320. Memorandum of Conversation1

PARTICIPANTS

  • The United States

    • The Secretary
    • Under Secretary Rogers
    • Under Secretary Maw
    • Luigi R. Einaudi, S/P—Notetaker
    • Anthony Hervas, Interpreter
  • Peru

    • Foreign Minister de la Flor
    • Secretary General Marchand
    • OAS Ambassador Alvarado

de la Flor: You look marvelous. Work is obviously the best preserver of youth.

The Secretary: I certainly had a marvelous time in Lima last February. It is a beautiful city. In fact, I understand you may hold the extraordinary session of the General Assembly in Lima next year.

de la Flor: Yes. This is a point I want to raise with you after the photographers leave.

The Secretary: When I walk into the OAS I see so many personal friends that it is always a pleasure. You are one of the best.

de la Flor: I can say the same. I can reciprocate fully. And I do not say that in official terms. The future will be the best way to reveal that this is so. After neither of us is in office any longer, I will invite you to visit Lima, with your wife, and to stay with me.

The Secretary: Yes, we will be friends when both of us are out of office . . . in 1981.

de la Flor (laughs): I doubt you will retire. You may reach 1980, but I doubt I will.

The Secretary: It will be difficult for you, too, to leave. You have done much.

de la Flor: No, it will not be difficult. I have already been out of the Army too long.

[Page 864]

The Secretary: You intend to go back to troop command?

de la Flor: I must. My job is exhausting. I have had too many problems with the United States . . . Maw won’t let me sleep.

The Secretary: You, too, give us some worries. What is holding up a settlement on Marcona?

de la Flor: We have some problems. We will be talking further with Dr. Maw tomorrow.

The Secretary: Dr. Maw? [turning to Maw] Are you a Dr.? [to de la Flor] Had I known, I would not have hired him.

Maw: I am a J.D.

The Secretary: I am a professor. Those lawyers’ degrees fool generals, not me.

de la Flor: He is a good man.

The Secretary: We will go to the limit. We want no victories. We do not want to put anyone in a difficult position. [turning to Maw] Have you reached an agreement on when you will get together?

Maw: Yes, tomorrow.

The Secretary: Let’s see if we can’t resolve this now. We are really close. [to Maw] What is the sticking point?

Maw: There is a small cash problem.

The Secretary: There is a difference in amount?

Maw: Yes, but we can compromise if we can get an equivalent to cash.

The Secretary [to both men]: Look, we are too close to break down now. Talk tomorrow, if you can’t reach an agreement then, we can talk again this week.

de la Flor: We have talked to Maw a great deal. The big point for us is the financing. Marcona has been very hard. But the financing is now the only factor. The basic understanding is a good one.

The Secretary: It’s true. That is why we want to clean this up. Maw is a good friend of mine. You understand the pressures that we are working under. We have used the utmost flexibility. I think it would be better to settle this now.

Maw: We are meeting at 9:30 tomorrow.

The Secretary [to Maw]: Good. And you will stay until you finish.

[To de la Flor] While in office you have nationalized everything you could. Soon you will have nothing left to repay.

de la Flor: No. But this is a good solution—for the company, for the United States and for Peru.

Maw: The proposal is self-financing.

The Secretary: Well, you will discuss it tomorrow, not now. Tomorrow we will let neither of you out of the room. [to de la Flor] Don’t [Page 865] worry about being outnumbered. In any case Einaudi is an agent of yours. We sometimes think he should worry more about the US than Peru.

de la Flor: We know he is a friend. We like him very much. Now I am even being attacked because he gets too much from me because of our personal friendship. But when the friendship of countries is involved, all else is secondary.

The Secretary: You will not be returning soon to the Army?

de la Flor: At the latest by the end of the year. Politically, my position has been eroded. I have had too many problems with the United States.

The Secretary: You have done much to improve our relations and to make confrontation between us impossible.

de la Flor: That has been my purpose from the beginning; since January 1972, when I became Foreign Minister.

The Secretary: Yes. You are my senior.

de la Flor: In position, yes; in politics, no.

[Omitted here is a discussion of OAS reform.]

The Secretary: Let’s talk about the meeting we are attending now.

First, there is the human rights question. This involves two problems. We want to state our convictions on the importance of fundamental human rights. Second, we don’t want to elaborate a new form of intervention. What we will do is make a general statement without attacking any particular country. We will call attention to the IAHRC report on Chile and say that the United States is worried by conditions there. But we will not ask the Assembly to do anything except in general terms. We will also call attention to Cuba. But we will not ask for any resolution.

What do you think?

de la Flor: Peru’s position is also one of principle. We do not want to alarm Chile which is our immediate neighbor. I agree with you on the need for norms to define the functions of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. Sometimes in the name of human rights there is excessive intervention. I believe we have the same position.

The Secretary: I have been told some of my colleagues expect great things. We are not here for theater.

de la Flor: Yes, we had heard of possible announcements on Chile.

The Secretary: The press wants to hear me say something. But my job is foreign policy. What I will say will be based on my responsibilities, not on what makes good press.

de la Flor: What you say will be well received.

The Secretary: I will be very firm on human rights in general and I will mention the IAHRC report on Chile.

[Page 866]

de la Flor: I feel that is a highly respected position. I also think, as a neighboring country of Chile, that it is important to avoid major problems.

[Omitted here is a discussion of OAS reform, the Generalized System of Preferences and the International Resource Bank]

de la Flor: You have just been to Bolivia. I saw in press reports that you favor Bolivia’s outlet to the sea.

The Secretary: Yes. But I didn’t say whether the outlet was to be to the Atlantic or the Pacific.

de la Flor: True, but there is still an important issue. When you say that the solution will contribute to peace and development in Latin America, others will think you support the Chilean proposal.

Peru believes the outlet should guarantee peace and development. But if there is no port, there can be no development. If there is no port, there can be no peace. We consider the Bolivian corridor should not become another Danzig. Clemenceau warned Danzig would lead to the Second World War, and Danzig led to the conflict between German and Poland. We do not want such an outcome. We do not want war in this part of the world. You know that. Though I am a soldier, I want peace.

The Secretary: How could this lead to war? You are opposed to a corridor?

de la Flor: No. The issue is that the Chileans propose a corridor without a port.

The Secretary: Could Bolivia build one?

de la Flor: You know they could not. The costs would be prohibitive.

The Secretary: Nevertheless, if what you say is true, a corridor without a port could conceivably lead to a war between Bolivia and Chile, but not with Peru.

de la Flor: Theoretically. But their fear of the north, and their efforts to obtain a port, would eventually involve Peru as well.

The Secretary: I am told Peru has so many Soviet tanks that you are running out of spare parts and room to put them.

de la Flor: Chile has just as many US tanks.

But the point is, we want peace. And we want no false solutions to endanger peace.

The Secretary: I am not applying any pressure. This is something for the negotiating parties to resolve. You have said you will study the matter. Beyond what I have already said, no more is needed.

de la Flor: We are talking with Chile to seek a solution.

The Secretary: It is not our responsibility.

de la Flor: Yes. But it is our responsibility.

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The directing ideals of US foreign policy are basic, regardless of government. This gives coherence. We do the same. That is why we do not accept pressures. We do not have power like the United States. But I can affirm that the presence of other countries in the corridor negotiations could create problems.

You also know other foreign elements want to create confusion. The communists are doing everything possible to stir up trouble over this issue.

The Secretary: We will not be active. We want a positive solution. We will not put forth what it should be. You will hear no more from me on this.

But I hope we will be seeing a good deal more of each other. My wife wants to visit Peru.

de la Flor: In that case, we will not let you in alone again.

  1. Summary: Kissinger and de la Flor discussed a prospective settlement for Marcona and Peruvian-Chilean relations.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820118–1635. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Einaudi on January 13, 1977. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s suite. Kissinger and de la Flor were in Santiago for an OASGA meeting. A record of the de la Flor-Maw conversation has not been found.