Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

337. Telegram 2164 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State¹

Montevideo, July 13, 1973, 1917Z.

2164. Subject: Defense Minister’s Views on Current Situation. Ref: Montevideo 2148.

1. On July 11, Minister of Defense Walter Ravenna asked me to come in to discuss a hospital supplies problem in which he is personally interested (see septels). Ravenna, who is one of leading civilian figures of the GOU, took the occasion for a lucid exposition of the Bordaberry Administration’s goals and tactics. He spoke with great conviction. Highlights of the conversation follow:

2. DefMin said it was very important for the U.S. to understand precisely what was going on in Uruguay and what issues were at stake. He said there currently existed a “state of war over the future of Uruguay’s economic development”. At issue was whether or not Uruguay would be able to develop economically, socially and politically or would be condemned to continued stagnation and ultimate ruin. He said Uruguay’s situation was not like Vietnam although the “war” was against Marxist subversion. As a long-time friend of the US, he sincerely believed that the outcome was of significance to the US interests in the Southern Cone of South America. Uruguay would remain an outpost of democracy which, in view of the situation in Chile and Argentina, was a factor of importance. Speaking with feeling, Ravenna said that President Bordaberry, with the full support of the armed forces, was determined to uproot the Marxist infiltration of Uruguayan society which had done such enormous damage to the country. There was no turning back possible; there would be no mediation or negotiation. A set of priority goals had been established, starting with labor, and eventually to encompass the educational sector. These goals would be achieved at a controlled pace and President Bordaberry sets the pace. The President was personally committed to this great national struggle and knew he had the support of the vast majority of Uruguayans.

3. Ravenna said strike reports and accounts of disturbances were greatly exaggerated. The interior was practically 100 percent normal and fully supported the government’s actions. In Montevideo the center of Marxists penetration the government’s tactics were slowly but surely breaking the power of the extreme leftist labor leaders and there was no doubt that the government would prevail. Ravenna said it was important to bear in mind that many of the Marxist leaders were Maoists and further to the left than communists.

4. The principal goal of the difficult task undertaken by the military was to create in Uruguay a climate in which capital could be formed and investments made, jobs created and opportunities opened up. Foreign investment would be welcomed under set rules. Drastic measures were required if this goal is to be achieved.

5. Ravenna said US comprehension of the stakes in play and the goals to be achieved was very important and he was sure the Embassy was so advising the USG.

6. I asked Dr. Ravenna where the actions against the opposition Blanco party fit into the description of the situation he had just given me. He replied that the Blancos were badly split, that one faction had gone so far as to form an alliance with the “Frente Amplio” but that a majority of the Blanco Party members who could not stomach such an alliance were joining the Etchegoyan faction which was supporting President Bordaberry. He said the democratic sensibilities of many Uruguayans were affected by drastic measures that had had to be taken but that there had been a general rallying to the government.

7. Comment: Ravenna is one of the best friends the US has in Uruguay. He is a straight-talking, sincere man who has a distinguished record of public service. I would like to believe that he has considerable influence in the councils of government, particularly on the military. His balanced views, sophistication and good judgment are important qualities at this time. I report his views as I consider them to be a good statement of the administration’s goals and actions as he conceives them to be.

Ortiz

1. Summary: Ortiz reported on his conversation with Defense Minister Ravenna, who explained the Bordaberry administration’s economic and social goals and its reasons for the suppression of opposition parties.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Confidential. Repeated for information to Brasilia, Buenos Aires, La Paz, and Southcom.