328. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Army and Air Force Insurrection in Uruguay
Current Situation:
President Bordaberry has sought and obtained the resignation of Defense Minister Malet and replaced him with 73-year old retired Army general Francese who served as Minister of Defense during the late 1960s. Partly due to this act and other complications, including recent criticism of the Armed Forces by a Uruguayan Senator, a conflict has developed between the Army of Uruguay, led by General Cesar Martinez, probably supported by the Air Force, on the one hand, and President Bordaberry, supported by the Navy, on the other.
[Page 890]Martinez and the Commander of the Air Force, Brigadier Perez Caldas, have stated that they would not accept the orders of the new Minister of Defense and have called for his removal. The President has asked for their resignations and addressed the nation on radio-TV late February 8, calling for harmony and public support.
The Navy is supporting the constitutional government and has drawn up forces within part of downtown Montevideo, including the port area. The Army and Air Force have occupied most of the radio and TV stations in Montevideo, thus obtaining greater access to the public ear, and have blocked off part of the city where the main Army base in Montevideo is located. The Army has called on the Navy to join with it and the Air Force and to return to its traditional role in the water, reserving to the Army activities on land, but the Navy has declined. There is some indication that the Cabinet has resigned to free the President’s hand in the conflict.
This is the first time in recent history that the armed forces of Uruguay, which have been stimulated by their success against the Tupamaro urban guerillas to greater involvement, have become politically active. The principal players on the Army side do not seem to have a significant personal following. If they are removed from the scene, calm may be restored. Representatives of the President and the dissidents met late on February 9, and while there has been no physical conflict between the opposing groups thus far, we are seriously concerned about the likelihood of the overthrow of the Bordaberry Government, although time can be a coolant.
Our Role:
Our Embassy has been instructed to be careful to avoid being drawn into the conflict or to be used as an intermediary. We do not wish to get ourselves into a position where we even appear to be a party to the demise of Uruguay’s democratic constitutionalism should that take place. Our Embassy has been authorized to take the line with the Uruguayan Army leaders of all factions and others that we hope and urge that the conflict can be resolved within the framework of Uruguay’s great constitutional tradition and without bloodshed.
Probable Orientation of a Military Government:
Should a military takeover occur, we expect that a new government would probably be more conservative than the Bordaberry government. This general orientation is by no means a certainty, however, because the leaders of the activist military appear to have no definite politico-social orientation, other than a desire for more vigor in the address to Uruguay’s serious social and economic problems. In any [Page 891] event, the technical and administrative competence of the Uruguayan military is very much in doubt.
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Summary: Eliot summarized the dispute between President Bordaberry and the different branches of the military and reported that instructions had been given to the Embassy to remain neutral.
Source: Nixon Library, NSC-Latin America, Box 796, Folder 3. Confidential. In a memorandum to Scowcroft on the same date, Howe reported that there did not appear to be any “foreign involvement” in the dispute and that it “does not concern political orientation and factions but rather the degree of civilian versus military control in the government.” He noted that Uruguay “has one of the few democratic governments that have survived in Latin America” but that there appeared “to be no immediate policy implications for the US.” (Ibid.)
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