Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

16. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford, Washington, June 13, 1975.¹ ²

Washington, June 13, 1975

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger [HK initialed]

SUBJECT: Philip C. Habib’s Trip to Southeast Asia

Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, visited Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Laos and the Philippines between May 18 and June 11. I believe his general comments and specific observations will be of interest to you. There follows a summary of his comments, which I had him prepare for your reading.

Attachment:
Trip Report

Southeast Asia: General Observations

• — In each country it is believed that Hanoi’s success in Indochina has brought about a fundamental power shift in the region. All the Southeast Asian countries fear Hanoi, which they now see as a major force in the sub-region with plenty of arms, revolutionary zeal and the momentum of success. This compels the various nations to explore what adjustments in their policies might help them to meet the new realities. The initial shock of the unwanted Indochina debacle has been absorbed, and now there is a second phase of a serious but not panicky search for long-range security options. In a sense there is relief, not because there is satisfaction with the outcome of Indochina, but more because there is hope that the U.S. will now be able to devote more attention to the remainder of the area:
• — The five-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly for Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, has quickly emerged as a potential loose mechanism for security cooperation—imperfect but relatively safe and possibly useful.
• — All of the nations in the area fear the PRC. Therefore, part of the adjustment for all ASEAN members is to change or consider a change in their relationship with the PRC: Malaysia and the Philippines have already established ties with China, and Thailand is moving rapidly in that direction. Singapore and Indonesia are holding back but will eventually make their peace.
• — With regard to the Soviet Union, they are all suspicious, but it is further away and there is no Russian minority to deal with. So they place their trust in the U.S. deterrent and the Sino-Soviet conflict as the basic checks on Soviet expansionism in Asia.
• — With respect to the U.S., our affirmations of good intentions are welcomed by all. There is a uniform desire that the U.S. play a supporting—and deterrent—role in the region. There is nevertheless a deep suspicion that the U.S. will fail to provide the type of financial and security resources the ASEAN countries perceive as essential. ASEAN doubts are rooted in the concern that the U.S. Congress will not join in an Administration policy of a continued active interest and role in the region.
• — With the exception of Thailand, the regimes in the ASEAN countries are relatively stable, and should remain so over the next several years. Thailand could surprise us, and Khukrit—a man whose sophistication and political sense are increasingly impressive—may survive the odds against him longer than we anticipate. Lee Kuan Yew, not unexpectedly, has a lock on his power position. The others—Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines—labor under varying degrees of potential instability, with substantial medium-range threats of social or communal unrest.
• — Nationalism in SEA has been spurred significantly by various world developments, and by the Indochina outcome. In some ways it is a healthy development, but in any event we cannot be caught bucking it. There is no doubt that we can adjust to the forms presently being manifested, and in the long run nationalism can serve our interests vis-a-vis the kind of open and independent SEA we would like to see emerge.
• — American bases in SEA, in the form to which we have become accustomed, will no longer be available to us. In Thailand, at best we may be able to retain some residual access and minimal operational and intelligence facilities. In the Philippines, we must make an early and conscious decision to discuss substantial modification of the current terms under which we exercise our rights, to avoid an escalation of Filipino emotions regarding sovereignty. By doing so we will be able to retain the facilities as major operating bases.
• — U.S. assistance is still relevant, indeed perhaps more so than in recent years. Modest amounts of MAP grant and FMS credit to Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines can: a) provide military equipment which the countries need for their own security requirements; b) offer concrete evidence of the U.S. intention to play an active role in SEA—at a time when we are most doubted in our capacity for follow-through; and, c) in the Philippines at least, and possibly Thailand, enhance our opportunities for access to bases. For all the ASEAN countries, except Singapore, U.S. economic assistance—some of it on concessional terms—can contribute to social development and infrastructure projects, and in turn aid in the reassertion of our diminished influence and credibility.
• — There is little to be salvaged in Laos, where we can only pare down to the barest minimum over the next two weeks, holding back our new Ambassador until that has been accomplished, and then take stock as to the nature of a relationship which would be useful and possible. Similarly, there is no significant interest to be served in our recognizing Hanoi or Saigon at this time. Others, such as Australia, Japan, France and some of the ASEAN countries, can proceed to probe, recognize, aid or what-have-you, while we watch from the sidelines.
• — The extraordinary period of crisis in SEA has run its course (leaving aside the possible final act of Laos), and the task now is to adjust to our revised but continuing interests in the area, and to Asian hopes and requirements. We can now gear for the long-haul relationships which demand step-by-step development. In the process we will be aided by the desire of each of the nations in the area to retain its independence and by the deep-rooted feeling among them that all will be well if only the U.S. really can help out. The thing they fear the most is the loss of U.S. interest in their future.
• — In each country the leaders interviewed had some trenchant observations or views worth noting:

Prime Minister Whitlam recognizes the primacy of the U.S.-Australian relationship in Australian foreign policy, and counts on an active U.S. role in Southeast Asia.

President Suharto views Thailand’s prospects as dim indeed, is deeply concerned that insurgency in Malaysia may reach serious proportions, and hopes that—under Indonesian leadership—ASEAN can serve as a counter to a communist Indochina. He believes it is of critical importance that the U.S. play a discreet but active role in assisting the ASEAN countries.

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, having little faith in the Thai and worried about Malaysia, looks to the U.S. to provide selective but vital assistance to the ASEAN members. Like the others in the region, Lee fears Hanoi and anticipates eventual Vietnamese support for subversion in the ASEAN area.

Prime Minister Razak is focusing on ASEAN, with quiet American support, as a possible security blanket at a time when his insurgency problems could be compounded greatly if Hanoi so chooses. He is anxious to avoid confrontation with the communist regimes in Indochina, but is increasingly aware of the importance of keeping his powder dry.

Prime Minister Khukrit, forced to deal with major leftist student and labor pressures and significant communist insurgencies, is fully cognizant of Hanoi’s potential threat. He is seeking to adjust his external relationships with the hope of garnering some protection against Hanoi, but still hopes the U.S. will contribute security assistance to help the Thai defend themselves.

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma says Laos will continue to require American economic aid, but he has lost control of the situation in the face of overwhelming communist strength and pressure.

President Marcos is intent on adjusting Philippine foreign policy away from the “U.S. stooge” image of which others accuse the Philippines, but he is equally firm in his expressions that the U.S.-Philippine

security relationship is essential to his country. He insists that Philippine sovereignty must be established over U.S. bases, but he does not want U.S. military operational capabilities to suffer adversely from the revised base agreements he seeks.

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 1, Southeast Asia (3). Confidential; Exdis. Attached and published is Habib’s summary of his trip report. Ford initialed Kissinger’s covering memorandum.
2. Kissinger gave Ford a report on Habib’s visit to Southeast Asia.