Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

401. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Santiago, June 9, 1976, 8:05–9:10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The United States

  • The Secretary
  • Under Secretary Rogers
  • Luigi R. Einaudi, S/P—Notetaker
  • Anthony J. Hervas, Interpreter

• Venezuela

  • Foreign Minister Escovar

As the group enters, a photographer begins to take pictures. The Secretary leaves to take a call from Washington.

Rogers: I suspect that call has to do with the Shlaudeman nomination.

Escovar: It is still to be confirmed?

Rogers: Yes, many nominations were made at once.

Escovar: I suppose that electoral tensions have contributed to the delay.

Rogers: Yes.

Escovar: And I suppose specifically that the Reagan candidacy continues to create problems.

Our general impression, of course, is that Carter is very strong.

Rogers: Yes, he has broad support, particularly among Blacks.

Escovar: We see parallels to JFK. I have heard tapes of Carter’s campaign. He is quite charismatic. On the other hand, he is an unknown quantity as concerns foreign policy.

Rogers: Yes. But the basic principles of US foreign policy must continue . . .

Escovar: Whatever the government?

Rogers: Absolutely.

[Secretary of State enters].

The Secretary: Some McCarthyites are after Shlaudeman. [Turning to Rogers.] Could you draft a message to Sparkman for me? The Department is paralyzed. [Turning to Escovar] Are any Latin Americans opposed to Shlaudeman?

Escovar: No.

The Secretary: The delay is an insult to Venezuela.

Escovar: We thought Shlaudeman was a very good Ambassador.

The Secretary: Let us go in to breakfast.

Ramon, it is a great pleasure to see you again. I must say that my February trip could not have begun any better than with my visit to Venezuela.

Escovar: Yes.

The Secretary: Your President is coming to visit us in October?

Escovar: I think he is planning to come after the election, precisely because he would not want to . . .

The Secretary: I understand.

Escovar: He could go the United States immediately afterwards.

The Secretary: Fine. We should pick a date sometime in November. Then it could hold, even if there is a change in Administration.

Or, would President Perez want to wait until February?

Escovar: He would be ready to come in December or any other date would be convenient.

The Secretary [To Rogers]: What do you think?

Rogers: November should be ok.

The Secretary: It would be good if the new President had a chance to talk to Perez while thinking over his approach to the Administration. I think November or December would be all right.

Escovar: I told President Perez last night of your greetings. He asked me to transmit his greetings to you in return.

The Secretary: What do you think about this General Assembly? Do you think the speech on human rights will do any good?

Escovar: I am not very optimistic. Not much will come of it. Nonetheless, I liked your statement. I told the press it was very positive.

The Secretary: That’s good. We could use that in our press. Do you mind?

Escovar: On the contrary, I have no doubts whatsoever in saying your contribution to good understanding with Latin America has been extremely important.

The Secretary: Thank you.

Escovar: You are greatly esteemed in the hemisphere.

The Secretary: I have a great deal of affection for Latin America. That helps.

Escovar: Even at the time of your speech in Brazil, President Perez made a declaration very different from many of the speculations that were carried in the press.

The Secretary: I appreciate that. I don’t think we ever consult with the Brazilians on matters that we do not take up with Venezuela as well.

Escovar: We thought it entirely logical. Brazil is important. It can contribute to stability.

The same is true of Argentina. But Argentina is in a very poor situation, and is consumed with internal problems.

The Secretary: Yes. Their situation is extremely difficult.

Escovar: The new Argentine Foreign Minister seems good. The military have good intentions. But they must graduate from the barracks, control repression, and establish order without Chileanizing their society.

The Secretary: Do you think Chile is improving on the human rights issue?

Escovar: Very little. I spoke an hour with Pinochet. It was a difficult conversation. I brought up the question of political prisoners and pointed out that if conditions were as stable as the Chileans themselves claimed, they did not need political prisoners.

Venezuela undertook action in behalf of Corvalan in particular because Podgorny wrote directly to President Perez asking for help.

The Secretary: He is asking everyone. He has written to us, too.

Escovar: The problem with the Chilean military is that they have no political sense.

The Secretary: They have never been in politics before.

Escovar: The Argentines have more experience. There have been many coups there.

The Secretary: Even so, I wish they wouldn’t try Mrs. Peron. She was not qualified to be President. Her presidency was a joke by her husband. Will they really try her, do you think?

Rogers: She was in with a bad bunch.

The Secretary: Can’t they just throw her out? Wasn’t she illiterate?

Escovar: [Nods agreement.]

The Secretary: Did she enjoy being President?

Escovar: Yes. I have the impression she did.

We in Venezuela are very interested in Argentine stability for the sake of continental peace.

The Secretary: Really? I had not thought Argentina was that decisive.

Escovar: Yes. Argentina is essential to North-South equilibrium in the continent.

Pinochet should be pressured to understand politics more. Pinochet is not vulgar, but he is hard. He has no political savvy. That is the problem.

The Secretary: I talked with him. First in a group, then alone. I said some things I did not say in front of others. He always says he is doing what we are asking.

Escovar: The prisoners are the key.

The Secretary: He says he only has 400.

Escovar: Maybe. But whatever the number, it is damaging.

We are going to ask Castro also for political prisoners. We could use a better example from Pinochet to bring pressure on the Cubans.

Our relations with Castro are deteriorating.

The Secretary: On whose side: his or yours?

Escovar: Ours. There is the matter of Angola. And then there have been tensions over the Embassy.

The Secretary: Your Embassy in Havana?

Escovar: Yes. Conditions there are bad. We asked for the release of Venezuelan prisoners now being held in Cuba. Men who participated in the Bay of Pigs.

The Secretary: Castro is cynical about prisoners. He has used them as pawns in dealing with McGovern and Kennedy.

Escovar: We should campaign on human rights. Seen broadly, Chile could be used to put pressure on the Communists.

The Secretary: I agree, but we don’t want to overthrow the Chilean government either. We want to increase freedom, not bring about greater repression.

Escovar: True, but if the US were to pressure Chile, it could get results.

The Secretary: Did they understand my speech?

Escovar: Not fully.

The Secretary: I could not discuss these issues in front of everyone in detail. I think personal pressure works best.

Escovar: I told Pinochet that we liked you as Secretary of State precisely because of that. You are intelligent. And you understand how things can be done.

The Secretary: I told Pinochet we could not maintain support if he did not make progress. That is a fact of life.

Escovar: Good.

I am not optimistic about Latin America.

The Secretary: No?

Escovar: No. The pressures are building up. Even in Peru the situation is bad. And then [we] have people like the Paraguayans.

The Secretary: You missed the Paraguayan. He went on for 45 minutes.

Escovar: Yes.

The Secretary: What you say is true. But what can we do?

Escovar: The United States should pressure these governments to seek a greater measure of legitimacy.

The Secretary: Even Peru?

Escovar: Yes. I was there after your visit. Morales is a serious man and has a great deal of good will.

The Secretary: I agree.

Escovar: Furthermore, the Prime Minister, who is generally thought to be a leftist, is really more of a puritan type.

The Secretary: That can be dangerous in politics.

Escovar: Yes. The military often need lessons in politics. The politicians in Peru need a lesson, too. APRA represents another type of innocence, which is also dangerous.

The Secretary: Can we influence Peru?

Escovar: Yes, I think you can. And Ecuador is considering a new constitution.

The Secretary: But are we influential in that?

Escovar: No. But in any case, if the United States pressures for democracy in ways appropriate to the country in question, it can have a great influence. For example, there is, of course, no alternative to Somoza in Nicaragua. But there are other cases where something could be done. I asked Torrijos, for example, why he hadn’t founded a political party.

The Secretary: Torrijos has been very sound. I am very impressed with him. He has been provoked many times and has handled it well.

Escovar: He has intuition.

It would be useful if there were a clearer US position in favor of democracy. There has just been a meeting of European Social Democrats, including Brandt, Kriesky and others.

The Secretary: I know. They are all friends of mine.

Escovar: The European Social Democrats are closer to Latin America than other outside political groups.

The Secretary: Can we use my statement yesterday as a general statement in support of democracy in the hemisphere?

Escovar: Yes. It can be used. The bicentennial also affirms the democratic convictions of the United States and provides a similar opportunity. Yesterday, President Perez signed a decree making July 4 a national holiday in Venezuela.

The Secretary: What a charming gesture. That is very nice.

Escovar: We are worried that the United States position toward Latin America might harden.

The Secretary: Are you referring to Cuba, or to Latin America as a whole?

Escovar: As has happened in the past, we believe there is a great tendency in the United States to value authoritarianism to fight communism. Our own experience in Venezuela is the opposite.

The Secretary: I agree completely. The best defense against communism is democracy. Institutional processes are vital.

Escovar: Latin America lived a great trauma with Foster Dulles. The fear of reversal is always present.

The Secretary: As a practical matter, if the Democrats win in November, there is always the possibility of over-activity. This happened before with the Alliance for Progress. But it would be done with great good will, not in the Dulles style. It might even go too far in the direction you want.

I believe democracy should not be visibly the result of US pressures. Do you agree?

Escovar: [Nods agreement]

The Secretary: We have to permit evolution to occur naturally.

As for the Republicans, if I stay, you know my views. If Connally comes in, you might get a Dulles type of policy again. But to be frank, if the Republicans win, it will be up to me whether I stay or not.

In any case, whoever wins, the major lines of foreign policy are set. I have tried to use this year to give to the American people a sense of success, and thereby to forestall tendencies toward isolationism.

In this regard, what happened in Nairobi was most unfortunate. The way in which the IRB was voted down was not helpful in our public opinion.

I understand Venezuela abstained on the IRB.

Escovar: Yes.

The Secretary: The detail doesn’t matter. We can keep the lesson of Nairobi in mind here and consider the IRB within the OAS framework.

On the broader forces at work in the United States, there are two tendencies. One is extreme anti-communism, the other liberal isolationism. I believe we must participate in the development process, otherwise the international system will become prey to confrontation. You understand that, too. That is why I have always thought you were establishing credentials for a constructive dialogue. And now is the time to begin.

After the election, I am optimistic of progress. The strategy I have to follow now is to state objectives. I cannot carry them out. But we can get momentum going. Last year, the very mention of commodity problems caused explosions in the United States. This year we are even talking about common funds. Little by little we can make progress. I believe Perez Guerrero understands this.

Escovar: Yes.

The Secretary: Today I will make some specific proposals. They will not be contentious. But they will set the stage. Then, after the elections, when the visit of your President takes place (and by the way, I think it should be late November, or better yet, early December: before then people will still be too tired from the campaign) it will be useful to sit down with the new President and go over all of these things.

Incidentally, Carter won big in Ohio, which means he’s in as the Democratic nominee.

Escovar: In relation to Nairobi, I spoke to Perez Guerrero. He told me of the premature vote. The Bank should be looked at later, more calmly.

The Secretary: What we should have done would have been to get Perez Guerrero’s advice. If we could have avoided a vote, we could have presented it as a success to our people. We could have maintained momentum. Now, everyone is debating what went wrong. Our representatives were economic technicians, not political types. At 33 to 31, the vote was so close we should not have let it go against us.

Escovar: Perez Guerrero told me that Robinson was very positive.

Now, if you will permit, I know you have much work, but there are a few bilateral problems that I would like to take up.

First, there is the Owens-Illinois kidnap and expropriation case. Recently there has been some very harsh correspondence from the State Department. We know there is disagreement over the expropriation. We think the company is being a bit harsh. When Shlaudeman was here the situation was more positive. I hope to have a chance to discuss this soon with Ambassador Vaky.

The Secretary: If you want to hear about democratic institutions, you will [hear] a great deal about them from Vaky. Seriously though, Shlaudeman was our best man for Latin America. Without exception. I am sorry we had to move him from Venezuela.

On Owens-Illinois, I agree with your government on the substance of the kidnap issue. Never negotiate with terrorists.

On using expropriation as punishment, however, there we have our differences. If individuals behave contrary to your laws, they should be prosecuted as individuals.

Escovar: I understand your position. But President Perez was annoyed with the tone of the recent communication from the State Department.

The Secretary: Who signed it?

Escovar: President Perez thought it amounted to intervention in the internal affairs of Venezuela.

The Secretary: I don’t know the details. Rogers evidently does not either. When was it sent?

Escovar: Four days after Shlaudeman left. It is important that President Perez not lose confidence . . .

The Secretary: He should ingore the note. (To Rogers) Look at it. If it is offensive, have it withdrawn.

Escovar: It is not offensive. The President is very sensitive. In part this was a semantic problem. I will explain it to him. But I wanted to tell you. Because I received a letter from you via Maillard on bilateral matters dealing with transfer of technology, agriculture and so forth that proves your constructive position.

We want an intelligent appropriation, not confrontation. We know all about verbal radicalism. We are superdeveloped in rhetoric. But our policies do not always correspond.

The Secretary: I understand. When President Perez takes radical positions, but cooperates with us on specifics, it increases his legitimacy. We have no problems of principle with this. So long as you do not organize against us we have no objection. We certainly have no objection to SELA for example.

Escovar: Turning to another matter, I have recently traveled in the Caribbean. Some governments there are serious, some are not. The Grenada Prime Minister is not very trustworthy. The British warned us that some of the pay provided for civil servants went to his private account in Switzerland. When I saw him I thought he was looking for a deal. Nonetheless, others are more serious.

The Secretary: Trinidad?

Escovar: The Prime Minister is not in love with Venezuela. But he is respectable. And then there is Jamaica.

The Secretary: Manley seems to reserve all his love for himself and none for Jamaica.

Escovar: Thompson is brilliant. But the government is close to Cuba. Perez wants to talk to Manley.

The Jamaicans are to the left of Fidel. The Caribbean will be a turbulent area in the years ahead.

The Secretary: Will Castro try to organize the Black Caribbean into a bloc?

Escovar: Yes, and with his African adventures and symbolism behind him he may have some success. We are worried.

The Secretary: I take it you are talking about a different form of subversion than that undertaken by Guevara.

Escovar: Yes. They are exploiting ideology and racial affinities. To counteract the Cubans, we are seeking to improve our own relations with Africa. Senghor will come to Venezuela in January.

The Secretary: He is one of the most brilliant leaders in Africa. We want to invite him also. Perhaps he can visit the United States as well.

Escovar: We also want to establish contact with Houphuet-Boigny from the Ivory Coast, Nyerere and others. The model of Guyana and Jamaica is Tanzania. We in Latin America must pay attention to this phenomenon, for the young in the Black Caribbean are looking naturally to Africa.

The Secretary: I like Nyerere very much personally. But when I was in Tanzania I found quite a depressing situation. I remember an extraordinary scene of goose-stepping soldiers, no straight lines, no shoes tied and about of the soldiers losing their shoes while marching.

We should certainly exchange ideas on dealing with Africa. Venezuela has advantages in dealing with Africa that we do not.

Escovar: The real advantage on the Latin American side is to be found in Venezuela and Brazil which are mulatto countries. Chile and Argentina are European. Peru and Colombia are Indian.

We want to maintain an active international position. Our role is facilitated by maintaining relations with communist countries. I was attacked in Venezuela for coming to Chile. But I have been to Moscow as well and so could not be criticized effectively.

The Secretary: We welcome your international role. We should exchange views more on Africa. I should write President Perez about my African contacts. Through you, perhaps, we can get a dialogue going.

Escovar: That is a good idea. I followed your trip in the newspapers.

The Secretary: Yes, in Liberia I was made a principal chief, which means I am eligible to have 100 women at my disposal . . .

Please send my warm regards to President Perez. And remember that, personally, are always welcome in Washington.

1. Summary: Kissinger and Escovar discussed inter-American relations, the Niehous kidnapping, international economic affairs, and African politics.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820118–1601. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Einaudi on January 14, 1977. Kissinger and Escovar were in Santiago for a meeting of the OASGA. The text of Kissinger’s June 8 speech in Santiago on human rights is in the Department of State Bulletin, July 5, 1976, pp. 1–5.