Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

122. Memorandum From Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, March 4, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Threshold Test Ban Progress

The Threshold Test Ban PNE talks are progressing more rapidly than expected. The Soviets have moved considerably toward the U.S. position. They have:

—Agreed in principle to a yield limit on individual PNE shots, probably shot below 150 KT, so long as the total yield of a “salvo” is unlimited.

—Agreed to permit observers, including rights to make on-site seismic measurements, provided the observers are couched or participants under a “cooperative” agreement.

Thus, on both major aspects of our position—yield limits on PNEs and on-site observers—the Soviets have made major moves in our direction. The chances are high that some form of agreement could be concluded before the Summit.

Soviet motivation is unclear. I suspect that Morokhov has concluded that a PNE agreement would legitimize his PNE program and protect it from opposition within the Soviet bureaucracy. He apparently faces considerable opposition within the Soviet government; at one of Paul Dody’s recent “Pugwash” meetings, one of Morokhov’s men was opposed openly by members of the Academy of Sciences when he took a strong advocacy position in favor of PNEs. There are other similar instances where splits in the Soviet ranks have been evident.

The Soviets movement toward our position means you may wish to reassess our policy toward the TTB, before we are locked into a completed deal. We now have to take seriously the possibility that the TTB will be ready for submission to Congress later this year.

As I see it, you have two alternatives:

—Let the present course of events continue and submit the TTB for ratification once it is negotiated.

—Try to “enhance” the TTB, either by adding provisions which would call for follow-on CTB negotiations, or by explicit provisions to the agreement which would result in an eventual CTB, say 5–10 years later.

If we proceed on the present course, there will probably be a considerable ratification fight, although in the end, the treaty will probably be ratified. Opponents will argue that the high threshold is counterproductive to real arms control and that the PNE agreement “legitimizes” pernicious PNEs, harming non-proliferation efforts. On the other hand, completing the agreement will clearly signal to the Soviets that the U.S. sticks to its word, and it would represent another step in improving relations. Everyone—on both the Soviet and American sides—acknowledges that the agreement has only limited military significance.

“Enhancing” the treaty by adding either general or specific CTB provisions would make it considerably more attractive to the Congress and the public (with the exception of some element in the weapons development community). And in the long run, a CTB would have some military significance by gradually eroding the confidence each side has in its first strike capabilities. Nevertheless, four major problems remain with the CTB:

1. PNEs. A CTB which permitted continued PNEs would be a sham.

2. Verification. Our verification capability is miniscule at very low yields (below 5–10 KT).

3. The French and Chinese. We might be able to assuage the French by offering additional weapons design cooperation, but the Russians would have to fall off their demand that the treaty be worded in such a way that it is obviously aimed at the French and Chinese.

4. Changing course with the Soviets. Reopening the CTB issue before the TTB is completed would give the Soviets additional reason to question the continuity of U.S. policy.

Despite these problems, there is clearly a possible CTB deal with the Russians if you want to pursue it. You could tell them we would go along with the CTB, which they want very badly, provided they fall off explicit anti-French and anti-Chinese provisions and agree to forego PNEs. They would also have to give us some verification provision aids to insure that low-level seismic events were earthquakes and not tests. In return, we would probably have to agree to join them in a joint non-proliferation effort, although we could probably keep it far short of their desires for nuclear condominium. This approach might have some marginal positive influence on nonproliferation.

Recommendation

That you indicate below how you wish us to proceed at this stage.

__________ Discuss with me.

__________ Prepare thorough analysis of enhancing TTB by moving towards CTB.

__________ Continue toward TTB agreement and forget CTB for now.

__________ Other.

1. Summary: Lodal updated Kissinger on the status of the TTBT/PNE talks ongoing in Moscow. He noted that the Threshold Test Ban Treaty might be ready for submission to Congress later in 1975 and suggested that Kissinger might reassess the administration’s policy concerning the TTBT.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files—NSDMs, Box 58, NSDM 287—Instructions for the U.S. Delegation to the TTB/PNE Negotiations, 2/10/75 (2). Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed the first page of the memorandum, approved the first two recommendations, and wrote “including Sonnenfeldt” next to the first recommendation.