegation welcomes this step and hopes it will contribute to a better understanding of the wide range of issues relating to nuclear-free zones. Given the differences that exist from region to region, we think it would be unrealistic to expect the experts to reach agreement on requirements for nuclear-free-zone arrangements that could be applied universally. One useful purpose of the study might be to identify issues where standardized provisions could be feasible, and others where they would not.

Unlike earlier studies undertaken under the auspices of the Secretary General, the study of nuclear-free zones will involve issues that are by nature primarily political rather than technical. This is the first such study to be carried out under the auspices of the CCD, and it was entrusted to this body with the understanding that a number of states not represented in the Committee would participate. My delegation has developed a number of ideas on the organization of this project which we will be discussing with members of the Committee in the next few days.

Restraints on Chemical and Biological Weapons

Turning to the area of restraints on chemical and biological weapons, I am pleased to be able to report two important actions recently taken by the U.S. Government. On January 22 President Ford signed the U.S. instrument of ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. I should point out that, although not party to the protocol in the past, my government has always observed its principles and objectives.

The President also signed on January 22 the U.S. instrument of ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention, a product of the expert and painstaking efforts of this Committee. As members of the CCD are aware, this convention is the first agreement since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an entire class of weapons; namely, biological agents and toxins. With ratification procedures already completed by the three depositary governments and by many more than the required 19 additional governments, we expect the convention to enter into force in the very near future. It is our hope that this will prompt many other governments to adhere to the convention.

As members of the Committee are aware, article II of the Biological Weapons Convention requires parties to destroy or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after entry into force, all agents, equipment, and means of delivery prohibited in article I. In this connection I would like to state that the entire U.S. stockpile of biological and toxin agents and weapons has already been destroyed and our former biological warfare facilities have been converted to peaceful uses. My delegation, and I am sure other members of the Committee, would welcome similar confirmations of implementation of article II from parties to the convention.

The ratification of the Geneva Protocol and the ratification and entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention are viewed by my government as significant steps toward our common objective of the effective prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

My delegation is prepared at the current session to participate in the active examination of possibilities for further effective restraints on chemical weapons. An important element in this examination should continue to be a thorough analysis of the verification question in relation to the possible scope of any prohibition.

The U.S. interest in overcoming the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes was reflected in the U.S.-Soviet summit joint statement of July 3, 1974, in which both countries advocated the most effective measures possible to accomplish that objective. At the UN General Assembly last fall my government indicated that it would be ready at the CCD to consider this subject further. We pointed out that little is known about the scientific and technological aspects of environmental modification and that many of the applications posed for discussion are at present only hypothetical. At the same time we stressed that we were prepared to participate actively and positively in further discussion of this matter. We would expect to contribute to the Committee’s deliberations in that spirit.

In my statement today I have discussed a number of new responsibilities to be assumed by the Committee. There is another issue I think should be added to the list: the question of restraints on conventional arms. This Committee has always given the highest priority to the control of weapons of mass destruction. While my delegation regards this as entirely appropriate, we see no reason why possible controls on conventional weapons, which account for the largest share of world military expenditures, cannot be considered concurrently. I plan to return to this subject in a later intervention.

1. Summary: Martin read the text of a message to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament from President Ford and summarized the U.S. position on various arms control initiatives.

   Source: Department of State Bulletin, April 7, 1975, pp. 454–458. All brackets are in the original. Martin made the statement before the opening session of the CCD.