Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

334. Telegram 1176 From the Embassy in Uruguay to the Department of State¹

Montevideo, April 18, 1973, 1940Z.

1176. Subj: Uruguay Two Months After the Crisis. Ref: Montevideo’s A–27 of March 3, 1973.

1. Summary: After two turbulent months, a period of relative political calm has been reached, accompanied by some public optimism that long-standing problems will at last be attacked. The military’s leadership has consolidated its central role in the Bordaberry administration and retains the initiative. However, the current political balance is very fragile and pressure by the military for reform, action and change could at any moment provoke a renewal of last February’s serious civilian-military problems. End summary.

2. The traditional suspension of all activities during Holy Week (tourist week in secular Uruguay) also marks the two-month point since the severe civilian-military confrontation of early February. The political situation here remains fluid. However, some conclusions can now be reached about the “soft golpe” of early February and the changes it has already produced. There follows an assessment of the various factors influencing the current political scene and their probable implications.

3. The military—Uruguay’s military leadership has emerged from the conflicts and uncertainties of the past two months with its determination to press forward with reform and its self-confidence largely unshaken. The military’s chosen instrument for action—The National Security Council (COSENA)—has weathered its initial “shakedown”. The military chiefs appear satisfied with its operation. Although some complain of the long hours which COSENA meetings take from their daily schedules, no major challenges have been mounted to the military’s insistence on a central role in governmental affairs. President Bordaberry has not sought to assert himself in a manner contrary to military wishes. The armed forces leadership now admit that their communiqué of March 23 attacking alleged misuse of privileges on the part of congressmen boomeranged badly against them. However, they consider this a tactical error of no larger consequence, except as a lesson that they are not invulnerable to criticism. They attribute the relative quiet of the political left as an unwillingness to confront them on issues of major importance. Two months’ day-to-day involvement in the governing of the nation has also reduced the aggressive and somewhat bombastic tunes of the military’s earlier public statements. Its leadership now appears more reserved, aware of the complexities of the problems they face and somewhat more wary of such hasty actions as their March 23 communiqué which leave them open to counterattack and criticism.

4. The play of forces within the ranks of the armed forces’ leadership remains a subject of endless speculation by those outside the military’s core group. It is generally agreed that such generals as Cristi, the two Zubias, Vadora and Army CINC Chiappe Posse represent the conservative, traditional wing of military thinking, which holds that it is preferable for armed forces to guide, but not itself direct, the GOU. On the other hand, Army General Gregorio Alvarez and Col Ramon Trabal of the Defense Intelligence Service apparently believe that the accomplishment of the goals of the military will require the creation of active support by the masses. They favor more “populist” policies and would see the armed forces more directly involved in governing. Conflicts between these two points of view have undoubtedly occurred—General Alvarez implied as much to the chargé in a recent conversation (being reported separately). As an example, there was a clear difference of opinion between the two groups on their approach to the communist-dominated CNT Labor Federation. Following several meetings between Armed Forces Chiefs and CNT Leaders, a military communiqué was issued which termed the Armed Forces efforts toward National Development and the activities of the CNT to be “irreconcilable”. This indicated that conservative military elements had succeeded in imposing their views upon those who favored a softer, more conciliatory approach. Likewise, Col Trabal’s recent request for a tribunal of honor because of press stories about his over-liberal “influence” was probably designed to seek the “seal of approval” from more conservative military leaders on his conduct since last February. For the moment, however, these differences appear to be more of style and tactics than of substance. Whatever their internal disagreements, the military’s leadership continues to march under one banner. These differences are thus far of less importance to them now than the overriding need to preserve military unity and a common action front. A very significant but largely unknown factor is the position of Junior Military Officers. As of now, we believe they are content with developments.

5. The President—President Bordaberry, whose private attitudes during the past two months have alternated between deep pessimism and bright hope, is presently in an “up” mood according to sources close to him. Not a problem-solver himself, he appears increasingly content to rely on the COSENA mechanism to deal with his administration’s basic problems. As “Chairman of the Board”, he is closely consulted by the military leadership. They now speak of him with respect and deny that there was any intention to replace him during the February crisis. References to the President as the “jeep” (gree[?], square and driven by the military) have largely disappeared. The President is cautious in asserting his personal leadership, probably because he feels it is not needed in the present situation. His relative inactivity in this regard infuriates civilian politicians, particularly his continual delays in patronage matters such as appointments to the boards of autonomous state enterprises. However, the President, a political conservative himself, obviously feels at home with his military leaders and not too uncomfortable in his role as their Senior Advisor.

6. The five-year development plan—long term development programs in Uruguay are traditionally announced with great fanfare and promptly forgotten. The current plan recently announced by the Bordaberry Administration (MVD 1140) may prove to be no exception. It does, however, offer a sharp break in philosophy as compared to existng governmental economic management and therefore could provide some insight into thoughts of the current military-civilian co-government on the issue of long-term progress in this country. [less than 1 line not declassified] that Minister of Economy and Finances Cohen’s initial interventionist, state-dominated approach to development was ultimately not accepted as basis for the current plan. As originally drafted by the office of planning and budget, it posits a much freer economy in which market factors rather than state intervention would play a major role. This draft emerged largely unchanged in its final form, indicating that at least the military leadership had no basic problems with its philosophy. Though weak in its specific programs to implement this philosophy, the new development plan nevertheless gives grounds for some optimism that military leaders do not now intend to push for increased state inervention in the economy and its manipulation for short-term goals.

7. The traditional parties—political leaders for both the Colorado and Blanco parties remain somewhat defensive and highly uncertain about the implications for them of the military’s new central role. Most are hoping fervently that serious conflicts can be avoided which could affect the holding of elections in 1976. The Presidents “national accord” coalition is frayed at the edges, but most of its members see no alternative but to continue to support the administration. Blanco opposition leader Ferreira Aldunate has now apparently given up any serious hope of elections before 1976 and continues to seek to build his forces by across-the-board opposition to President Bordaberry and an open door to disaffected “frente” elements. One senior Colorado leader, lamenting what he termed the refusal of the President to assert strong civilian leadership, declared that the main role of the traditional parties now is to, “shore up the facade” (of constitutional government). In general, most of these leaders see the role of civilian politicians in the next few years as somewhat marginal “whipping boys”. Their main hope now rests with surviving the next three years until new elections which they believe can be a vehicle for reassertion of their position.

8. The left, the Marxist and non-Marxist left, as represented principally by the “Frente Amplio”, continues its cautious “open options” stance toward the military. Earlier optimism regarding possible openings which the military’s leadership would allow have been greatly dampened by the armed forces “irreconcilable” position with regard to its actions and those espoused by the “Frente”. Radical elements within the “Frente Amplio”, and in other groups such as the CNT and the Communist-dominated [garble] student federation, continue to press for more vigorous opposition to the armed forces. Thus far, however, “Frente” leaders have continued to stress the compatability of their goals with those of the military and to proclaim a common “anti-oligarchy” front with the armed forces.

9. The public—aside from those Uruguayans directly involved in one of the above groups, the public remains largely indifferent to and on the margin of current events. Recent opinion surveys indicate public support for military “guidance” of the government, but rejection of the notion of the military taking power itself. The public prestige of civilian politicians has never been lower while that of the armed forces continues high. Thus far, a majority of Uruguay’s population is much more concerned with problems of day-to-day living, rather than larger questions of military or civilian leadership. We do, however, detect some growing public optimism that some chronic problems may be improved.

10. Perspectives—the present relative tranquility on the Uruguayan political scene rests upon the fact that none of the major groups involved see it in their basic interst to disturb the balance. The military appears satisfied that it retains the upper hand; the President is content with this situation because it is basically in harmony with his own political conservatism and goals; leaders of the traditional parties see the current stability as offering the best hope for 1976 elections; and the left is anxious not to foreclose any opportunities to strengthen its own position however, given the military’s insistence on change and reform, the political situation will not be static but rather dynamic. It is doubtful that the spindly legs upon which the current balance of forces rests are elastic enough to survive a major confrontation between any of the main political forces. A round of serious labor disputes and strikes, refusal by the Congress to approve new law considered essential by the military, frustrations within military or with the bureaucracy in implementing the military’s program, all could provide the spark for a new and serious political crisis. Despite the military leaders’ hopes to guide rather than govern, the current political situation remains unstable. When new disequilibriums arise in the present balance of forces, the military may well be drawn further and further toward direct control of the government.

1. Summary: The Embassy reported that “a period of relative political calm” had been reached since the February crisis, and assessed the factors among the military, President Bordaberry, economic development plans, political parties, the left, and the public that might influence future events.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, POL 14 UR. Confidential. Repeated for information to Southcom and DIA. Airgram A–27 from Montevideo, March 3, reported that the rise to power of the military over a civilian political structure that had seemed stable could be attributed to a number of factors, including longstanding Uruguayan economic troubles, the relative prestige of the military versus the government bureaucracy and politicians, Bordaberry’s lack of institutional support from a political party, and Bordaberry’s poor management of the crisis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, POL 15 UR) In telegram 1199 from Montevideo, April 24, Ortiz reported on his April 20 meeting with Foreign Minister Blanco. Blanco asserted that Bordaberry had power over the military, which he described as anti-communist, and that the new National Security Council (COSENA) would be a useful tool to curb corruption. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])