37. Telegram 15113 From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts, January 21, 1976, 1737Z.1 2
TELEGRAM
Department of State
015113
R 211737Z JAN 76
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUQMNI/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0000
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA
STATE 015113
FOL RPT USUN 134 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ANKARA ATHENS BONN BRUSSELS COPENHAGEN CANBERRA DUBLIN HELSINKI LISBON LONDON LUXEMBOURG MADRID OSLO OTTAWA PARIS REYKJAVIK ROME STOCKHOLM TOKYO THE HAGUE VALLETTA VIENNA WELLINGTON GENEVE NATO DTD 16 JAN.
QUOTE
USUN 0134
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UN, SG
SUBJECT: “WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHERS” GROUP AT THE 30TH UNGA
REF: USUN 6963
1. SUMMARY:
DURING THE 30TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY (UNGA), THE 22-MEMBER “WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHERS” GROUP ( WEOG) WAS MARKED IN PARTICULAR BY INCREASING COHESION WITHIN ITS KEY EC-9 COMPONENT. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, SERIOUS INSTANCES OF LACK OF EC-9 AND NATO SOLIDARITY ON KEY ISSUES AND SUPPORT FOR U.S. AND NATO INTERESTS WAS NOTABLY DEFICIENT.
USUN ATTENDED WEOG AMBASSADORIAL-LEVEL MEETINGS AS AN OBSERVER AND WEOG LOWER-LEVEL MEETINGS AS A PARTICIPANT. ADDITIONALLY, USUN PARTICIPATED AT AMBASSADORIAL-LEVEL IN VINCI GROUP MEETINGS (WEOG PLUS U.S. AND JAPAN). ACTIVE U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE WEOG CONTINUES TO BE WELCOME BY THE GREAT MAJORITY OF WEOG MEMBERS. WITHIN THE WEOG, THERE HAS BEEN A FIRMING OF POSITION AGAINST LEFTIST TACKS BY WEOG MEMBERS SUCH AS SWEDEN OR MALTA. GIVEN THE ROLE AT THE UN OF THE WEOG AS A PRINCIPAL FONT OF SUPPORT FOR WESTERN DEMOCRATIC POSITIONS, IT BEHOOVES US TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP PARTICULARLY CLOSE TIES AND COORDINATION WITH THIS GROUP. END SUMMARY.
2. COMPOSITION OF THE WEOG:
THE WEOG IN THE UN CONTEXT COMPRISES ALL THE NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE (INCLUDING MALTA, BUT NOT CYPRUS) PLUS AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND NEW ZEALAND (22 COUNTRIES IN ALL). AT AMBASSADORIAL-LEVEL WEOG MEETINGS, THE U.S. PARTICIPATES AS AN OBSERVER AS DO SWITZERLAND AND THE HOLY SEE. AT WORKING-LEVEL WEOG MEETINGS (I.E., UNGA COMMITTEE-LEVEL MEETINGS), THE U.S. PARTICIPATES AS A FULL MEMBER. ADDITIONALLY, USUN AT AMBASSADORIAL-LEVEL PARTICIPATES IN VINCI GROUP (REFTEL) MEETINGS (WEOG PLUS U.S. AND JAPAN). THE EC-9 ACTS AS A CORE WITHIN THE WEOG ON MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES. OTHER WEOG MEMBERS ARE INFLUENCED BY EC-9 POSITIONS (AS IS THE WEOG BY U.S. POSITIONS). HOWEVER, THIS INFLUENCE VARIES FROM ZERO IN THE CASE OF MALTA TO MUCH IN THE CASE OF CANADA, WHICH ON MOST ISSUES PARALLELS THE EC-9. THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND AUSTRIA SOMETIMES LINE UP WITH THE EC-9. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND HAVE OFTEN SIDED WITH THE NON-ALIGNED, BUT SO HAVE THE STRONGLY SUPPORTED WESTERN POSITIONS. JAPAN, ALTHOUGH NOT A WEOG MEMBER, PARTICIPATES IN THE VINCI GROUP AND OFTEN IDENTIFIES ITSELF WITH WEO AND EC-9 POSITIONS IN BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AREAS. FINALLY SPAIN, PORTUGAL, GREECE, AND TURKEY ARE INDIVIDUAL CASES. AS DISCUSSED IN REFTEL, THERE IS NO PURELY NATO CAUCUS IN NEW YORK. HOWEVER, THE WEOG AND THE VINCI GROUP PROVIDE FOR MEETINGS OF ALL NATO MEMBERS ALBEIR IN THE COMPANY OF OTHERS.
3. EC-9 AND NATO PERFORMANCE:
(A) EC-9 AND OFTEN FRUSTRATING AND DISAPPOINTING 30TH UNGA, EC-9 COHESIVENESS AND GENERAL ALIGNMENT WITH U.S. POSITIONS WAS ENCOURAGING. THE EC-9 ARE PROUD OF THEIR INCREASING COHESIVENESS AND SAY SO IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC. THEY HAVE POINTED OUT THAT AT THE 27TH UNGA (1972) THEY VOTED IN PLENARY AS A BLOC ON 67 PERCENT OF THE ISSUES WHILE AT THE 30TH SESSION THE PERCENTAGE ROSE TO 84 PERCENT. AT THE 30TH UNGA, ITALY AS EC-9 PRESIDENT, DELIVERED COMMON STATEMENTS OF POSITION FOR THE EC-9, INCLUDING SEVEN IN PLENARY. AT THE 30TH UNGA THERE WAS, NEVERTHELESS, DIVERGENCE AMONGST THE EC-9 ON 34, SOMETIMES KEY, RESOLUTIONS. THERE WERE, HOWEVER, FEW CASES WHERE ONE OR MORE OF THE EC-9 VOTED “NO” OR “YES” WHEN THE MAJORITY VOTED THE OTHER WAY. DIVERGENCE WAS MOST OFTEN REFLECTED BY ABSTENTIONS. ON KOREA AND “ZIONISM,” THE EC-9 WERE WITH US FOURSQUARE, BUT ON PALESTINE, THE MIDDLE EAST AND GUAM THEY SPLIT. FRANCE, DENMARK, IRELAND AND THE NETHERLANDS MOST OFTEN VOTED DIFFERENTLY THAN THE MAJORITY OF THE EC-9. USUN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EC-9 ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE US, WHILE NORMALLY CONDUCTED IN THE BROADER WEOG CONTEXT, WERE HELPFUL IN OUR LOBBYING EFFORTS. UNDER ITALY’S ENERGETIC EC-9 LEADERSHIP, THERE EMERGED A STRONGER SENSE OF WESTERN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY THAN IN RECENT YEARS. WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT, AS THE EC-9 DEVELOP COHESION OF VIEWS, THEY GAIN COURAGE AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS TEND TO BE LESS LIKELY TO TAKE MAVERICK POSITIONS IN THE UN.
(B) NATO
MOST REGRETTABLY ON THE GUAM RESOLUTION ELEVEN NATO MEMBERS (BELGIUM, CANADA, DEMARK, FRANCE, GREECE, ICELAND, ITALY, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, PORTUGAL AND TURKEY) ABSTAINED RATHER THAN JOIN FRG, LUXEMBOURG, THE UK AND THE US IN VOTING AGAINST IT. LACK OF NATO SOLIDARITY WAS ALSO STRIKING ON THE BASKET RESOLUTION ON DECOLONIZATION AND ON THE RESOLUTION ON DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON DECOLONIZATION. NATO VOTES ON THE FIRST WERE: IN FAVOR (8) - CANADA, DENMARK, GREECE, ICELAND, ITALY, NORWAY, PORTUGAL AND TURKEY; AGAINST (1) - US; ABSTAIN (6) - BELGIUM, FRANCE, FRG, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS AND THE UK. NATO VOTES ON THE SECOND WERE: IN FAVOR (13) - BELGIUM, CANADA, DENMARK, FRP, GREECE, ICELAND, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, PORTUGAL, TURKEY AND THE UK; AGAINST (1) - US; ABSTAIN (1) FRANCE. THE SPECTACLE OF NATO IN DISARRAY ON THESE RESOLUTIONS WAS DEPLORABLE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE BASKET RESOLUTION ON DECOLONIZATION ENDORSED A REPORT FEATURING, FOR INSTANCE, GROSSLY FALSE ALLEGATION OF NATO SUPPORT FOR RHODESIA AND THE RESOLUTION ON DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON DECLONIZATION CALLED FOR ACTION WHICH WOULD RESULT IN BROAD DISTRIBUTION OF SUCH A FABRICATION. MORE POSITIVELY, HOWEVER NATO VOTES ON THE “ZIONISM” RESOLUTION WERE: IN FAVOR (2) - PORTUGAL AND TURKEY; AGAINST (12) - BELGIUM, CANADA, DENMARK, FRG, ICELAND, ITALY, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY, UK, US; ABSTAIN (1) GREECE.
4. OTHER ASPECTS OF WEOG PERFORMANCE:
THE DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED IN THE WEOG COMBINE A WIDE VARIETY OF NATIONAL INTERESTS AND PROBLEMS. THEREFORE, A FEW COMMENTS ON INDIVIDUAL WEO COUNTRIES AND GROUPINGS SEEM APPROPRIATE:
A. FRANCE:
EVEN MORE THAN LAST YEAR AS THE FRENCH POSITION BECAME MORE HARMONIOUS UNDER GISCARD D’ESTAING, THE FRENCH LINED UP MORE EASILY WITHIN THE EC-9 COMMUNITY AND SEEMED MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE IN DEALING WITH US POSITIONS. FOR INSTANCE, FRANCE WITH ITS AMENDMENTS, GAVE US STRONG SUPPORT ON KOREA AND WAS CRUCIAL IN MAINTAINING AND DEVELOPING SUPPORT FOR THE FRIENDLY RESOLUTION. ALL THE SAME, FOR INSTANCE, ON SOME DISARMAMENT AREAS AND ON THE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION RESOLUTIONS, FRANCE VOTED INDEPENDENTLY OF EC-9 AND U.S. POSITIONS. USUN’S RELATIONSHIP WITH FRANCE’S MISSION REMAINS EXCELLENT.
B. MALTA:
ON EVERY UN ISSUE OF INTEREST TO THE U.S., MALTA SIDED WITH THE NON-ALIGNED OR THIRD-WORLD VIEW. MALTA’S CONTINUED THIRD-WORLD POSITION GAVE HEARTBURN TO MANY WEOG AND EC-9 MEMBERS. SOME (E.G. THE FRG AND THE NETHERLANDS) SUGGESTED INFORMALLY WITHIN THE EC-9 THAT THE TIME MAY HAVE COME TO EXPEL MALTA FROM THE WEOG.
C. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND:
WITH NEW CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENTS JUST INSTALLED, THESE TWO ACTIVE WEOG MEMBERS MAY BECOME LESS INCLINED TO SIDE WITH THE NONALIGNED AND MAY RETURN MORE TO THE INNER FOLD OF WEO THINKING. NEVERTHELESS, AT THE 30TH UNGA AUSTRALIA GAVE US OUTSTANDING SUPPORT ON PUERTO RICO AND NEW ZEALAND ON KOREA.
D. THE NORDIC GROUP:
DURING THE 30TH UNGA, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DIVINE NORDIC SOLIDARITY ON MANY ISSUES. FINLAND ABSTAINED ON THE KOREAN RESOLUTION, VOTED AGAINST US ON GUAM AND THE NORDICS SPLIT ON PALESTINE. ON ZIONISM AS A FORM OF RACISM, ALL THE NORDICS VOTED AGAINST THE RESOLUTION. AMONGST THE NORDICS, SWEDEN AND FINLAND TEND TO TAKE THE MORE DIVERGENT VIEWS. SWEDEN’S ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN PARTING COMPANY WITH WESTERN MEMBERS TO VOTE UNDER A PRESTIGE-ACCRUING FORMULA TO INVITE THE PLO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TABLE PROBABLY STRUCK THE NADIR.
E. GREECE AND TURKEY:
GREECE AND TURKEY ARE PREOCCUPIED BY CYPRUS AND THEIR VOTING POSITIONS ON OTHER ISSUES USUALLY REFLECT THEIR QUESTS FOR SUPPORT ON CYPRUS RESOLUTIONS.
5. FUTURE US-WEOG COOPERATION AT UN:
(A) WHILE AT WEOG AMBASSADORIAL-LEVEL MEETINGS WE PRESERVE OUR UNIQUE SPECIAL STATUS OF INDEPENDENCE FROM THE REGIONAL GROUPS AND ATTEND AS OBSERVERS, ACTIVE US. PARTICIPATION IN THE WEOG CONTINUES TO BE WELCOME BY A GREAT MAJORITY OF ITS MEMBERS. DURING THE 30TH UNGA, WE ATTENDED ALL AMBASSADORIAL-LEVEL MEETINGS AND WERE CONSULTED INFORMALLY ON ALL ISSUES. IN THE CASE OF SELECTION OF THE WEOG CANDIDATE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ELECTION, WE PARTICIPATED AT AMBASSADORIAL-LEVEL IN A SECRET STRAW-BALLOT TO HELP THE CHAIRMAN DETERMINE THE RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE FIVE WEO CANDIDATES. HOWEVER, AT ALL COMMITTEE-LEVEL WEOG MEETINGS WE PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY. WE CHAIRED THE SIXTH COMMITTEE (LEGAL) WEOG MEETINGS. WITH GROWING ECJAO COHESIVENESS ON MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES WITH WHICH WE AND THE EC-9 ARE CONCERNED, THERE HAS BEEN A CERTAIN FIRMING OF POSITIONS AGAINST LEFTIST TACKS TAKEN BY COUNTRIES SUCH AS SWEDEN AND MALTA. NOT SURPRISINGLY, AFTER THE DECISIVE SWEDISH VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN FAVOR OF PLO PARTICIPATION, A NUMBER OF EC-9 PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES INFORMALLY SUGGESTED THAT SWEDEN MIGHT NOT CONTINUE TO DESERVE WEO SUPPORT. MALTA ALREADY HAS BEEN EXCLUDED FROM WEOG FIFTH AND SIXTH COMMITTEE MEETINGS. CONVERSELY, BOTH THE EC-9 AND THE WEOG AS A WHOLE, SEEM TO FAVOR CLOSER U.S. PARTICIPATION AND THE EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF OUR POSITIONS AND VIEWS ON AREAS OF MUTUAL IMPORTANCE. WE SHOULD POINT OUT, THOUGH, THAT CLOSER COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S., THE EC-9 AND THE WEOG WOULD ENTAIL CERTAIN DANGERS. AS THE EC-9 BECOME MORE COHESIVE, THEY TEND TO CONSULT LESS WITH THE WEOG AS A WHOLE. FURTHERMORE, WITH THEIR POLICY OF CONSENSUS, THE EC-9’S LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR CAN SOMETIMES WEAKEN A SITUATION WHERE THE U.S. COULD COMMAND FULLER SUPPORT FROM SOME MEMBERS OF THE EC-9.
(B) DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF COUNTRIES SUCH AS MALTA AND CUBA IN THEIR
RESPECTIVE GROUPINGS, THE 22-MEMBER WEOG, AND THE 26-MEMBER LATIN
AMERICAN GROUP PROVIDE THE PRINCIPAL WEIGHT OF UN SUPPORT FOR WESTERN
DEMOCRATIC POSITIONS. IN 1976 THESE TWO GROUPS WILL PROBABLY REPRESENT
LESS THAN 1/3 OF THE UN MEMBERSHIP WHICH NOW TOTALS 144 AND WHICH MAY
WELL BE AUGMENTED BY NEW MEMBERS SUCH AS ANGOLA, THE AFARS AND ISSAS,
AND THE SEYCHELLES. THUS IT BEHOOVES US TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP
PARTICULARLY CLOSE TIES AND CONSULTATION WITH THE WEOG, MANY OF WHOSE
MEMBERS CAN HELP INFLUENCE FAVORABLY SIGNIFICANT THIRD AND FOURTH WORLD
ELEMENTS. FURTHERMORE, INCREASED CONSULTATIONS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL OF
NATO COMBINED WITH THE EARLY IDENTIFICATION OF KEY ISSUES SHOULD IMPROVE
THE NATO PERFORMANCES ON UN ISSUES AND HOPEFULLY WILL PROVIDE MORE WEO
SUPPORT FOR US INTERESTS.
MOYNIHAN
UNQUOTE
SIWE
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. Drafted by Trevithick and approved by Lynch. Sent to Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, Canberra, Dublin, Helsinki, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Madrid, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, Stockholm, Tokyo, the Hague, Valletta, Vienna, Wellington, the Mission to the U.N. in Geneva, and the Mission to NATO. Repeated to Nairobi and the Mission to the IAEA in Vienna. This message repeated telegram 134 from USUN, January 16.↩
- The Department communicated Moynihan’s views about European participation in the 30th United Nations General Assembly.↩