341. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Uruguayan Foreign Minister’s Bilateral Meeting with the Secretary
PARTICIPANTS
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Uruguayans
- Foreign Minister Juan Carlos Blanco
- Ambassador José Perez Caldas
- Ambassador (OAS) Mateo Marquez Sere
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U.S.
- The Secretary
- Assistant Secretary (ARA) William D. Rogers
- Ambassador (USOAS) William S. Mailliard
- Ambassador Ernest V. Siracusa
- Country Director (ARA–LA/APU) Carl E. Bartch
The Secretary: How many Uruguayans are here?
Minister Blanco: Three.
Ambassador Siracusa: I am half Uruguayan.
The Secretary: Ambassador Siracusa is an outstanding officer. He first came to my attention because of the excellent reports he did when he was in Bolivia. I wasn’t in the Department at that time.
Minister Blanco: He and I have an excellent understanding.
The Secretary: Mr. Minister, you may sometimes think that we spend more time with those who disagree with us than with those who agree with us. And you you would be right. I very much appreciate the strong position you have taken at the OASGA. It has been very valuable. Would you like tea or coffee?
Minister Blanco: Coffee, please.
[Page 917]The Secretary (to an aide): Coffee for everyone except me. Everyone will drink coffee. That is one of the few things I can act decisively on in this Department. Our biggest problem in this country is the role of the legislature. I think Congress is totally overplaying its hand, and there will be a backlash if this goes on much longer, because I don’t think the U.S. public wants to see the Executive Branch totally paralyzed in its conduct of foreign policy. Congress also has internal problems and is not able to act effectively. Cutting off aid to Turkey must be one of the most insane moves ever made. Here is a country that is doing nothing to us, that is situated between the Soviet Union and the Middle East. Why should the U.S. public care where the dividing line is established in Cyprus? That is what it is about, you know. This whole move was pushed through by Greek restaurant owners. The President and I called in Congressional leaders last October. We were obeying the law, but we didn’t announce it. But the Congressional leadership has lost control over the House. When Bill (Ambassador Mailliard) was there, even three years ago, the leadership could control the Congress. Today it’s a waste of time for me to spend an hour with the Speaker of the House. He can’t control anything. Who ever heard of the Greeks (except as a people, of course)? Bill, what’s happened on the Chilean determination?
Assistant Secretary Rogers: You have a memorandum on that.
The Secretary: Every day I find there is a law that I never heard of before. Secretary Rogers is an outstanding man, but he is a lawyer, and when he sees a law, he applies it immediately. Every day I am stopped from doing something because of laws I never knew existed. Usually if you throw something into the State Department, it takes three weeks to come out again, but if there is a law involved, it is acted upon immediately.
Minister Blanco: I read your Houston speech with great interest, Mr. Secretary, and I was particularly interested in your statement that in six months you had appeared before Congressional committees 37 times.
The Secretary: I have had another study done since then. In 16 months, I have met 116 times with Congressional groups including meetings with the Congressional leadership on human rights, Jewish questions, etc.
Minister Blanco: The role and organization of the legislature also concerns my country, Mr. Secretary, and Latin America generally. The legislatures were established in the old days, but now they have to deal with so many modern, complex problems they can’t understand.
The Secretary: Another problem is that they can’t act in any consecutive fashion. We’re stuck with one law, the action on Turkey for example, and they have gone on to something else. They have no [Page 918] span of attention, no continuity. They can only pass laws; they can’t conduct policy.
Minister Blanco: Yes, and they lack the information required to make intelligent decisions.
The Secretary: I was invited to meet with some Senators, and there were four or five presidential candidates present.
Ambassador Mailliard: At least.
The Secretary: There is nothing in the Constitution that says the Senate has the right to give its advice and consent on policy. That only applies to presidential nominations and treaties. But I didn’t argue the point, so I went. But they didn’t have any ideas; they didn’t know what should be done, and they were scared, because they knew that if an unpopular decision were made, the Jewish community would stick them. So they were going to leave that up to us. At the end, Senator Mansfield said what a wonderful meeting it had been, and that I must come back and see them again when our Middle East policy review has been completed. I could go there every two weeks, and it wouldn’t help. That is a pity, because our system of separation of powers used to work beautifully. The previous leaders could control things.
Ambassador Mailliard: Yes, they used to know what they were doing, and what needed to be done.
The Secretary: There used to be three or four strong men in the Congress, and they could make decisions.
Ambassador Mailliard: If Morgan and I agreed, there was never any question in the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
The Secretary: I was at a meeting chaired by one of the oldest and most respected members of the Congress, Rep. Mahon, and after I gave my presentation he congratulated me, but when it came time to vote, he voted against the position I took. I asked him about it later, and he said he agreed with me, but as Chairman of the Committee he had to think about getting reelected two years from now. As long as that is true, you have to rely on seniority.
Minister Blanco: But many complain about the weaknesses of the seniority system.
The Secretary: The Senate can wreck things, but it can’t do anything constructive because there is never any consensus. The House is even worse. It is a rabble, with more than 400 members, and even the leaders don’t know what to do.
Ambassador Mailliard: It is a bad situation, but it may straighten itself out.
The Secretary: It is so bad it is bound to change. The Congress has no public support. The latest poll I saw indicated that only 20 per cent [Page 919] of those interviewed thought Congressmen were doing a good job. Even at the height of Watergate, they ranked lower than Nixon, and it is worse today. If I look on this as a historian, I wouldn’t bet that the democratic process would survive another 20 years, at least not in Western Europe. Maybe that doesn’t apply here.
Minister Blanco: Yes, look at Italy. What we are trying to do at home is to build a new framework, to strengthen the democratic system.
The Secretary: There is no democratic framework in Italy. The bigger parties cancel each other out, so that a little party with two per cent of the vote can wreck everything.
Minister Blanco: We must meet the challenge in Western Europe and Latin America to build a strong and effective democratic system, and to make it work. It is now almost impossible to do this, and the problem is worse for a small, underdeveloped country, where an impasse between the executive and legislative branches stops the whole country.
The Secretary: The major problem is that the legislature can’t understand the problems it has to deal with.
Minister Blanco: We are trying to undertake reforms, including amendments to the Constitution, to strengthen the democratic process. I met recently with several Senators, including Senators Jackson and Javits.
The Secretary: What did they want, free emigration of Jews from Uruguay?
Minister Blanco: I know that the Senate committees have big staffs, and the House has a big staff.
The Secretary: Most of the staff is composed of disgruntled former employees of the Executive Branch, including several ex-Foreign Service Officers. They go there to pursue their vendettas. Who else would want to work there? (To Assistant Secretary Rogers) You have several people from ARA over there.
Assistant Secretary Rogers: I don’t think so.
The Secretary: Three of the Church Committee staffers are former State Department employees.
Minister Blanco: We need completely new reforms. We are trying to develop our own solutions to the political crisis facing Western civilization. The second most important thing is that we must solve the problem of subversion and terrorism. Many may have thought when this first started that this only happened in countries with military governments, or as the result of tyranny, or because of social injustices. But now we have it in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, Central America, Mexico, and even Western Europe.
The Secretary: And we’ll have it here sooner or later.
[Page 920]Minister Blanco: In Western Europe, it can be stopped without altering the life of the country. But in our own country, it destroyed our small defenses, and we have had to fight for our life. We do not ask others to do it for us; we will do it ourselves, and we will continue to do it. But these subversive movements are all inter-connected. We can fight them in our country, but it is difficult when they get assistance from abroad. We had all the evidence we needed about the assistance the Tupamaros receive from abroad, and their connection with Havana, and we could have reported on this at the Quito meeting. But we didn’t want to embarrass the Argentine Foreign Minister.
The Secretary: Let me give you our view on Cuba. We have no illusions about Cuba. We attach no importance to Cuba from a national point of view. The Cubans can’t do anything for us, or to us, unless they establish a Soviet base there.
Minister Blanco: Which is not likely.
The Secretary: No. But something must be done to strengthen the inter-American system. We are not going to lift our blockade in the near future, certainly not before the next presidential election. Bill Rogers’ candidate will keep agitating on this, however. He has a great capacity for picking the wrong issues.
Assistant Secretary Rogers: The Secretary means Senator McGovern. The Senator said that Castro had told him how sorry he was that McGovern had lost the election.
The Secretary: Senator McGovern actually said that?
Assistant Secretary Rogers: Yes.
The Secretary: He’ll get even less than 38 per cent next time. Well, Mr. Minister, this is our attitude on Cuba, and we can understand it if you have difficulties with it. We may consider lifting sanctions, but we won’t lift the blockade even if the OAS removes its sanctions. What the Cubans want from us is trade, you know. So we may negotiate with Cuba about lifting the blockade, if we can get something in return. But I don’t see it. Have you discussed our formula with Minister Blanco?
Ambassador Mailliard: I have.
Minister Blanco: All of these formulas are based on the assumption that we must lift the sanctions imposed on Cuba. But we think that Cuba must make changes in its foreign policy before the sanctions are lifted, not after. Mr. Secretary, in your foreign policy speech in Houston, you listed several changes Cuba must make, but we think these conditions should be fulfilled before we remove the sanctions. We are too weak to achieve this bilaterally, and we think the only way to do this is as a prerequisite to lifting sanctions. That is why we put such great emphasis on multilateral action.
The Secretary: If we enter into bilateral relations with Cuba, that is one of the things we’ll require—not that the Cubans stop their subver[Page 921]sion in the United States, because they don’t have the capability—but that they stop their subversion in Latin America. We have no compulsion to establish relations with Cuba, but if more countries do this on their own, it weakens the inter-American system. We are now thinking of a formula to give each state freedom of action. If you vote against this, it won’t affect our relationship, and we will not be pushing for affirmative votes.
Minister Blanco: Mr. Secretary, I want you to understand our position.
The Secretary: Intellectually, you’re right.
Minister Blanco: We think it extremely important to show how subversion works. If the decision is taken to lift sanctions, that would weaken our moral strength. We are trying to show that subversion has foreign support. We’d lose our moral and political strength if the sanctions are lifted. We are convinced that the cause we are fighting for is a good cause.
The Secretary: We should discuss some time how the left-wing and the intellectuals are demoralizing public opinion on every issue. In Europe, 90 per cent of television is controlled by extreme leftists and intellectuals and they are preventing the public from receiving a fair perception of events and of reality. I saw a survey of television programming in the Netherlands, Britain, Germany, and one other country, and it indicated that nothing favorable about the United States is being shown. The Viet Cong are depicted as heroes, the United States as an ogre, and U.S. farmers as being poor and oppressed. I don’t know where you’d find such farmers in the United States. Only eight per cent of our population are farmers, and they are not noticeably poor. Perhaps the Mexicans are. But the left-wing extremists are demoralizing public conceptions.
Minister Blanco: Yes, that is the point.
Assistant Secretary Rogers: Mr. Minister, the press is waiting downstairs.
The Secretary: I want to let you know, personally, Mr. Minister, how much I appreciate the strength and courage you have displayed at the OASGA.
Minister Blanco: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We will continue to pursue our present orientation as strongly as we can.
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Summary: Kissinger and Blanco discussed the role of the legislative branch, subversive movements, and Cuba.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820125–0458. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Bartch; approved by Covey on October 29. Distributed in S/S and to Peter Rodman at the White House. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s Office. Blanco was in the United States for the OAS General Assembly. Telegram 110984 to Montevideo, May 13, gave a shortened account of the meeting that focused on Blanco’s statements about the problems of Uruguay and the portion of the conversation regarding Cuba. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850083–2585) A May 9 Briefing Memorandum and background papers for the meeting are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820145–0375. The text of Kissinger’s March 1 speech, “The United States and Latin America: The New Oppurtunity,” presented to the Combined Service Club in Houston, is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, March 24, 1975, pp. 361–369.
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