Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1973–1976

101. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Ingersoll) to President Ford¹

Washington, December 4, 1974.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy

NSSM 202 directed a review of present U.S. policy concerning non-proliferation and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in light of the Indian nuclear test. A recently updated NSSM 156 study is a companion paper that focuses on the specific options open to us in dealing with India. The policy decisions in NSDM 255 concerning consultations regarding multilateral supplier controls over transfers of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment, have been taken into account in this review.

On the basis of the review done pursuant to NSSM 202, the Under Secretaries Committee, recognizing that the proliferation problem is at a crucial juncture, recommends an intensified program to inhibit the further spread of independent nuclear explosives capabilities. This program would exploit the common interest of many key countries in inhibiting proliferation by providing for concerted action. The U.S. could both support such action and, where appropriate, catalyze more effective international coordination.

The Under Secretaries Committee recognizes that we might only be able to delay further proliferation however determined our anti-proliferation efforts may be, but concludes that U.S. national security objectives can be served even with a nonproliferation strategy that is only partially effective. It would be desirable to defer the disadvantages associated with an expanded number of nuclear powers as long as possible, while seeking to create conditions which might ultimately check such expansion.

In the short run, the most effective approach to slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons is for the advanced nuclear industrial states to tighten controls on weapons-usable material and related production capabilities. Proliferation can also be limited through maintaining and making more widely applicable the legal and political barriers to acquisition of independent nuclear explosives capabilities. In addition to the policy actions presented below, a successful nonproliferation strategy will be affected particularly by the confidence of non-nuclear weapon states that their security needs can continue to be met without recourse to independent nuclear forces. It will also be affected by perceptions of these states regarding progress in U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms limitations.

As a series of near-term nonproliferation steps, it is recommended that:

1. Through consultations with nuclear industrial states, particularly the U.S.S.R. and France, and a conference of such states, the U.S. should pursue coordinated policies designed to:

—Ensure that international safeguards are both effective and widely applied to peaceful international nuclear cooperation by seeking to strengthen the political, financial, and technical base of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards program, and by requiring that such safeguards be placed on nuclear material and equipment exported by these states or material derived from these exports, at least to the extent indicated by the guidelines issued by the Zangger (nuclear exporters’) Committee. Considerations should also be given to: (a) expanding these guidelines to cover sensitive nuclear technology and additional equipment; and (b) developing concerted policies to secure IAEA safeguards to the maximum extent possible on peaceful nuclear programs of non-nuclear weapons states who are not NPT parties.

—Restrict the spread of independent national uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing facilities through: (a) reaching common principles regarding the supply of sensitive technology, equipment and assistance in the construction of national facilities; and (b) encouraging multinational plants (or bilateral plants involving the U.S.) capable of satisfying future world demands for reliable and economic commercial services in these fields. In this connection, nonproliferation considerations should be factored into U.S. policy decisions with respect to future availability and supply of uranium enrichment services.

—Impose special conditions on nuclear exports to countries in sensitive regions, such as certain areas in the Middle East, in order to minimize the accumulation of plutonium and other special nuclear material. These conditions would include such provisions as requiring that reprocessing, storage and fabrication of plutonium derived from supplied nuclear material or equipment take place in mutually agreed facilities outside the country or region in question. In the case of NPT parties, less stringent conditions should be arranged, if compatible with our overall nonproliferation interests.

—Establish specific physical security standards to be included as a condition of nuclear cooperation, and strengthen international efforts to achieve widespread adoption and maintenance of meaningful physical security measures on nuclear material. In this connection, the U.S. should advocate that the IAEA be the forum for drafting a physical security convention.

—Minimize the risk of indigenous “peaceful” nuclear explosive (PNE) development in non-nuclear weapons states not party to the NPT through: (a) seeking agreement by non-NPT parties that they will not in any way assist any NNWS to develop or acquire PNEs; (b) requiring explicit confirmation that nuclear material exported, or derived from the use of exports, will not be used for any nuclear explosives; and (c) establishing that all nuclear materials subject to IAEA safeguards may not be used for any nuclear explosives.

2. In conjunction with other NPT proponents, the U.S. should intensify efforts in support of the treaty and in seeking early ratification by key non-nuclear weapon states, through:

—Support for the FRG, UK, and other European countries in their high-level contacts with the Italian Government to convey both the importance of early NPT ratification and the relationships of such ratification to the ability of NPT parties to continue nuclear supplies to the European Communities.

—High-level communications with the Japanese designed to remove any doubt about the continued importance of such ratification to the U.S. and other NPT proponents as an essential contribution to international stability and long-term progress toward nuclear arms control, and as helping to ensure a maximum role for Japan in international nuclear commerce and at the NPT Review Conference in May 1975.

—Appropriate actions designed to achieve ratification by other prospective NPT participants, and encouragement of a common recognition by nations unlikely to adhere to the treaty in the near-term that the further spread of independent nuclear explosives capabilities endangers the security of all states.

—Development of visible ways, consistent with the policies set forth in recommendation 1 above, in which preferential treatment could be given to NPT parties in such areas as: (a) the availability of commercial nuclear facilities, fuels, and technological support; (b) potential PNE services; and possibly (c) credit terms.

—Taking a more positive stance with respect to implementing Article V of the NPT, but being prepared to highlight the limitations as well as the potential benefits of PNEs.² Without prejudging the scope of the future U.S. indigenous PNE program and bearing in mind that the U.S. program has been inactive for several years, this approach would involve: (a) participating more readily in selected studies of proposed PNE projects; (b) making clear our intention to meet our Article V obligations; and (c) supporting IAEA efforts to devise procedures for implementing PNE services, should such services appear warranted. On all these issues, consultations with the Soviets should be held in an effort to develop common policies. The question of PNE services may well be affected by the outcome of negotiations with the Soviet Union on Article III of the TTBT. Evolving U.S. PNE service policy must be carefully coordinated with our test ban objectives to preclude taking actions that might, in view of the probable greater exploitation by the Soviet Union of peaceful nuclear explosives, place the U.S. in a relatively disadvantageous position with respect to nuclear weapons development and deployments.

3. Coordinated multilateral approaches should be developed to ensure that the Indian nuclear explosion does not hasten further proliferation in Pakistan and elsewhere, by:

—Endeavoring to persuade India to place IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports and not to export nuclear explosive technology or devices, or assist others in building national chemical reprocessing plants.

—Seeking to dissuade India from undermining the NPT and to defer any further Indian explosive tests, particularly in the period prior to the Review Conference.

—Avoiding the implication that India’s status as a world power has been substantially enhanced as a result of its nuclear test.

—Seeking to hold India to its peaceful protestations and to minimize the scope, pace, and military dimensions of its nuclear explosive program through Indian acceptance of such measures as: (a) accountability for weapons-usable material; (b) deferral of further PNE production and limiting it to specified current needs; and (c) international observation of PNE tests, recognizing that such observation procedures would not be expected to constitute a technically sound basis for distinguishing between PNEs and nuclear weapons.

—Seeking Soviet and French cooperation, and the cooperation of other potential suppliers, in continuing not to supply India with long-range bombers or other sophisticated nuclear delivery capabilities.

4. Appropriate interagency mechanisms should be established to formulate and oversee future U.S. nonproliferation policies, support relevant consultations and negotiations, and conduct necessary policy studies.

—Prompt study should be undertaken of U.S. policy on implementing Article V of the NPT and PNE services generally in a manner consistent with our test ban objectives.

—Urgent attention should be paid to further defining a U.S. policy on preferential treatment for NPT parties in such areas as fuel supply and technical assistance.

—Studies should be made of sanctions as a deterrent to proliferation, measures which should be taken to assure the credibility and effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, the use of financing as a supplementary vehicle for imposing safeguards conditions on nuclear exports, and the possibility of multilateral controls on sophisticated nuclear delivery systems.

—A series of “country studies” should be launched to investigate in detail the factors affecting potential nuclear weapons decisions in key NNWS, the preferred strategy for deterring such decisions, and options for the U.S. in the event these states acquire independent nuclear explosives.

—The question of how best to handle the problem of security assurances at the NPT Review Conference should be examined.

—There should be consideration of further steps to maintain a strong U.S. public posture against nuclear proliferation.

Robert S. Ingersoll Chairman

1. Summary: As a corollary to the NSSM 202 study and the updated NSSM 156 study, the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee advanced several recommendations for a near-term nonproliferation strategy.

   Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Institutional Files National Security Study Memoranda, Box H–205, NSSM 202 (1 of 3). Secret. Tab A, an executive summary of the NSSM 202 study is attached but not published. Tab B, the NSSM 202 study, also attached, is Document 57. The summary of the updated study in response to NSSM 156 is Document 52. NSDM 255 is Document 53.

2. This recommendation is presently being reviewed in the context of a more comprehensive study for the Verification Panel of U.S. policy regarding international aspects of PNEs. [Footnote is in the original.]