78. Telegram 177759 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations and Secretary of State Kissinger, July 29, 1975, 0033Z.1 2
TELEGRAM
Department of State
177759
O 290033Z JUL 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL
SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
USMISSION
USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
3628/3629
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
USLO PEKING IMMEDIATE
STATE 177759
CORRECTED COPY (OMISSION LINE 3 PARA 14)
E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UNSC,
UNGA, VN, KS
SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE APPLICATIONS FOR UN MEMBERSHIP
FOR AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN
1. SECRETARY HAS DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO VETO THE VIETNAMS ADMISSION, IF NECESSARY, ON GROUNDS WHICH WILL CLEARLY BE BASED ON LINKAGE TO A RENEWED ROK APPLICATION BUT TO AVOID ARGUING THE VIETNAMS’ QUALIFICATIONS AND USE THIS POSITION TO URGE THE VIETNAMS NOT TO PRESS THEIR APPLICATIONS. MOST DESIRABLE OUTCOME, OF COURSE, WOULD BE ADMISSION TO UN OF ROC (AND NORTH KOREA ALSO IF IT DECIDED TO APPLY) ALONG WITH VIETNAMS AND THIS SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND IN DECIDING TACTICS. IN VIEW STRONG LIKELIHOOD THAT NORTH KOREA WILL NOT CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE SOON AND THAT USSR AND CHINA WILL DEFER TO NORTH KOREA AND OPPOSE ENTRY OF ROK, AT MINIMUM WE WANT TO BRING ABOUT SITUATION IN WHICH VIETNAM APPLICATIONS ARE NOT PRESSED TO VOTE.
2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUFFUM IS INFORMING ROK AMBASSADOR JULY 28 OF ABOVE AND OF DESIRABILITY OF ROK RENEWING ITS APPLICATION AT ONCE. WE DO NOT BELIEVE ROK SHOULD PRESS FOR SC CONSIDERATION, HOWEVER, UNLESS SC WERE TO BE CONVENED TO CONSIDER VIETNAMESE APPLICATIONS.
3. WE ALSO INTEND TO CONVEY TO SOVIETS IN NEW YORK OUR VIEW THAT APPLICATION OF TWO VIETNAMS SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED APART FROM THAT OF ROK AND THAT NOW IS TIME TO FINALLY RESOLVE MATTER OF DIVIDED COUNTRIES BY ADMISSION OF VIETNAMS, ROK AND, IF IT WISHES, THE DPRK. QUESTION OF APPROACHES TO PRC WILL BE ADDRESSED SEPARATELY AND WE DO NOT INTEND TO APPROACH EITHER OF THE VIETNAMS ON THIS ISSUE IN THE NEAR TERM, LEAVING TO USSR COMMUNICATION OF OUR VIEWS TO VIETNAM.
4. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT IT NECESSARY NOT ONLY THAT USSR AND PRC NOT OPPOSE KOREAN MEMBERSHIP IN SECURITY COUNCIL BUT THAT THEY AGREE NOT TO LOBBY TO BLOCK ROK APPLICATION (OUR PRESENT READING IS THAT WE HAVE ONLY 7 CERTAIN VOTES ON SECURITY COUNCIL AND WOULD HAVE TO ATTRACT TWO MORE EVEN WITHOUT SOVIET AND CHINESE VETOES).
5. WHEN AND IF SECRETARY APPROVES OF THIS COURSE, USUN SHOULD ARRANGE TO CONTACT SMUN AT DEP PERM REP LEVEL AND CONVEY US VIEWS ON VIETNAMESE AND KOREAN APPLICATIONS AS OUTLINED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS.
6. SMUN DEP REP SHOULD BE REMINDED THAT EARLIER THIS YEAR SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, AT THE REQUEST OF HANOI, ASKED IF THE USG WOULD SUPPORT THE ADMISSION OF NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM INTO THE UN. WE ASKED THEN IF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WILLING TO FACILITATE SOUTH KOREA’S APPLICATION, JUST AS WE WOULD CONCUR IN NORTH KOREA’S APPLICATION WERE THEY TO APPLY. USG HAS GIVEN FURTHER CAREFUL STUDY SINCE THEN TO THE QUESTION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN FOR THE TWO VIETNAMS AND BELIEVES THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE ORGANIZATION TO CONSIDER THESE APPLICATIONS UNTIL THE QUESTION OF UN MEMBERSHIP FOR ALL PRESENTLY DIVIDED STATES CAN BE RESOLVED.
7. FAILURE TO STRIVE FOR AND MAINTAIN FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE UN NOT HELPFUL TO ACHIEVING THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS IN WHICH BOTH US AND USSR ARE INTERESTED.
8. THE COMBINATION OF THE VIETNAMS’ RECENT APPLICATION AND SOUTH KOREA’S LONG-STANDING APPLICATION GIVES THE UN THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING A DEGREE OF NORMALITY AND STABILITY TO BOTH OF THESE AREAS, THE SCENE OF MUCH DISRUPTIVE INTERNATIONAL TENSION. WE BELIEVE THE ADMISSION OF ALL OF THESE APPLICANTS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE REDUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND, TOGETHER WITH THE ANTICIPATED ADMISSION OF MOZAMBIQUE, ANGOLA, AND OTHERS, VIRTUALLY COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF UNIVERSAL ASSOCIATION WITH THE UN. BOTH OUR COUNTRIES SHARE AN INTEREST IN REDUCTIONS OF TENSION AND FULL PARTICIPATION OF STATES IN THE UN AND WE HOPE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD FACILITATE ALL OF THESE APPLICATIONS.
9. YOU SHOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE INCREASINGLY SKEPTICAL PUBLIC OPINION IN THIS COUNTRY TOWARD THE UN COULD BE NEGATIVELY AFFECTED BY THE SPECTACLE OF THE ADMISSION OF TWO VIETNAMS WHILE SOUTH KOREA IS EXCLUDED. FURTHERMORE, CRITICS OF DETENTE WOULD FIND A FURTHER RATIONALE FOR ARGUING THAT IT WAS A ONE WAY STREET, ESPECIALLY IF IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN CAUSING THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO FAIL TO CONSIDER AND ENDORSE SOUTH KOREAN MEMBERSHIP. SOVIETS SHOULD UNDERSTAND PARTICULARLY WELL THE ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION WHICH WOULD BE GENERATED IN THE US BY SUCH DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SOUTH KOREA.
10. ADMISSION OF BOTH VIETNAMS IN THE FACE OF CONTINUED EXCLUSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WOULD IN FACT CREATE SUCH ADDED DIFFICULTIES FOR THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF THE UN IN THE US AND HAVE SUCH A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO USE OUR VETO TO KEEP IT FROM HAPPENING. WE MUCH PREFER ENTRY OF ALL DIVIDED COUNTRIES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO FUTURE UNIFICATION. WE BELIEVE NOW IS THE TIME TO ACT.
11. WHILE THE SOUTH KOREANS ARE RENEWING THEIR APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE UN, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD PRESS SC CONSIDERATION UNLESS SC WERE TO BE CONVENED TO CONSIDER VIETNAMESE APPLICATIONS. THEREFORE, IF THE SOVIETS ARE UNWILLING AT THIS TIME TO SUPPORT SOUTH KOREA’S APPLICATION, WE BELIEVE THAT BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR TWO VIETNAMS TO LEAVE THEIR APPLICATIONS STANDING BUT NOT PRESS FOR EARLY CONSIDERATION. MEANTIME, WE WOULD EXPECT TO CONTINUE CONSULTATION WITH USSR AND OTHER PERMANENT SC MEMBERS WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON SOLUTION WHICH WILL BRING ALL DIVIDED STATES WHO WISH MEMBERSHIP INTO UN.
12. SMUN WILL BE AWARE THAT WE HAVE ISSUED VISAS TO PRG AND NVN OBSERVERS AND HAVE NOT POSED ANY OBJECTION TO THEIR ENTRY OR PARTICIPATION AS OBSERVERS IN THE WORK OF THE UN. WE BELIEVE THAT FOR THESE GOVERNMENTS, AS WAS THE CASE FOR THE TWO GERMAN STATES, THE PRESENCE IN NEW YORK OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES ON THE SAME BASIS AS THAT OF THE TWO KOREAN STATES CAN BE A USEFUL PRELUDE TO THE INCLUSION OF ALL FOUR STATES.
13. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT WE WOULD REQUEST THAT THE SOVIETS, SINCE THEY APPROACHED US INITIALLY ON BEHALF OF THE VIETNAMESE, MAKE OUR CONSIDERED VIEWS KNOWN IN FULL TO THE TWO VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENTS, ADDING THAT OUR POSITION IS ONE OF SEEKING TO BRING ADMISSION OF DIVIDED STATES ABOUT IN A CONTEXT CONDUCIVE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE, ESPECIALLY IN EASTERN ASIA, AND HELPFUL TO THE GOAL OF UNIVERSAL UN MEMBERSHIP. WE HOPE THAT WE WOULD THEREFORE NOT BE PLACED IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE WE SHOULD HAVE TO VOTE NEGATIVELY.
14. USUN, IN CONVEYING FOREGOING FULLY, SHOULD REPORT ANY REACTIONS OR COMMENTS. IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD CITE THE 1948 ICJ ADVISORY OPINION. YOU MAY COMMENT THAT NEITHER THE USSR NOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THIS OPINION AND THAT, RELUCTANT AS WE ARE TO DEVIATE FROM IT, WE REGARD THE CONSIDERATIONS PRESENTED AS MORE COMPELLING AT THIS MOMENT.
15. FOR SECRETARY. USUN WILL EXECUTE FOREGOING AS SOON AS YOA APPROVE. WE BELIEVE IT DESIRABLE THAT FOREGOING MESSAGE GET TO VIETNAMESE BEFORE THEIR OBSERVERS SEEK TO SET DATE OF SC MEETING ON THEIR APPLICATIONS SINCE WE WOULD HAVE LITTLE SUPPORT IN SC FOR DELAYING MEETING. RECOMMEND THAT YOU TAKE OPPORTUNITY IN TALKS WITH GROMYKO TO REFER TO OUR APPROACH TO SMUN SO THAT HE WILL BE AWARE OF IMPORTANCE YOU ATTACH TO MATTER. WE INTEND TO BRIEF UK, FRENCH, JAPANESE AND ITALIAN MISSIONS IN CONFIDENCE ON OUR TALK WITH SOVIETS AND ALSO RECOMMEND TELLING PRC UN MISSION ALTHOUGH WE COULD WAIT UNTIL YOUR MEETING WITH THEM SHOULD YOU PREFER. INGERSOLL
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Baker and Montgomery; cleared by Stowe and in EUR/SOV, EA, and L/UNA; and approved by Buffum. Repeated Immediate to London, Paris, Seoul, Tokyo, Rome, and Beijing. Kissinger accompanied Ford on a European trip which included stays in Warsaw (July 28–29), Helsinki (July 29–August 2), Bucharest (August 2–3), and Belgrade (August 3–4). On August 11 the United States vetoed the proposed admission to the United Nations of the North and South Vietnamese governments. On September 19 the United Nations General Assembly voted 123–0 (with 8 abstentions, including the United States) requesting that the Security Council revisit the issue of admission of both Vietnam governments. On September 30, the United States again vetoed in the Security Council admission of the Hanoi and Saigon governments.↩
- Ingersoll forwarded Kissinger’s rationale for opposing the entry of the North and South Vietnamese governments into the United Nations.↩