Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

303. Telegram 10425 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State¹

Lima, December 11, 1974, 1111Z.

10425. Department Pass S/PC for Einaudi. Subject: The United States and the Peruvian Revolution.

Summary: This message reviews the Peruvian revolution, American interests, and problems affecting our relations. With the signature last February of the agreement resolving outstanding investment disputes, we expected that relations would improve markedly and they did to some extent. However, at the same time, the Velasco Government has recently adopted a number of radical measures. Faced with mounting domestic opposition and economic problems it has become prone to blame the United States (the CIA and external conspiracies) for many of its troubles any may be inclined to reduce further the United States presence, official and unofficial, in this country. U.S.-Peruvian relations appear designed to undergo continual strains as the Peruvian Government broadens and deepens the Peruvian Revolution. We cannot now say how new ministers taking office will influence the general course or specific policies of the revolution. However, the basic thrust and objectives of the revolution are in any event expected to be pursued by the new ministerial team under Velasco’s direction. End summary

1. The Peruvian Revolution. In 1968, with popular support, President Velasco overthrew his predecessor (President Fernando Belaunde) and ushered in a series of sweeping, nationalistic changes. Velasco set out to assert Peru’s economic and cultural independence by drastically reducing traditional foreign (primarily U.S.) influences in Peru while expanding ties with the communist countires. He also undertook to restructure society, sharply curtailing the Peruvian private sector and dismantling the parliamentary system which existed in Peru. The revolution has declared that it favors state and worker-controlled (social property) enterprises, and promised to reorganize society on a “particapatory” basis suggestive of corporatism. It has applied a far-reaching program to redistribute virturally all of the large estates. The Peruvian reforms have been enacted by a military government which shows no signs of relinquishing its control of Peru. In the course of this year, the government has all but abolished an independent press and purged the navy of ranking moderates. The government has also become preoccupied with domestic and alleged foreign opposition. The regime says it sees CIA’s hand behind many of its troubles, which tactic also is a useful device to cow its domestic opponents. The worsening world economic situation has exacerbated the government’s headaches as inflationary pressures have compounded domestic discontent with over six years of Velasco rule. The President at 64, and with a history of serious circulatory disorders, has grown more arbitrary and apparently is bent on pushing through more radical measures during his remaining time. So far, Velasco’s opponents have not shown themselves capable of challenging his rule, although recently there have been a few scattered but inconclusive reports that the army—which has the final say on how Peru is run—may be tiring of Velasco. Even so, the United States must continue to deal with Velasco and face the prospect that, advised as he is by a coterie of leftist military and civilian advisors, he will continue to whittle away at our interests and presence unless Prime Minister Designate Morales Bermúdez serves as a moderating influence. Concern exists also about Peru’s revanchist intentions toward Chile. Since the inception of the revolution, the Peruvian Armed Forces have spent heavily on weapons and become the first South American Military Forces to acquire Soviet arms. It seems highly illogical for Peru to embark on a military adventure against Chile but GOP arms purchases and the unpredictable behavior of President Velasco are worrisome. Although improbable, a war by miscalculation cannot be ruled out because of the increased Peruvian and Chilean military presence in the border area, where an incident might get out of control.

2. American interests

(A) The security field. The United States predominant role in hemispheric security is being challenged by Peru which has assumed leadership in questioning the validity of the Rio Pact, as it now stands, and has purchased Soviet arms (up to now 200 or more Soviet tanks and a few helicopters). Concern arises over what use Peru might put its Soviet arms to, whether more Soviet weaponry might not be acquired, and over Soviet intentions. Peru continues to express interest in American weaponry, and will be receiving shortly 131 armored personnel carriers, S2E antisubmarine surveillance aircraft, 24 A–37B jet trainers and other U.S. matériel. In addition, Peru is anxious to purchase an additional 280 armored carriers and appears seriously interested in F5E jet fighters.

(B) The economic field. Peru is rich in minerals (copper, lead, zinc, and possibly exportable quantities of petroleum). U.S. investment in the extractive field totals well over a billion dollars; $50 to $100 million is invested in other areas. In 1973, U.S. exports to Peru totalled $413 million, which represents over 30 percent of Peru’s imports. Peru has become a champion of raw material producers’ organizations, notably the Copper Producers’ Organization (CIPEC), and has announced that it will seek eventual full control of mining and carry out all petroleum operating in Peru.

(C) The political field. Since 1968, Peru has espoused a “third world” foreign policy, voting often but not always against us in the United Nations, Organization of American States and other world forums. Peru has a vice-presidency in the non-aligned conference organization and plans to host NAC meeting in 1975. Peru is also a vocal advocate of the 200-mile territorial sea position and has, in the past, captured U.S. fishing boats. The last seizure took place in early 1973. This country is a major producer of coca and we are making a serious effort here to try to stop the illicit flow of narcotics to the United States; Peru has been cooperative in this regard.

3. Bilateral Questions

(A) The American presence. Nationalism verging on xenophobia is motivating force in the Peruvian Revolution. To some extent, this means a return to Peruvian sources of inspiration as the country exalts it’s Inca heritage and downgrades Spanish and more recent American influences. In practice, the Revolution has drawn on Yugoslav and Cuban precepts among others, a mix served up by Peru’s leftist intelligentsia with close ties to key military leaders. Peru seeks to diminish the role of private enterprise and to limit individual liberties, substituting for parliamentary democracy a system founded on organized “bases” such as campesinos [trade?] workers. Peru rejects democracy as the U.S. understands it as unsuited to the task of incorporating the “zmarginados” (dispossessed) into the social order. The totality of U.S. influences brought to bear on Peru may be decreed by GOP to be antithetical to these tenets of the Peruvian “process”. In order to reduce U.S. influence, the revolution seems to be seeking to limit our presence. The explusion of the peace corps probably represents an effort to purge the country of “alienating” foreign influences notwithstanding the government-controlled press charge that the volunteers were spies. Next to go could be missionary groups, such as the Mormons, and even USIS binational centers. There may also be an attempt to close or limit the activities of foreign news agencies, including AP and UPI. GOP attitudes toward aid are ambivalent, particularly in the presidential palace and to much lesser extent in the technical ministries. There was a report that President Velasco wanted to turn down a recent $10 million rural development loan. In any event, the GOP accepted the loan and gave it widespread, favorable publicity. Finally, there is Peru’s CIA syndrome. President Velasco and his supporters, surveying admitted U.S. actions in Chile and the recent declarations of CIA Director Colby, and in need of a whipping boy, have turned on the CIA—though without turning up any evidence whatsoever of misbehavior. USG protestations of innocence, both public and private, have so far fallen largely on deaf ears.

(B) Military cooperation. The United States seeks to maintain close military ties with Peru in order to limit communist country influence in the field of defense and maintain a relationship with an institution that has dominated Peru’s independent history. However, due to U.S. Congressional restrictions and our own perceptions of what Peru needs or does not need, our military relations have been uneven despite Peru’s traditional preference for American training and hardware. In 1967, the USG refused to sell supersonic jet aircraft to Peru; the GOP bought Mirages. In 1973, after FMS credits had been turned off and on, due to fishing boat seizures, and due also to unbeatable prices, Peru purchased Soviet tanks. Today, we are holding up a Peruvian request to make a second purchase of armored personnel carriers after they already bought 130 from the U.S. We are also hesitant to provide Peru (and Latin America) with a variety of weapons such as TOW anti-tank missiles and helicopter gunships. While we might invoke security grounds for not providing some weapons systems, in other cases the GOP can perceive that we are acting paternalistically as far as Peru is concerned e.g. the lack of approval for more APC’s. In Peru’s eyes, our unwillingness to contribute to the Peru/Chile arms imbalance constitutes interference in their security affairs and disregards Peru’s other concerns about its borders with Brazil and Ecuador. Furthermore, if Peru can afford to buy something, why should the USG refuse to sell? The Peruvians may otherwise again respond by shopping in the USSR or Europe. (The former’s political motives and the latter’s credit terms also vex the Peruvians, who may wind up irritated with all their arms suppliers.) Given U.S. policy of treating Peru and Chile evenhandedly, we must simply bear with Peruvian grievances. Dispite our ups and downs, they give few signs of wanting to dispense with U.S. arms or become dependent on the Soviets. This might not be the case if the United States refused to provide a modest (current FMS levels) amount of military credits to Peru because of a possible Congressional ban on military credits for Chile. Such a policy might precipitate the further radicalization of Peru. It would needlessly alienate those professional military who see arms acquisition not in political terms but as a means to fulfill their duty of defending the country.

(C) Peru/Chile rivalry. It is impossible to disassocate U.S. arms assistance from Peru’s rivalry with Chile. Any military aid to Chile is resented in Peru. Delays on Peruvian requests are interpreted as favoritism toward Chile. We must live with accusations by either side that we are unfair. More worrisome is the potential threat to hemispheric peace posed by Peruvian matériel superiority over Chile, particularly if additional Soviet arms or, for that matter, arms from any origin, further increase that superiority. The Embassy does not believe that Peru, faced with internal division, economic problems and Pinochet’s fearsome (compared to Allende’s) military regime, would go to war now. Unless Peruvian arms acquisitions or the stationing of its forces point more clearly in the direction of war, notwithstanding President Velasco’s penchant for dramatic action, at this juncture the Embassy discounts the likelihood of warfare deliberately begun by Peru. Should it occur, there is a possibility that Chile would seek American mediation. Peru would probably prefer to have the problem aired before its “third world” friends at the U.N. The Peru/Chile situation is an endemic contingency which must be watched continually.

(D) Future nationalizations. The Revolution’s Inca ban, published in July, states unequivocally Peru’s intention to control its mineral wealth. This probably means the eventual nationalization of two large American mining enterprises: Marcona (iron) and Southern Peru (copper). Miners’ Unions to the left of the government are calling for their immediate expropriation. Nevertheless, development needs for foreign capital temper the government’s demands and it appears more likely that Peru will negotiate Marcona’s amicable takeover while biding its time with Southern Peru. In the petroleum field, service contracts with the U.S. oil companies will probably be respected pending a hoped for but by no means assured petroleum bonanza. Paer can be counted on to bargain hard with U.S. mineral companies, while keeping an eye cocked to foreign credit markets so as not to close external capital doors. The realization that the communist countires cannot supplant western capital purveyors is a further restraint on rash action.

(E) Foreign economic policy. A champion of raw material producers’ organizations such as CIPEC (copper) and OPEC (petroleum), Peru subscribes to efforts to artifically raise mineral resource prices. Each and every time the United States threatens to try to hold down such prices, Peru will react as a “third world” country and accuse us of engaging in econimic aggression. This appears to be an area where Peru will be intransigent. In general terms, it leads the chorus in denouncing multinational corporations and supports the Latin hard line on the transfer of science and technology. In its policy toward foreign investment, it resists any significant liberalization of the Andean Pact’s decision 24 and applies these regulations more stringently than other members of the Pact. It adheres to the Calvo doctrine and reacts strongly against real or imangined infringement of economic sovereignty. When local critics charged that provisions for foreign arbitration in the Japanese oil pipeline contract were in conflict with the constitution, the government charged them with being unpatriotic and counterrevolutionary. It deported some, jailed others, and closed publications where those criticisms first appeared. When an editor pointed out that, as a result of the “Greene Agreement”, the GOP had tacitly exonerated IPC from several hundred millions of dollars in tax claims, the GOP closed his magazine and brought suit against him. The GOP’s reaction to the payment of several million dollars to Exxon for IPC (under Greene Agreement) is likely to be equally sharp.

(F) Foreign political policy. Peru’s stance on “third world” political issues still shows a little flexibility in world forums. The tendency is nonetheless to side with the Afro-Asian majority on topics such as Vietnam, the Middle East and Africa (it votes against us), and to resist joining that bloc on Korea and Cambodia (where high-level lobbying by the U.S. and others has so far gained abstentions). Within the OAS, Peru has denounced traditional U.S. primacy. It seeks to reincorporate Cuba into that body and rewrite the Rio Pact, with a provision for sanctions for economic aggression. Peru will probably favor a Latin American move to form an organization without the U.S.

(G) Fisheries dispute. Peru has shown no willingness to compromise its 200-mile territorial sea claim and appears convinced that its thesis will triumph at the Law of the Sea Conference. Peru believes that time is on its side and therefore is in no hurry for a world regime regulating this issue. The result will be that U.S. tuna boats will risk detention every fishing season, unless Peru looks the other way for reasons of its own (e.g. GOP hopes for U.S. military and economic assistance).

(H) Narcotics cooperation. The United States attaches high priority to arresting the illicit flow of narcotics to the United States from Peru, a major producer of coca. Elements of the military government are concerned over coca traffic and have cooperated with us in this field despite peasant resistance to production controls on a traditional, easily grown cash crop.

(I) Civil air negotiations. Peru’s tough approach to international negotiations is manifest in the current round of civil air talks. Peru’s postion amounts to de facto rejection of the Bermuda principle and insistence an “equality” as measured by equivalence of operations. It regards traffic to and from Peru as an exploitable natural resource and insists that if Braniff’s services are greater than Aeroperu’s, then Braniff must pay for this “privilege”. Peru’s “take it or leave it” approach is based apparently on the belief that Braniff has more to lose as a result of curtailment of its profitable routes to Peru than does the fledgling Aeroperu. Peru expects the United States to accede to Peruvian demands. Peru appears to have been able to line up support for its policies in countires such as Ecuador and Bolivia, which increases pressures on Braniff.

(J) U.S. Bank Credits. Peru’s foreign borrowing requirments in 1975 will be very high—perhaps as much as $11 billion—if it is to maintain reasonable balance of payments equilibrium. Opinion in banking circles is divided over whether banks will be willing to acquire this much more Peruvian paper; certainly interest rates will be higher and probably repayment periods will be shorter. Peru is likely to regard a real credit squeeze as a retaliatory, capitalist action against the revolution, and Peruvian rhetoric would contribute little to improve the situation.

(K) U.S. attitudes toward the Peruvian states. Up to now, the generally nonrepressive nature of the Peruvian revolution has resulted in few outcries in the U.S. over civil liberties in Peru. With the takeover of the Peruvian press, however, the American press has begun to editorialize about the Peruvian “dictatorship”. If middle class opposition and possibly terrorism grow more serious, the regime is likely to adopt tougher measures against its opponents. Such measures could stir up U.S. public opinion against Peru, as could any dramatic increase in Soviet/Cuban arms and influence.

4. Comment: Going beyond innovative reforms, which included land redistribution, the industrial community, education reform and a determination to reduce the country’s dependence on outsiders (notably ourselves), in 1974 the Peruvian revolution embarked on a more radical course aimed at accelerating the creation of a new society. Peruvian ideologues speak of a new man, one who works for society as a whole and not entirely, or even largely, for individual profit. In order to reform human nature, and revolution seeks to purge Peruvian society of foreign influences. While private enterprise and western influence is chipped away, local Marxists—with major support by Soviets, Cubans and other communist countries—lend their support to the military governors, hoping to inherit the new state. The reforming zeal of the Velasco regime is real but so is its desire to hold on to power by debilitating rival power centers (political parties, the business class, land-holders, foreign interests, professional groups and unions) and incorporating the population into “participatory” groups. The first years of the revolution went more or less smoothly thanks to a reasonably united armed forces (Army, Navy, Air Force); pragmatic economic management (under Prime Minister-Designate Morales Bermúdez); and high prices for Peruvian exports. There was also widespread civilian disenchantment with the way Peru had been run prior to 1968. More recently, the revolution has been marked by arbitrary rule, a divided Armed Forces (although no significant cracks have appeared in the army’s unity), economic dislocation and growing opposition including limited terrorism (presumably from the fearful middle class and disgruntled navy elements).

5. President Velasco apparently has no inclination to slow the pace of the revolution and, stimulated by a left wing advisers, appears intent on restructuring Peruvian society. When things go wrong, as they are bound to in any revolution, Velasco blames foreign devils (the CIA) for many of his troubles. This bodes poorly for the U.S.-Peruvian relations. In addition, Velasco seems intent on reducing the U.S. role (our presence and interests) before his time in power runs out.

6. U.S. Peruvian relations will outlast Velasco. Pending change, we are engaged in a damage-limiting operation, one which preserves our interests and our self-respect despite a possible further reduction in our presence. The revolution has not yet penetrated deeply into society. While many reforms are probably irreversible, a new government might well seek to reduce the class divisions and xenophobia stirred up by Velasco (and Sinamos). The Army, which has the power to decide whether Velasco must go—unless illness overcomes him first—is generally moderate (albeit nationalistic and reform-minded) and leans toward U.S. technology and arms. It presumably does not want a confrontation with the U.S., nor with Chile, that might isolate Peru further in the region and risk defeat. The U.S. should sustain military cooperation at present levels, trying to limit Peru’s arms purchases by not raising present FMS credit levels and refusing to sell weaponry to Peru which might give it too decisive a military edge over Chile. (This message does not speculate about the possibility of further Peruvian arms purchases of Soviet weaponry which could force US to review our whole policy toward this country, depending on the nature of a USSR-Peru deal.) We should also try to stay in the aid game at the present momentum without increasing bilateral assistance beyond CASP levels. While not antagonizing Velasco, we should be careful not to appease him. As a strong man, he would take such a stance as a sign of weakness and probably interpret our posture as one of inability or unwillingness to check his actions against American interests. He might thereby be more tempted to damage those interests (e.g. in the economic field or in his dealings with the communist countries).

7. The question exists whether Peru might be ruled differently when pragmatic General Morales Bermúdez becomes Prime Minister on February 1. A deliberate man, Morales Bermúdez would probably act cautiously at first, testing Velasco’s strength and testing his own popularity within the army. However, up to now, no one has been able to stand in Velasco’s way and it is likely that he will continue to set the basic course of the revolution as long as he remains in power.

Dean

1. Summary: The Embassy transmitted an analysis of the long-term implications of Peru’s 1968 revolution.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740359–0838. Secret.