Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

14. Memorandum From W.R. Smyser of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, May 7, 1975.¹ ²

Washington, May 7, 1975

MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION

May 7, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: W.R. SMYSER [WRS initialed]

SUBJECT: Policy Review on Asia

After recent developments in Indochina, with their reverberations in many Asian countries, we may wish to review our policy in Asia in order to get a clearer picture of where we are and where we want to go.

We could follow a number of policies. We could continue the strategy we have been pursuing, sustaining our friends and developing our strategic and diplomatic position; we could go to a more maritime strategy, concentrating on the island nations and perhaps such peninsulas as Korea while abandoning our remaining Asian mainland positions; or we could move toward an emphasis on economic relations and draw down our military presence throughout Asia as a whole.

As we plan our course, there are two things we need to keep in mind:

• — First, the current problems of Asia, and our approaches to those problems, are not uniform: One group of nations, which includes Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia, appears to be most deeply affected by Indochinese developments and most in need of careful handling. Another group, including Japan, Australia and New Zealand, seems less affected though still concerned. China, of course, is a separate issue.
• — Second, the nations of Asia are increasingly skeptical about the capacity of the U.S. Administration to make and sustain policy. Many question American consistency. They also watch what our Congress does more and more. They may regard anything we say or do with great skepticism, at least until we take a series of steps that do develop some demonstrable popular and Congressional support.

As you know, Bill Kintner is doing a study on Southeast Asia but that need not interfere with other efforts.

We have three options on where we proceed from here:

1. Develop our own concepts and manage policy from here under tight control and in coordination with our Ambassadors and with Phil Habib. We are doing this already, and are already moving ahead to redistribute and expand aid, to redistribute Vietnamese military assets, and to increase Presidential activities in terms of meetings and — as I will propose separately — perhaps more foreign visits by the President.

— The principal advantage of this course is that it is discreet and arouses little excitement in the bureaucracy, enabling us to manage and tailor each situation. Its principal disadvantage is that offices may get out of control if we do not catch every little point, and may also do their own studies. Essentially, it makes our actions here central to the policy process which is not unprecedented but which I believe you want to de-emphasize.

2. Deal with the problems through NSSMs on selected countries. As you know, we already have NSSM studies under way on Indonesia, Singapore and Taiwan. The Taiwan paper should be with you next week; the Singapore and Indonesian papers should be finished in a month. I am proposing, as part of this memorandum, new NSSMs on Thailand and Korea.

— The principal advantage of this course is that it recognizes that, while our problems in Asia have broadly common elements, the basic policy responses must be tailored to the quite different contexts of individual countries if they are to be effective. This approach also recognizes that our immediate need is to deal effectively with the more acute problems in these particular countries, and that the broadest Asian problem can — and perhaps should — wait a bit “until the dust settles.” The principal disadvantage is that this process makes it more difficult to bring cohesion to our policies in Asia as a whole.

3. A NSSM on Asian policy. This study would analyze the new situation in Asia and present options on how to achieve our objectives. It would not necessarily invalidate the NSSMs already started, but — simply for bureaucratic reasons — would probably make it difficult to begin any other individual country NSSMs until it is complete.

— The principal advantages of such a study are that it would provide an opportunity for a general review and that, once it is completed, there should ideally be common understanding of where we are trying to go. The principal disadvantages are that the study would be very general, that it may not produce any changes in policy but will heighten expectations and thus frustrations when nothing new develops, and that its existence may leak and add to Asian uncertainties. In addition, the new dimensions of the Asia-wide problems are not yet sufficiently clear to make a broad approach effective.

My View

I think an Asian NSSM is premature at this point. It is too early to assess the full impact of developments and the conclusions in a NSSM would not really help us to deal with the specific policy problems in each country. On the other hand, I think it is essential to proceed with studies on Thailand and Korea, the two countries most likely to be affected by developments in Indochina. Mr. Solomon concurs with this view.

Since, however, I understand you wished to examine the possibility of an Asian NSSM, I have drafted one and attached it under cover of a memorandum to the President. We could even try to do all of the NSSMs, which would strain the system but could give us the best look at policy. At Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he proceed with the two country NSSMs on Thailand and Korea.

At Tab II is a memorandum to the President recommending a NSSM on Asia.

Of course, you may prefer to discuss these with him in person rather than to send any memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the President recommending NSSMs on Thailand and Korea (Tab I).

ALTERNATIVELY:
That you sign the memorandum to the President recommending a NSSM on Asia (Tab II).

Concurrence: Dick Solomon
Donald MacDonald

1. Source: Ford Library, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–36, NSSM 226, Review of U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Solomon and MacDonald concurred in the memorandum. Near the top of the first page, Kissinger wrote, “Agree. HK.” Attached but not published is Tab I, the memorandum to the President recommending NSSMs on Thailand and Korea, which Kissinger drew a line through and wrote, “not necessary.” Also attached but not published is Tab II, the memorandum to the President recommending a NSSM on Asia, which Kissinger drew a line through and wrote, “Not required.” As Smyser recommended, Scowcroft, acting on behalf of Kissinger, signed two NSSMs on May 27. NSSM 225, Document 401, requesting a review of U.S. policy toward Thailand and NSSM 226, Document 268, toward the Korean Peninsula.
2. Smyser provided options for reconsidering policy toward Asia.