13. Telegram 99106 From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts, May 13, 1974, 2237Z.1 2
TELEGRAM
Department of State
099106
R 132237Z MAY 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
USINT ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
USINT DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY
KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
AMEMBASSY SANAA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
INFO AMEMBASSY BERN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY
BANGUI BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY BANJUL BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY BLANTYRE
BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY BY
POUCH
AMEMBASSY COTONOU BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY GABORONE BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY KIGALI BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY LOME BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY MASERU BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY SUVA BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE BY POUCH
USLO PEKING BY POUCH
STATE 099106
KUWAIT PASS DOHA
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XA, XB, XR, YO, RO, MT, UN
SUBJECT: NON-ALIGNED ACTIVITIES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
1. SUMMARY: IN LIGHT OF 28TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND RECENTLY COMPLETED SIXTH SPECIAL SESSION OF UNGA, DEPT ASKS POSTS TO ASSIST IN REEXAMINATION OF US APPROACH TO LDCS, ESPECIALLY NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE GROUP (NACG), IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND OF IMPACT OF LDC ACTIONS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES AND US INTERESTS. EFFORTS BY MOST MILITANT NACG LEADERS TO ESTABLISH COHESIVE AND DISCIPLINED BLOC PURSUING POSITIONS OFTEN HOSTILE TO US, AS WELL AS APPARENT READINESS OF MANY LDCS TO MAINTAIN GROUP LOYALTY TO SUCH POSITIONS, COULD HAVE SERIOUS AND LONG-RANGE ADVERSE IMPACT ON ABILITY OF US TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY IN UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THIS DEVELOPMENT COINCIDES WITH EFFORTS OF SECRETARY IN MAJOR STATEMENTS AT 28TH UNGA AND SIXTH SPECIAL SESSION, TO PRESENT CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERDEPENDENCE IN MULTILATERAL EFFORTS, AS WELL AS SPECIFIC INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO SERVE US INTERESTS AND TO BE OF PRACTICAL VALUE IN MEETING NEEDS OF INCREASINGLY INTERDEPENDENT WORLD COMMUNITY. WE HEREIN SHARE PRELIMINARY VIEWS OF SITUATION WITH POSTS AND SOLICIT COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS AS TO EXTENT WE MAY BE ABLE TO TAKE POSITIVE INITIATIVES OR ARREST UNFAVORABLE TRENDS AND THEREBY PROMOTE RECEPTIVITY FOR MORE BROADLY BASED NEGOTIATION AND CONSENSUS AND STRENGTHEN CAPACITY OF UN TO HANDLE URGENT WORLD PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY.
2. CURRENT DYNAMICS: UNTIL SIXTH SPECIAL SESSION, MOST LDCS SEEMED TO GO ALONG WITH NACG POLITICAL POSITIONS AND ECONOMIC RHETORIC, BUT TO LOOK TO GROUP OF 77 (G-77) FOR REAL PROGRESS ON SPECIFIC ECONOMIC AIMS. SPECIAL SESSION MOTIVATED NACG TO CONSIDER ECONOMIC PURPOSES MORE PRECISELY, BROUGHT OUT INHERENT CONFLICTS IN NACG AND G-77 TACTICS, AND EXPOSED INDIVIDUAL AND FACTIONAL NATIONAL INTERESTS. SESSION ALSO DEMONSTRATED NEW-FOUND LDC CAPACITY, DESPITE INTERNAL DIFFERENCES, TO DRAW TOGETHER INTO FORMIDABLE PARLIAMENTARY BLOC CAPABLE OF FORCING UNGA INTO APPARENT UNANIMITY DESPITE KNOWN US OBJECTIONS. PARADOXICALLY, COMPETITION BETWEEN AND WITHIN NACG AND G-77 AMONG ALGERIA, INDIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHERS FOR LEADERSHIP CONTRIBUTED TO LDC SOLIDARITY IN CRUNCHES. IN END, NACG MILITANTS AIDED BY THE IRANIAN-LED G-77 RAMMED THROUGH ONE-SIDED SET OF PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIONABLE ACTION PROGRAM, WHILE PROFESSING DESIRE TO AVOID OPEN CONFRONTATION WITH DEVELOPED, INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. THUS, SPECIAL SESSION MAY BE WATERSHED FOR RELATIONSHIPS AMONG LDCS AND BETWEEN THEM AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, EXPOSING STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES, WITH OIL EMBARGO AND RELATED PRICE INCREASES PROVIDING FOCUS OF BEHIND SCENES DISCORD WHEN NATIONAL INTERESTS DIFFERENTIALLY AND SERIOUSLY AFFECTED.
3. US POSTURE: USG GENERALLY HAS SO FAR PURPOSELY DISPLAYED RELATIVELY LOW-KEY INTEREST IN NACG ACTIVITIES. HOWEVER, DEVELOPMENTS IN 28TH UNGA AND SIXTH SPECIAL SESSION LEAD US TO CONSIDER WHETHER OUR DEFENSIVE LOW PROFILE APPROACH TO NON-ALIGNEDS MAY NOT BE INCREASINGLY INADEQUATE. PROSPECTS ARE: (A) NACG METHOD OF HANDLING POLITICAL ISSUES EXTENDED TO ECONOMIC AND TRADE AREA AS IN ALGERIAN INITIATIVE FOR SPECIAL SESSION, COULD AFFECT INCREASINGLY AND ADVERSELY US ECONOMIC AS WELL AS POLITICAL INTERESTS; (B) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DOMINATED BY NON-ALIGNED SLOGANS AND PRIORITIES COULD BE SEEN BY AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CONGRESS AS MEANINGLESS OR HOSTILE FORUMS; (C) US COULD BE ISOLATED INCREASINGLY AS APPARENT PROTECTOR OF STATUS QUO ON NACG-AGITATED ISSUES CONCERNING SELF-DETERMINATION, RACIAL EQUALITY, AND DISTRIBUTION OF GLOBAL RESOURCES; (D) DISCERNIBLE TREND AMONG DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO DRAW AWAY FROM US ON SUCH ISSUES COULD STRAIN RELATIONSHIPS; AND (E) NACG BLOC VOTING CARRIED TO EXTREME COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE UN AS A DELIBERATIVE BODY. WHILE USG HAS NOT WISHED TO APPEAR TO BE USING DIVIDE AND RULE TACTICS, WE DO HAVE STAKE IN HAVING LDCS RECOGNIZE DIFFERENCES OF INTEREST AMONG THEMSELVES AND DEAL PRACTICALLY WITHIN UN SYSTEM WITH PROBLEMS WHICH VITALLY AFFECT THEM. ACCORDINGLY, WE ARE INTERESTED IN ACCURATE PICTURE OF SIGNIFICANT DIVERGENCES AMONG LDCS AS THEY EMERGE. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO BE ABLE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF SITUATION TO ENCOURAGE MORE PRAGMATIC LDC APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES, AND THEREBY TO CONTRIBUTE TO MORE REALISTIC PERFORMANCE OF UN BODIES, ESPECIALLY GA.
4. US MEANS FOR IMPROVING ATMOSPHERE IN US-LDC RELATIONS AND FOR ENCOURAGING LDCS TOWARD MORE INDEPENDENT AND CONSTRUCTIVE STANDS ARE LIMITED. CONTRADICTIONS OR DIFFERENCES IN DEGREE BETWEEN (A) NATIONAL LDC POLICIES ON BILATERAL AND REGIONAL LEVEL AND (B) THOSE PURSUED IN MULTILATERAL CONTEXT ARE NOT UNCOMMON. HOWEVER, OUR RESOURCES AND OPPORTUNITIES CAN BE BETTER USED THAN AT PRESENT NOT ONLY TO PROMOTE MORE FAVORABLE VOTING PATTERNS IN UN ET AL, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY TO ENCOURAGE: GREATER LDC READINESS TO WORK WITH US PRAGMATICALLY, LESS DISPOSITION TO COMPLICATE OUR SECURITY PROBLEMS, MORE INCLINATION TO ESCHEW CONFRONTATION AND TO LIMIT HORTATORY RESOLUTIONS TO POLITICALLY ESSENTIAL AREAS, ETC. APPROPRIATE MEANS MIGHT INCLUDE:
A) ENCOURAGE AWARENESS OF NATIONAL INTEREST OF LDCS IN STABLE INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECONOMY AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. AS SECRETARY TOLD SPECIAL UNGA: “ORGANIZATION OF ONE GROUP OF COUNTRIES AS A BLOC WILL SOONER OR LATER PRODUCE THE ORGANIZATION OF THE POTENTIAL VICTIMS INTO A COUNTERBLOC...THE WORLD IS COMPOSED NOT OF TWO SETS OF INTERESTS BUT MANY: DEVELOPED NATIONS WHICH ARE ENERGY SUPPLIERS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHICH ARE ENERGY CONSUMERS; MARKET ECONOMIES, AND NON-MARKET ECONOMIES; CAPITAL PROVIDERS AND CAPITAL RECIPIENTS...NO NATIONS OR GROUP OF NATIONS CAN GAIN BY PUSHING ITS CLAIMS BEYOND THE LIMITS THAT SUSTAIN WORLD ECONOMIC GROWTH.”
B) CONSULT MORE FULLY ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES IN CAPITALS, WASHINGTON, AND AT HEADQUARTERS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN EFFORT TO MOVE DIALOGUE WITH LDCS ON UN ISSUES SYSTEMATICALLY BEYOND CRASH CONSULTATIONS ON TACTICAL ISSUES;
C) CONSIDER WITHIN BASIC USG ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POSITIONS THE PRACTICALITY AND DESIRABILITY OF ADJUSTING OUR POSTURES TO ACCORD BENEFITS OR COSTS AS APPROPRIATE TO LDCS WHO RISK, OR REFUSE TO RISK, TAKING POSITIONS SUPPORTING US INTERESTS, TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO STAND UP FOR THEIR INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS, AND TO HELP THEM MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY IN RELATIONS WITHIN NACG;
D) IDENTIFY FURTHER PROBLEMS OF BROAD CONCERN AND TAKE CONCRETE INITIATIVES (E.G., WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE), WHICH CAN BE IMPLEMENTED THROUGH UN SYSTEM AND BENEFIT POOREST LDCS;
E) DEMONSTRATE FLEXIBILITY IN TRANSFERRING AID RESOURCES TO OR THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR BENEFIT OF DEVELOPING NATIONS AS SECRETARY INDICATED IN SPECIAL GA SPEECH. (IN ADDITION TO POLICY CONSIDERATIONS, OUR WILLINGNESS TO USE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THEIR OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS WHICH, IN TURN, DEPENDS TO SIGNIFICANT EXTENT ON INCREASED LDC UNDERSTANDING OF, AND RESPONSIBILITY TOWARD ORGANIZATIONAL AND BUDGETARY ISSUES.)
5. BACKGROUND: NACG AND G-77 INCLUDE MOST LDCS WITH IMPORTANT EXCEPTIONS. THESE ORGANIZATIONS GENERALLY SHARE ECONOMIC GOALS, BUT OCCASIONALLY DIFFER IN TACTICS, LEADERSHIP, AND POLITICAL COMMITMENTS. NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (ABOUT 80 COUNTRIES), BEGINNING WITH GENERAL LDC DESIRE TO AVOID POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN BIG POWER RIVALRIES, SOON BECAME WAY TO ACHIEVE SAFETY IN NUMBERS ON WIDE VARIETY OF ISSUES EXPRESSED MOST POTENTLY IN VOTING MAJORITIES IN UN AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. NACG MILITANTS PUSH -- AND TO SOME EXTENT MANIPULATE -- NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND ALGERIAN LEADERSHIP TENDS TOWARD ANTI-WESTERN AND ANTI US POSITIONS. THESE INCLUDE ISSUES OF LITTLE DIRECT INTEREST TO MOST NACG MEMBERSHIP (E.G., KOREA, VIETNAM, GRUNK AND PRG CREDENTIALS), AS WELL AS THOSE OF DIRECT CONCERN (E.G., COLONIALISM, RACISM, ARAB-ISRAEL, TRADE AND AID). AT NAG ALGIERS CONFERENCE IN 1973, 75 STATES PARTICIPATED WITH 16 OBSERVERS (LARGELY LAS). CONFERENCE ADOPTED MANY ANTIWESTERN RESOLUTIONS WITHIN CONSENSUS BASED ON LOGROLLING BETWEEN AFRICANS (ON COLONIAL THEMES) AND ARABS (ON ISRAEL). MODERATES WERE INEFFECTIVE AND, ALTHOUGH PRIVATELY CRITICAL OF MILITANTS, DID LITTLE TO DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM RESULT. IN 28TH UNGA AND SIXTH SPECIAL SESSION SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF DELS, WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO UNDERSTAND US POINT OF VIEW AND AT LEAST TAKE NEUTRAL STANCE, WERE UNWILLING TO CONSIDER ISSUES ON MERITS AND WOULD NOT DEPART FROM POSITION ADOPTED AT PREPARATORY NACG MEETINGS. PROBLEM EXTENDED WELL BEYOND TRADITIONAL DIFFICULTIES WITH NON-ALIGNED AND INTENSIFIED AS “SPIRIT OF ALGIERS DECISIONS” WAS CITED TO INHIBIT COMPROMISE.
6. GROUP OF 77 (NOW 96) GREW OUT OF UNCTAD AND CONCENTRATED ON TOUGH, PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO LDC ECONOMIC AIMS. G-77, WHICH PRESENTLY LED BY IRAN (IRAN DOES NOT BELONG TO NAG), HAS USED NUMERICAL LDC STRENGTH TO ATTEMPT TO SQUEEZE ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS FROM DEVELOPED COUNTRIES WHILE WORKING DIRECTLY WITH DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ON TRADE AND AID MATTERS WITHIN UN. RHETORIC OCCASIONALLY HAS BEEN STRIDENT, BUT G-77 USUALLY PLAYS DOWN POLITICAL POSTURING AND CONFRONTATION, AND NUMEROUS CONSTRUCTIVE ECONOMIC STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN AT UN ON CONSENSUS BASIS, E.G., 2ND DEVELOPMENT DECADE PROGRAM AND FIRST REVIEW AND APPRAISAL.
7. ACTION REQUESTED: SPECIAL SESSION OF UNGA PROVIDED UNUSUAL EXPOSURE OF ATTITUDES AND RELATIONSHIPS AMONG LDCS. ACCORDINGLY, DEPT REQUESTS ACTION POSTS AND OTHERS AS APPROPRIATE, IN COURSE NORMAL CONTACTS AND KEEPING IN MIND CAVEAT IN PARA A BELOW, TO MONITOR REACTIONS TO SPECIAL SESSION, ASSESS ATTITUDES OF DELEGATIONS AS THEY RETURN, AND ANALYZE EFFECT ON HOST GOVERNMENT ACTIONS TOWARD OR WITHIN NACG. AMONG ASPECTS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST ARE: (A) LOOSENING OF TIES BETWEEN ARABS AND AFRICANS WITHIN NACG, AND LIKELIHOOD OF POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF ABILITY OF NACG MILITANTS TO KEEP ASIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN LINE; (B) FOR ARA POSTS: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS SECRETARY’S INITIATIVE TO FOSTER AN IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP WITH LAS HAD AN IMPACT ON THEIR ATTITUDES; (C) EVIDENCES OF NACG AND G-77 TENDENCIES TO FRAGMENT ALONG HAVE/HAVE NOT OR OTHER LINES AND CONSEQUENCES FOR NACG MORALE AND COHESION OF SIGNIFICANT BREAKS IN SOLIDARITY, SUCH AS IN CONNECTION OIL PRICE INCREASES; (D) INDICATIONS OF NEW IDENTITY OR CONTINUING DIVERSITY OF NACG AND G-77 STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN LIGHT OF RECENT ASSERTIONS OF PERCEIVED POWER; (E) DISPOSITION OF LDCS OVER NEXT PERIOD TO REVERT MORE TO REGIONAL GROUPINGS OR CONVERSELY INCREASINGLY TO RESORT TO BROAD BLOC APPROACHES; (F) PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR US OF EMPHASIZING REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL APPROACHES TO LDCS; (G) POSSIBILITY THAT APPARENT NEW FOUND LDC SOLIDARITY ON ECONOMIC ISSUES MAY SPREAD TO INCREASING DEGREE TO POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES AS WELL; (H) METHODS WHEREBY LDCS MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED TO PERCEIVE THEIR DIVERSITY OF CHARACTERISTICS AND INTERESTS AND TO APPRECIATE CONGRUENT INTERESTS WITH US; (I) SIGNIFICANT EMERGING PATTERNS OF INFLUENCE AMONG LDCS WHICH SHOULD HAVE HIGHEST PRIORITY FOR US PARTICULARLY ANY SHIFTS IN ALGERIAN AUTHORITY AMONG LDCS, ESPECIALLY NACG; (J) NOTABLY FRUITFUL OR EGREGIOUS EXAMPLES OF MAJOR US INVOLVEMENTS WITH LDCS WHICH RESPECTIVELY SHOULD BE SUSTAINED OR ELIMINATED; AND (K) MAJOR CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS INCLUDING PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN THE US OF IMPORTANT LEADERS OR POTENTIAL LEADERS, WHICH NEED EQUAL OR GREATER ATTENTION COMPARED TO ECONOMIC ISSUES IN ORDER TO FACILITATE EFFECTIVE US IMPACT AMONG LDCS.
8. MOREOVER, DEPT WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENT CONCERNING HOW BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH HOST GOVT AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LOCATED AT POST COULD BEST GENERATE INCREASED INSIGHTS INTO NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND ENCOURAGE RECEPTIVITY TO US APPROACHES AND MORE INDEPENDENT POSITIONS WITHIN NACG. (EA POSTS ARE, HOWEVER, REMINDED OF US POSITION OF NON-INTERFERENCE WITH INDIGENOUS ASIAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LIKE ASEAN.) WE WOULD WELCOME FRANK AND REALISTIC APPRAISALS.
9. THIS IS INTERNAL REVIEW FOR POLICY BACKGROUND ONLY. POSTS SHOULD HOLD REASSESSMENT CLOSELY AND NOT DISCUSS AS SUCH WITH HOST GOVTS OR OTHERWISE OUTSIDE POST. WE NEED BENEFIT OF CANDID APPRAISALS TO ASSIST IN CONSIDERING FURTHER STEPS PRIOR 29TH UNGA AND LATER. RESPONSES WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO A MAJOR PLANNING STUDY OF THE THIRD WORLD BEING UNDERTAKEN IN S/P. POSTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO PROVIDE INNOVATIVE IDEAS BOTH CONCEPTUAL AND APPLIED. REPLIES WOULD BE APPRECIATED BY END OF JUNE. PLEASE REPEAT REPLIES TO USUN. RUSH
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. Drafted by Stull, Washburn, and Neidle; cleared in S/P, and by McNutt, Searing, McNeil, Walker, Goott, Morey, and Blake; and approved by Buffum.↩
- The Department circulated a request for information and ideas as part of a general reconsideration of U.S. relations with developing countries.↩