15. Minutes of the Acting Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting, Washington, June 13, 1975, 8–9:05 a.m.1 2
The Secretary’s 8:00 a.m. Staff Meeting
Friday, June 13, 1975
Participants:
- THE SECRETARY OF STATE - HENRY A. KISSINGER
- D - Mr. Ingersoll
- P - Mr. Sisco
- M - Mr. Eagleburger
- C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt
- AP - Ambassador Davis
- ARA - Mr. Rogers
- EA - Mr. Habib
- EUR - Mr. Hartman
- NEA - Mr. Atherton
- INR - Mr. Hyland
- S/P - Mr. Lord
- EB - Mr. Katz, Acting
- S/PRS - Mr. Funseth, Acting
- PM - Mr. Vest
- IO - Ambassador Blake, Acting
- H - Ambassador McCloskey
- L - Mr. Leigh
- S/S - Mr. Oritz, Acting
- S - Mr. Bremer
[Omitted is material unrelated to Habib’s trip to Southeast Asia.]
MR. HABIB: Well, generally speaking, in Southeast Asia the other countries perceive a fundamental power shift, a shift having taken place, and they look upon Hanoi’s success. They fear it. And they see it as a major force in the sub-region which has arms and zeal and the momentum of success. And they expect Hanoi not necessarily to preoccupy itself with the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Vietnam alone, but to continue to try to play an expansionist role in the area.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: They still don’t have a government in South Vietnam.
MR. HABIB: Not officially, no. They are being governed by these revolutionary committees, but it is quite obvious what is governing them is the Lao Dong party structure.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: The point is we may [Page 3] never see a PRG.
MR. HABIB: I would say we are still going to see a PRG, but it will be a short-lived one, and the ties between the PRG and Hanoi are going to be so close and intimate —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why would they put up a PRG at all?
MR. HABIB: I think partly to try to take care of the southern sensitivities first, southern nationalism, and then also because they said they were going to do it. Ands then finally, because that will allow them to restructure the south in a way that fits in and that coincides with the structure in the north on a more gradual basis.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Have they got all foreign correspondents out of Saigon?
MR. HABIB: Not all. There are still a few left. I think there are two or three Americans, and a few French and Japanese. They are not all out. They are talking now, it is not only correspondents, but they are talking about getting all foreigners out of Vietnam. I think that they are working up to the fact that the South Vietnamese themselves still have associations with a lot of Frenchmen and others who were present.
[Page 4]Meanwhile, of course, they are going to do everything else. They will make their gestures towards Peking. They will probably even make some towards Moscow, but less so, despite the fact that generally speaking they fear Peking. Generally speaking, they distrust Moscow and they are suspicious of Moscow.
The Southeast Asian countries will have, by everything that is being said or you read in the paper, a very deep-seated hope that the United states will not only stay with them, but will now, without Vietnam as a millstone, be able to assert itself in a policy in Southeast Asia, which is more akin to their own sense of nationalism, desire for economic development, and the internal security problems that they all generally face. With the exception of Singapore, and one could even say Singapore, each one of them faces an internal security problem of some sort. And that drives them to even greater fear of Hanoi, sitting up there with all those arms.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: What does it mean — that with the millstone of Vietnam around our neck?That sounds like one of our Harvard colleagues.
MR. HABIB: That is the way they look at it.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: They look at Vietnam as our [Page 5] millstone and say “Thank God you are out of there now; you can devote yourselves to us?”
MR. HABIB: Let me adjust myself. As I said, they all feel that a fundamental power shift has taken place which they do not like, and their first feeling was “My God, what a disaster.” They looked upon our defeat in South Vietnam as our defeat — not just simply South Vietnam’s defeat.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: It happens to be true.
MR. HABIB: They thought that was a disaster. However, they have got to live, and they come out of it now with a feeling, well, not only are they going to have to associate among themselves, but that it is possible in their view that it will be possible now for the United States to be able to get the resources out of Congress and get American opinion poised in such a manner that we will be willing to do the things in Southeast Asia that they look for us to do.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Like what?
MR. HABIB: Which all takes money. Economic assistance and military assistance. Modest military assistance, and in some cases —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Are you doing something [Page 6] about these MAP figures?
MR. INGERSOLL: Yes.
MR. HABIB: Now, in each case —
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Especially for Indonesia.
MR. HABIB: I think we want to take a close look at Malaysia For example, Malaysia is a country which has held off from us for a long time, and now wishes to come a little closer on a military relationship because they face an insurgency which they see being fed by both Thai instability and Hanoi’s aggressiveness. The Indonesians are in the same position. The Thai, of course, have a weak government and a border which now has Laos on the north, Cambodia on one side, and behind it all Hanoi. The Thai are desperate to find some means of protecting themselves so they will try every diplomatic channel. They have received the North Vietnamese, the PRG, they are going to go to China. But at the same time, they will be pleading, I am sure, with the ASEAN group to give them the support of the regional organization, and they will undoubtedly be looking to us for military assistance, particularly on the Army side. The Army is not happy with the way the government operates, but there is no indication at the moment they are going to overthrow it.
[Page 7]All the governments seem fairly stable except for the Thai government. The Thai government is the one in the area that they are all worried about.
Now, the conclusion I draw out of the trip was that from our standpoint, they are not worried about the constancy of the administration. You remember you asked me to express our determination, our consistency. I did that in each case. In each case they accepted it. And not only accepted it but welcomed it. But in each case, each of them asked me “What about Congress?” They are concerned about what they read about the United States. The daily newspaper in those parts of the world carry the reports of the deliberations in our committees, which is more than you can say about some of the provincial newspapers in the United States. And it is their constant preoccupation, what is going to happen to them if we no longer play the role in East Asia that they want us to play.
So we have the opportunity to play that role. But it is going to take some resources. And I think it is going to take both military and economic resources.
SECRETARY KISSINGER Do you think we could put — I don’t suppose that fits into the Japan speech — in some of these perceptions? I ought to take the occasion [Page 8] say something like that. I have plenty of other opportunities. Are you going to have that —
MR. LORD: Tonight.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay. Does anyone want to argue with Phil?
(Whereupon at 9:05 a.m. the meeting was adjourned.)