Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

352. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Ryan) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, June 18, 1976.

Uruguay: Current Political Situation

The dispute between President Bordaberry and the Uruguayan military over the future political process in Uruguay was resolved June 12 by Bordaberry’s removal from office. Vice President and President of the Council of State, Alberto Demicheli, has been sworn in as interim President. He has announced he will serve only two or three months until a newly-formed Council of the Nation—composed of senior military officers, cabinet ministers, and selected civilian leaders—chooses a new chief executive.

Military Restricting Government

The armed forces are moving quickly to restructure the government. The military has already given signals, mainly through “institutional acts” and announcements, that it foresees an eight to ten year time frame for restructuring Uruguay’s political system. We expect them to announce soon that no elections will be held this November, that the political rights of certain individuals will be proscribed, that political parties and labor unions will be allowed gradual participation in the political process, and that guidelines for a new constitution will be written and ratified by plebiscite. The reorganization of the political system is an ambitious undertaking, particularly for military leaders who do not always work well together. Disagreements within military circles could undermine their ability to implement a new political system and create new political crises.

Domestic Reaction

Most Uruguayans over the past few years have given high priority to economic growth and domestic tranquility. While Bordaberry’s ouster was peaceful, and the military’s plans for a new political structure produced no immediate opposition, it remains to be seen if the general population will gracefully accept attempts by the military to institutionalize their role in politics through a new constitution or structure that could leave the civilians with only a figurehead role.

The new President reiterated that this transitional phase will not bring any change in the government’s foreign, economic or social policies. There is not expected to be any change in personnel in the government’s key policy-making bodies. Foreign Minister Blanco and Minister of Finance Vegh Villegas are the most influential civilians; Blanco presently has the best chance of replacing Demicheli.

U.S. Interests

U.S. interests are not threatened by the new Uruguayan Government. An early government statement refers to the fact that the replacement of people does not imply changes in the international, political, economic and social directions followed by the government. Blanco is pro-U.S., as is Vegh. Consequently, Uruguay’s constructive support for U.S. positions in hemisphere and world forums should continue.

Our friendly relations with Uruguay, however, will become strained should U.S. legislative sanctions, like the Koch amendment, be taken against Uruguay for its human rights performance. Military hardliners would gain the upper hand and make it difficult for the moderate civilians and military leaders to improve Uruguay’s human rights performance.

1. Summary: Ryan summarized the removal of Bordaberry, the actions of the military regarding Uruguayan Government institutions, and the reaction of the Uruguayan populace, concluding that U.S. interests in Uruguay were not threatened by these changes. He argued that the passage of the Koch amendment could harm U.S. relations with Uruguay by giving “the upper hand” to “military hardliners.”

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760097–2115. Confidential. Drafted on June 17 by Brazeal. A handwritten notation on the first page of the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw the memo.