Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

322. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, September 10, 1976.

Soviet Planes for Peru

This memorandum attempts to clarify our broad options in light of the virtual certainty that Peru will acquire the SU–22. Because of Marcona and its side effects, the week ahead is critical.

The Peruvian Dynamic

The Peruvian Air Force is committed to the SU–22. The purchase will be virtually impossible to reverse:

—The Army supports the Air Force. It has already bought T–55 tanks and a host of lesser Soviet weapons as part of a three-service modernization plan.

—The Navy is unhappy at any Soviet connection, but cannot make a strong case against the purchase. It has just won against the domestic political left, and cannot convincingly argue that the US offers a reliable alternative for arms.

—President Morales Bermúdez is uneasy, but may not have the power to enforce a decision against predominant military opinion. The Air Force has been loyal. Recent internal troubles make its support more necessary than ever.

The GOP knows that the SU–22 purchase will unleash new tensions. But it calculates that criticism is less damaging than renewed military dissension—and that real politik confirms that bargains with neighbors are best made from strength.

The chief—indeed probably only—deterrent to final announcement of the purchase is the balance of payments loan Peru is currently concluding with foreign commercial banks. Ironically, however, the generous terms on which the SU–22 is being offered (particularly the moratorium and lack of down payment), makes it the only aircraft available to Peru whose acquisition is consistent with the short-term economic austerity measures the banks support. Most banks have thus apparently been satisfied by GOP assurances that any arms purchases will fall within the financial programs submitted to them.

Once Marcona is settled and the loan is secured, the GOP probably also calculates that the SU–22 purchase will demonstrate domestically that, appearances and press reports to the contrary, Peru has not mortgaged its independence to the foreign banks and the United States. In 1974, the purchase of Soviet tanks offset the Greene agreement in much the same way.

What Can We Do About It?

Peru has played its immediate cards well. So long as our conditions are met, we cannot renege on a Marcona settlement. And the lead American banks are now irrevocably committed to balance of payments financing for several months.

Our dilemma is increased by the fact that this is the best GOP in years—probably the best we are likely to get for some time. Except for the SU–22, all signs point to growing Peruvian realism and desire to accommodate our interests. In addition, Morales Bermudez’ survival is Peru’s best chance to recuperate from Velasco short of anarchy or outright dictatorship.

If a purchase is made and we do not react, however, the military rulers of Peru’s neighbors will be under irresistible pressure to upgrade their own military capabilities. Our inability to provide anything comparable to the SU–22—because we do not want to increase the likelihood of conflict, because Congress limits what we can do, and because we do not, in fact, have comparable weapons systems readily available to offer—would predictably erode our influence and perhaps ultimately invite new Soviet credit sales to other Latin American countries.

If, conversely, a purchase is made, and we react by cutting off bilateral assistance, we would appear to justify Peru’s behavior and lose our otherwise growing opportunities for influence. Similarly, to create a stink over a Soviet action we cannot stop or counter directly would only increase the insecurity of Peru’s neighbors.

Like inaction, therefore, obvious attempts to penalize Peru seem likely to be ineffective and possibly counterproductive. Either course risks conveying an impression of US impotence and driving Peru—and possibly some of its neighbors—closer to the Soviet Union, and perhaps to conflict as well.

Our first objective should, therefore, be to try to prevent the purchase—now, before it is irrevocably made. Given our limited specific leverage, and the fact that some papers have actually been signed (the Chileans have even just told us that they have reliable intelligence that a purchase of 18—not 36—SU–22s is now final), we cannot be very sanguine at prospects of success. But we must try.

Even if the SU–22 purchase is too far along to stop, however, it may not be too late to minimize its military, psychological and political impact. The Soviet Union probably hopes to provoke us into measures that will have the opposite effect. We should not take the bait.

Two objectives are central in this regard. The first is to prevent Peru’s military build-up from leading—however inadvertently—to armed conflict with Chile or its other neighbors. The second is to limit the Soviet Union’s opportunity to turn the SU–22 sale to geopolitical advantage. These more limited objectives depend fundamentally on our ability to enlist the cooperation of both Peru and Chile.

The implications for Carl Maw’s visit to Lima next week are reasonably clear: We should drive a hard bargain on Marcona—but should get it, restoring relations to “normal”. We should then make clear to both Foreign Minister de la Puente (who is a childhood friend of Morales Bermudez) and Prime Minister Arbulu that, though we want to cooperate with Peru—even on defense matters—we are very concerned at the implications of an SU–22 purchase. We should:

—review all the potential negative consequences of the SU–22 for Peru’s development, and for its regional and hemispheric relations;

—indicate that you intend to take the situation up personally with Foreign Minister de la Puente when you see him in New York; and

—conclude, without explicit threats, that should Peru make such a purchase in any case, we will have to draw our own conclusions.

Our subsequent actions will clearly have to be guided by the response we receive. But there can be little doubt that Peru’s military involvement with the Soviet Union will continue, and that our efforts to limit its consequences will remain a source of recurring headaches.

1. Summary: Shlaudeman and Lord advised Kissinger to stress to Peruvian officials the negative consequences of their purchase of SU–22 aircraft from the Soviet Union.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P760154–1688. Secret. Drafted by Einaudi and Patton. In telegram 249016 to Lima, October 7, the Department instructed the Embassy to pass a letter from Kissinger to de la Puente in which Kissinger regretted it was not possible to meet at the UNGA in New York. (Ibid., D760378–0001)