301. Memorandum From Stephen Low of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1

SUBJECT

  • Our Posture in Peru

As I mentioned in the staff meeting, I am concerned that our posture in Peru could be exploited to our disadvantage in the event of a coup attempt there. There are increasingly insistent reports that a coup against Velasco may be mounted very soon. The latest report, from a good source, predicts that a coup attempt could take place as soon as Thursday, the 31st. These reports are given substance by the number of known explosions which have occurred recently in Lima, the public reports of corruption in high levels in the Peruvian government, and the intention recently expressed by the President to modify military retirement regulations.

If a coup occurred it would be stimulated by more moderate elements of the Navy, supported by Army and Air Force officers. There are two possible outcomes: either it would be successful, or it would be suppressed as a result of a Velasco crackdown.

On at least four recent occasions, U.S. officials or Americans known to be close to them have been informed by Peruvians in Lima that a coup was imminent. [3 lines not declassified]

In the event a coup is attempted and is successful, there will be many in this country who will see this as another in the line of U.S. interventions beginning with Bolivia in August 1971 and including Chile in September 1973, and now Peru, which have gradually eliminated the radical governments of South America. We will be asked immediately whether we had any prior knowledge of the coup and what we did with this information. If a government crackdown thwarts [Page 808] the coup attempt, as is more likely, it is quite possible that American contacts with plotters may come to the surface and we will be charged with intervention.

In either event, it strikes me that appropriate steps should be taken very promptly to indicate to the Peruvian government that we have had reports of plotting but assuring the GOP that we immediately disassociated ourselves from such contacts and made clear we would do nothing to encourage any action of this kind. Secondly, I think the Ambassador should be warned to keep a very low profile and be willing to sacrifice reporting responsibilities for maintenance of a posture of non-involvement.

I expressed these views to ARA (both to Rogers and Shlaudeman) and to CIA. It is too late to take action now before the 31st. If that date passes without incident, I may come back to you to ask help in getting State action.

  1. Summary: Low informed Scowcroft of coup plotting in Peru and recommended that Dean be advised to keep a low profile in order to maintain a posture of non-involvement.

    Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, 1974–1977, Box 6, Peru, 1. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Scowcroft wrote “OK” on the memorandum and initialed it. In telegram 9200 from Lima, October 30, the Embassy informed the Department of coup-plotting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D740310–0428) On October 31, the Department passed telegram 9200 to the directors of the USCINCO, CIA, DIA, and the Chairman of the JCS. (Telegram 239218 to USCINCSO, October 31; ibid., D740310–0947) No instruction to Dean to maintain a low profile has been found.