Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

124. Telegram 1515 From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State¹

Geneva, March 5, 1975, 1800Z.

1515. Disto. Subject: CCD 655 Plenary Meeting, March 4, 1975.

1. Summary: At March 4 opening meeting of CCD spring session co-chairmen (U.S. and USSR) made statements touching generally on all major agenda items, without signaling any policy changes. U.S. representative (Ambassador Martin) also delivered message from President Ford reaffirming U.S. commitment to advancing the work of the committee. Mexican Ambassador posed series of questions concerning Threshold Test Ban and SALT II negotiations and expressed views on organization of ad hoc group for study of nuclear-free zone. New members of committee (GDR, FRG, Iran, Peru, and Zaire) made brief remarks. End summary.

2. Amb. Roshchin (USSR) said measures of political détente should be supplemented by measures of military détente elaborated in accordance with the principle of undiminished security of either side. He called NPT the most important international instrument of our time and said it is necessary to develop international cooperation both in field of peaceful application of nuclear energy and in preventing nuclear weapons proliferation. He noted with satisfaction that number of countries members of the CCD are now taking steps to ratify the treaty and called on them to expedite the process. Turning to question of environmental modification, Roshchin said possible use of EnMod techniques for military purposes is wide range and cited the stimulation of precipitation and of destructive sea waves as examples. Roshchin observed that Soviet draft EnMod convention is now before the CCD and that SovDel will in due course give further explanations regarding the substance of its proposal.

3. Referring to 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Roshchin said fact that control over the observance of this treaty should be exercised by national technical means is of great importance. Soviets are of opinion that in order to ensure verification of the complete cessation of underground nuclear tests, a form of control may be established on the basis of the experience derived from the elaboration of the control system for the TTB. Such an approach does not require international inspections. Turning to PNEs Roshchin maintained that as scientific and experimental research progress on this complex scientific and technological problem, new opportunities will open up for the expansion of international cooperation in this field. He observed that PNE question was also on the agenda of the bilateral Soviet-U.S. talks held under the 1974 TTB treaty. He said special agreement covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is now being negotiated by the two sides and asserted that these negotiations are directly linked with the realization of Article V of the NPT.

4. Roshchin cited General Assembly resolution calling for expert study on nuclear-free zones and said his delegation will be holding consultations with the committee in the near future for the group. Regarding CW, Roshchin cited the July 1974 summit statement referring to the consideration of a joint initiative and said (without elaboration) that at present steps have been taken to implement that agreement. Roshchin said SovDel believes discussion of CW problem at CCD should be continued on the basis of existing proposals and he cited Soviet and Japanese convention plus non-aligned working paper.

5. Amb. Martin (U.S.) delivered message from President Ford which paid tribute to CCD’s accomplishments and pledged that USG will do all in its power to promote agreed solutions to issues before the committee wherever and whenever possible. In his own statement, Martin commented that most pressing of large number of items on international agenda concerned nonproliferation and related nuclear issues. He said U.S. Government is urgently considering what courses of action would contribute most effectively to achieving a more universal, reliable system of safeguards against diversion of nuclear material and technology to military purposes. It is also considering what would be most promising steps to increase political and economic incentives which could lead a country to forego nuclear explosive option.

6. Martin noted that since CCD had last met, U.S. and Soviet Union had taken, at Vladivostok, another major step to curb their competition in nuclear arms. Because of this breakthrough, for first time in nuclear age each side’s strategic calculations and force planning will not be motivated by fear and uncertainty about a possible open-ended strategic buildup by the other side. While many details remain to be settled before general framework arrived at Vladivostok can be transformed into a new agreement, U.S. is confident that such an agreement can be concluded this year and that further negotiations on reducing the force ceilings can follow soon thereafter. He added that the US remains firmly committed to seeking an adequately verified CTB. The TTB, negotiated in Moscow last year, is not only a step toward that objective, but will be a significant constraint on the nuclear arms competition by the US and USSR.

7. Amb Martin commented that a number of uncertainties about the feasibility and practicability of PNEs have yet to be resolved and that use of PNEs is a highly complicated matter both politically and legally. US supported recent UNGA resolution requesting CCD to consider arms control implications of PNEs. It is clearly important to insure that nuclear explosions carried out ostensibly for peaceful purposes are not used to gain weapons-related information in circumvention of agreed limitations on weapons testing. This is central task of bilateral negotiations now going on in Moscow. With respect to PNE implications for spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, U.S. Government’s firm conviction remains that it would be impossible for a non-nuclear weapons state to develop a nuclear explosive device for peaceful purposes without in the process acquiring a device that could be used as a nuclear weapon.

8. Martin welcomed GA’s request that an ad hoc group of government experts, under CCD auspices, undertake a study of nuclear-free zones. He said it would be unrealistic to expect experts to reach an agreement on requirements for nuclear-free zone arrangements that could be applied universally. Study, however, might be able to identify issues where standardized provisions could be feasible. Martin highlighted U.S. ratification of Geneva Protocol and BW Convention and stated that entire U.S. stockpile of BW agents and weapons have been destroyed. U.S. would welcome similar confirmation of implementation of BW Convention from other parties.

9. Martin added that USDel is prepared to participate in active examination of possibilities for further effective CW restraints and said thorough analysis of verification question would be important element in such an examination. U.S. delegation is also prepared to participate actively in further discussion of question of environmental modification. Martin commented that little is known about scientific and technological aspects of environmental modification and that many of applications posed for discussion are at present only hypothetical. He reiterated view that discussion of restraints on conventional arms at CCD would be desirable and appropriate and that he would return to this subject at later intervention.

10. Amb Garcia Robles (Mexico) made lengthy statement along familiar lines, chastising U.S. and USSR for their alleged failure to carry out arms control commitments. He posed 13 tendentious questions to Soviets and U.S. concerning the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and current SALT negotiations. He acknowledged that Ambassador Martin’s opening statement had already answered some of these and expressed hope that this was sign of willingness to be responsive and forthcoming on the rest (text pouched). Turning to subject of ad hoc group for study of nuclear-free zones, Garcia Robles expressed view the group should be fully autonomous in its work and assume full responsibility for the study it was to prepare. Group could, if it wished, consult the CCD at the outset to learn what topics CCD advised should be included in the study. It could also solicit CCD’s opinions from time to time, particularly in connection with the drafting of that part of the study which “as usual, would include conclusions and recommendations.” The group’s consultations with the CCD should take place through informal meetings and without the exercise of the co-chairmanship. Designation of participants in group could be made solely and exclusively by UN Secretary General or he could carry this out in consultations with the CCD. Garcia Robles thought latter alternative would be more appropriate. He added that the opinions which the CCD might transmit to the Secretary General on this question should be the result of exchanges at informal meetings of the CCD.

11. Bjornerstedt, as acting representative of UN Secretary General, read customary message from him which was mainly notable for its reference to binary nerve gases and conventional weapons. Waldheim said that recent development of binary nerve gases demonstrates necessity of pressing forward with urgency on issue of chemical weapons controls. He observed that the destructive power of conventional weapons far exceeds anything known before and said that the current traffic in conventional arms was detrimental to peace and a cause of apprehension.

12. Representatives of the GDR (Vice ForMin Moldt), FRG, Iran, Peru and Zaire made brief general statements expressing their satisfaction over joining the CCD and their governments’ determination to contribute constructively to the committee’s work. Peruvian representative underlined his government’s efforts at achieving regional controls on conventional arms as reflected in Ayacucho Declaration.

12. Next plenary session Thursday, March 6.

Dale

1. Summary: The mission provided a summary of the opening meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament’s spring session.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750077–0621. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated for information to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Brasilia, Bucharest, Buenos Aires, The Hague, Islamabad, Kinshasa, Lagos, Lima, London, Mexico City, Moscow, New Delhi, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Prague, Rangoon, Rome, Sofia, Stockholm, Tehran, Tokyo, Warsaw, and the Mission to NATO. For Martin’s statement, see Document 123. Roshchin’s statement is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1975, pp. 66–73.