Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973–1976

10. Telegram 250151 From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts, December 26, 1973, 2137Z.¹ ²

December 26, 1973, 2137Z

TELEGRAM
Department of State
250151

R 262137Z DEC 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS
AMEMBASSY BANJUL BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI BY POUCH
XMT AMEMBASSY SUVA
AMEMBASSY SAIGON

STATE 250151

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UNGA

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF 28TH UNGA
REF: (A) STATE 163147; (B) USUN 5723; (C) USUN 5727; (D) USUN 5732

1. SUMMARY: ON THE WHOLE, OUTCOME FOR US OF 28TH GA WHICH RECESSED DECEMBER 18 WAS BETTER THAN WE HAD EXPECTED, WITH SUPPORT OF OUR DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS CONTRIBUTING GREATLY TO SUCCESS IN SEVERAL CRITICAL SITUATIONS. INITIATIVES IN SECRETARY’S GA ADDRESS HAD POSITIVE IMPACT. WE WERE ABLE TO ATTAIN OBJECTIVES ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT POLITICAL ITEMS, WHILE REMAINING IN SMALL MINORITY ON MOST AFRICAN AND ISRAELI RELATED ISSUES. IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AREAS US JOINED IN CONSENSUS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ON NUMBER OF IMPORTANT RESOLUTIONS IN CONTRAST WITH RELATIVE ISOLATION IN 1972. WE ALSO MADE MODEST GAINS IN HUMAN RIGHTS AREA AND IN URGING FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY. HOWEVER, GROWING AFRO-ARAB COHESION AND MILITANCY IN PURSUING OBJECTIVES OFTEN CONTRARY TO OUR INTERESTS WILL MAKE DEFENSE OF US POSITIONS AND ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR GOALS IN UN CONTEXT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT NEXT YEAR. ACTION REQUESTED: REVIEW WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AS APPROPRIATE. ALSO, EMBASSY COMMENTS APPRECIATED. END SUMMARY.

2. GENERAL ASSESSMENT: WE ARE REASONABLY PLEASED WITH OVERALL GA RESULTS. THERE WERE SOME SUCCESSES IN ALL FIELDS. WHERE SETBACKS OCCURRED, THEY WERE CONTAINED. POLEMICS WERE KEPT WITHIN BOUNDS WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, SUCH AS USSR ON MIDDLE EAST, AND PRC ON CAMBODIA AND AGAINST USSR ON DISARMAMENT. OUR SATISFACTION, HOWEVER, IS TEMPERED BY REALIZATION THAT PROSPECTS FOR NEXT YEAR’S GA LESS THAN PROMISING.

3. 28TH GA DEMONSTRATED INCREASING TENDENCY OF LDC’S TO PREOCCUPY UN WITH THEIR PRIORITIES AND TO GAIN UN ENDORSEMENT OF POLITICAL POSITIONS ESTABLISHED IN NON-ALIGNED AND OAU FORUMS. TO SOME EXTENT THIS STEMS FROM FRUSTRATION THAT IMPORTANT WORLD PROBLEMS ARE LARGELY DEALT WITH OUTSIDE UN. IN MAIN, HOWEVER, MILITANT GROUP OF “NONALIGNEDS” ARE SEEKING TO CAPITALIZE ON THEIR PARLIAMENTARY VOTING POWER TO MAKE GA SERVE THEIR PURPOSES.

4. US POSITION ON POLITICAL ISSUES WAS INCREASINGLY DEFENSIVE. WE SOUGHT BY FINESSING CONFRONTATIONS AND REDUCING UN ROLE IN ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO REDUCE OUR VULNERABILITY IN DEBATE, E.G., ON KOREA. OTHERWISE WE STROVE TO ANTICIPATE AND MANEUVER TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE, E.G., ON KHMER CREDENTIALS, MIDDLE EAST, AND DISARMAMENT. ON ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, WE NEGOTIATED RESOLUTIONS THAT LEAVE BASIC DECISIONS TO GATT, IMF AND OTHER FORA WHERE ECONOMIC REALITIES RECEIVE GREATER WEIGHT.

5. OUR TASK WAS COMPLICATED BY GROWING AFRO-ARAB MILITANT DOMINATION OF NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND BY FREQUENT UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY OF MODERATES TO RESIST PRESSURE FOR GROUP SOLIDARITY. VOTES OR POSITIONS WERE OFTEN JUSTIFIED BY REFERENCES TO NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE (NAC) RESES EVEN WHEN SUBJECTS HAD NOT BEEN FULLY DEBATED OR ENDORSED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS AND WERE FAR REMOVED FROM DIRECT INTEREST OF COUNTRIES CONCERNED (E.G., NAC RESES ON KOREA, CAMBODIA, PUERTO RICO).

6. NONETHELESS OPPORTUNITIES REMAIN TO AVOID AUTOMATIC APPLICATION OF NON-ALIGNED VOTING MAJORITY BY SPLITTING OFF MODERATE NON-ALIGNED FROM MILITANTS THROUGH SUCH MEANS AS: (A) ADOPTING POSITION ON “MIDDLE GROUND” OR WHICH OTHERWISE DEEMED EQUITABLE OR REASONABLE (E.G., DEFERMENT OF KHMER REPRESENTATION ITEM; UNEF FINANCING FORMULA); (B) WORKING WITH SELECTED AFRO-ASIAN REGIONALS (E.G., SE ASIAN EFFORTS IN KHMER CREDENTIALS) AND OTHERWISE CONVINCING NON-ALIGNED THAT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ARE IN THEIR OWN INTEREST (SUCCESSFULLY IN CASE OF CONVENTION ON PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS); AND (C) ENCOURAGING RECOGNITION THAT SUCCESS OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM DEPENDS ON CONTINUING COOPERATION OF DONOR COUNTRIES. AT SAME TIME, EXIGENCIES OF US WORLD-WIDE INTERESTS AND COMMITMENTS USUALLY INHIBIT US FROM EFFECTIVE LOG-ROLLING. MOREOVER OUR INCREASED IDENTIFICATION WITH ISRAEL AND PORTUGAL IN CONNECTION MIDDLE EAST WAR AND USE OF AZORES FURTHER REDUCED OUR ALREADY SLIM MARGIN OF MANEUVER WITH AFRICAN AND ARAB UN DELEGATIONS.

7. WE MUST EXPECT THAT AT 29TH GA NON-ALIGNED MILITANTS, AWARE OF THEIR VOTING COHESION AND STRENGTH, IN CONTROL OF ASSEMBLY PROCEDURES, AND PROBABLY WITH ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER BOUTEFLIKA IN THE PRESIDENCY, WILL PRESS EVEN MORE ENERGETICALLY ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THEM SUCH AS COLONIALISM, RACE DISCRIMINATION, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES, AND PREFERENTIAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT MEASURES. EVEN WHEN WE ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR OBJECTIVES, WE MUST OPPOSE METHODS SUCH AS APPLICATION OF UNREALISTIC SANCTIONS OR USE OF UN AND ITS RESOURCES TO AID INSURGENT GROUPS.

8. THUS, OVERALL PROBLEM FOR US THROUGH NEXT YEAR WILL BE HOW TO COPE WITH OUR NEAR-ISOLATION ON POLITICAL ISSUES OF OVERRIDING INTEREST TO A UNGA DOMINATED BY MILITANT AFRO-ARABS SUPPORTED NOT ONLY BY PRC AND SOVIET GROUP BUT ALSO ENJOYING SYMPATHY IN SOME CASES OF WEST EUROPEANS. AS THIS TREND CONTINUES, GA LIKELY TO BECOME EVEN LESS HOSPITABLE TO SERIOUS AND DISPASSIONATE CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL POLICY.

9. SITUATION REQUIRES US TO REVIEW AND IMPROVE OUR DAMAGE-LIMITING TECHNIQUES AND RE-EXAMINE OUR STYLE, WHICH IS FREQUENTLY IMPORTANT IN INFLUENCING GA RESULTS. FURTHER, WE MUST ACTIVELY FOLLOW THROUGH ON INITIATIVES SUCH AS THOSE ANNOUNCED BY SECRETARY, NOTABLY ON PEACEKEEPING, FOOD SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT, AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. FINALLY, WE SHOULD SEEK TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES IN SUCH FIELDS AS HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISARMAMENT, WHERE THERE ARE PROSPECTS FOR MOVES WHICH WOULD BE BOTH SUBSTANTIVELY AND COSMETICALLY USEFUL.

10. ACTION REQUESTED: POSTS MAY FIND IT USEFUL TO REVIEW WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS VARIOUS ASPECTS OF ANALYSIS CONTAINED IN THIS TELEGRAM AND REFTELS. POSTS WILL KNOW BEST HOW TO TAILOR DISCUSSION TO LOCAL SITUATIONS, BUT WE HOPE THEY WILL AS APPROPRIATE DRAW HOST GOVERNMENT’S ATTENTION TO OUR SERIOUS CONCERN RE LONGER TERM EFFECTS OF UNDUE POLITICIZATION OF ISSUES, BLOC VOTING PRACTICES, AND DOCTRINAIRE MILITANCY OF NON-ALIGNED. IF NOT MODERATED, THESE TRENDS COULD IN OUR VIEW FURTHER UNDERCUT UNGA EFFECTIVENESS ON WIDE RANGE OF POLICY PROBLEMS. WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE HAVING ANY EMBASSY VIEWS ON POINTS COVERED IN THIS MESSAGE AND REFTELS. KISSINGER
NOTE BY OCT: POUCHED BANJUL AND TAIPEI.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential. Drafted by Schaller and other IO staff members; cleared by McNutt, Monsma, Schiff, Walker, Goott, Bettauer, Morey, and in ACDA; and approved by Popper. Kissinger’s September 24 address to the United Nations is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXVIII, Foundations and Organization of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976.
2. The Department assessed how well the United Sates achieved its goals during the 28th United Nations General Assembly and outlined issues likely to arise at the 29th General Assembly.